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CHAPTER 1: 
1. O Introduction To The Research 
" it would appear that long-range planning 
often goes astray because management often tries 
to forecast the future with the approach of the past. 
For it will plan for the future by emphasizing that 
the corporation must adapt itself to change as it 
occur, rather then anticipating or planning for it." 
Jack Friedman, "Long Range Planning and Cloudy 
Horizons", Dun's Review, Vol. 81, January, 1963, p. 
42. 
1.1 The Research Problem 
Statement Of The Problem 
This thesis proposes an examination of the Strategic Management 
field, focusing specifically on the complex issue of designing an 
optimum time-frame perspective for effective corporate strategic 
management within the dynamic and demanding operating 
environment of the United States of America ( Kagono 1985 p. 138) 
(Yamada 1981p.10). 
While a great deal of research has been done in the field of Strategic 
Management in recent years the specialized, niche area of duration 
perspective in terms of strategic management has been over looked 
as an important tool for aligning corporate strategy with the 
operating environment and corporate strategic objectives. 
"In fact, as a strategic weapon, time is the 
equivalent of money, productivity, quality, 
even innovation. " 
William Shanklin, Six Timeless Marketing 
Blunders, The Journal of Business and 
Industrial Marketing, Vol. 2 No. 2 1987, p. 41. 
Thi~. complex strategic duration factor is a perpetual dynamic matrix 
of issues. The operating environment is incessantly evolving at 
variable rates which places pressure on strategic management to 
provide a balance between its role as corporate mission leader and 
1 
the changing realities of the operating environment. 
Further, while strategic decisions are present time-fixed their 
results and effects are future time-variable. Therefore the degree 
of tolerance allowed for, in terms of the reality factor, is at best an 
educated estimation. Consequently the strategic duration element 
within strategic perspective is critical to the outcome of the strategy 
(Amara 1983 p. 43). 
The collision of corporate strategy and the reality factor occurs 
within the confines of the calculated, computed yet inherent 
ignorance (Bartlett 1990 p. 140) of the precise future commercial 
milieu. Hence the importance of managing the duration factor so as 
to capitalize corporate resources upon the "impending" operating 
environment as and when appropriate opportunities are identified 
within the process of corporate strategic management. 
This point, as to the important consequence of the duration 
perspective, is further exaggerated when one considers the 
perpetual alignment of scarce corporate resources with an evolving 
operating environment. The matrix results of this alignment must be 
understood in terms of the timing factor. 
Therefore, it may be argued that until a satisfactory study is 
conducted into this vital specialty and a more scientific 
understanding of the duration factor and the related implications, 
between and amongst, the long and short-term models of strategic 
management the field of strategic management will continue to 
contribute to corporate management in a less than optimum mode. 
Further, the incessant increase in the complexity and pace of 
corporate operating environments makes this research urgent and 
crucial (Carlson 1990 pp. 15-19). 
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1. 2 The Subproblems 
The first subproblem is to determine and define the nature and 
characteristics of the short-term performance based strategic 
management model as found in the American strategic perspective. 
The second subproblem is to determine and define the nature and 
characteristics of the long-term strategic management model as found 
in the Japanese strategic perspective. 
The third subproblem is whether the Japanese strategic perspective 
is altered (why, to what degree and in which direction) when a 
Japanese corporation operates within the American economy (Bowman 
1986) (Binder 1991). 
The forth subproblem is the promotion of a strategic perspective 
able to effect an efficient working union between the long and short-
term matrix demands (investors, institutional and other, the 
financial markets, the corporation and the external operating 
environment) (Tylecote 1987 pp. 47, 51, 54) placed upon corporate 
strategic management within the American operating environment 
(Snow 1973 p. 14). 
"Interestingly, though, over half (52 
percent) felt that the Japanese would 
in turn be influenced by the American 
culture, and that the longer the period 
of operation in this country, the greater 
the probability that the company would 
be increasingly Americanized." 
James Bowman et al, Japanese Management 
in America: Experts Evaluate Japanese 
Subsidiaries, SAM Advanced Management 
Journal, Vol. 51, No. 22 Summer 1986, 
p. 24. 
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1. 3 The Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis is that an independent and viable strategic 
management model (in terms of academic theory) has emerged in the 
United States of America based on a short-term performance 
perspective (Saeed 1990 p. 57). This short-term performance model 
(Okumura 1973 p. 30) plays an important role in the strategic 
management of American business today (Burton 1989, p. 169). 
Therefore, appropriate usage or component usage of this "new" 
management tool is critical to the competitive success of American 
business and the incessant development of Strategic Management 
Theory. 
The second hypothesis is that Japan is an excellent example of the 
long-term strategic perspective model ( Tyecote 1987 p. 138) 
( Kangono 1985 p. 30). An examination of this Japanese perspective 
will enable the research to compare it to the American perspective 
and two, the perspective of Japanese corporations operating within 
the United States of America, that is Japanese-American 
corporations. 
"The unimpressive history of long-range 
planning in the U.S. would be less vexing 
if Japanese companies were floundering too. 
Alas, it seems many of them are succeeding." 
Anne, B. Fisher, Is Long Range Planning Worth 
It?, Fortune Magazine Vol. 121, No. 9, 1990, 
p. 138. 
The third hypothesis is that to the extent that Japanese-American 
corporations have adopted the American Strategic Duration 
Perspective (SDP.) (Ibuka 1982 p. 3) serves to confirm, that the 
short-term market driven American approach is arguably positive 
and may be considered (in general) an optimum approach for that 
particular (American) operating environment. However, to the 
extent that Japanese-American corporations have retained their 
long-term strategic perspective (Ibuka 1982 p. 3) with positive 
corporate results, would put into question the validity of the 
American Strategic Duration Perspective. 
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The forth hypothesis is that the future optimum corporate strategic 
perspective necessitates a combination of long and short-term 
performance perspectives in order to optimize the resource allocation 
decisions which collectively make up corporate management and 
which must account for both the long and short-term requirements, 
demands (Yee 1990) competition and opportunities of the American 
operating environment (Fisher 1990 p. 138). 
Further, that the strategic perspective of Japanese-American 
corporations will prove to be an important "yardstick" in the design 
of this strategic perspective model. The importance of this Japanese-
American contribution is directly related to the degree, or lack 
thereof, of adaptation/s made to compete within the American 
economy. As Lim (1981 pp. 18-21) suggested in his analysis of 
Japanese and American management skills; the study of Japanese 
management often reflect the adapted American management values 
of the past (Harper 1988 p. 45) (Rehder 1984 p. 27) (Bowman 1986 
p. 27). 
"In many ways, the lessons from 
the East help us to return to 
some old American values. 11 
H. Lim, Japanese Management: 
A Skill Profile, Training and 
Development Journal, Vol. 35, 
October 1981, p. 19. 
This is not to argue that a "Type J" or standard form answer exists 
or is suggested for strategic management in America (Ouchi 1981) 
(Harper 1988 p. 45). Rather, that through the process of 
understanding, analysing and measuring the respective strategic 
perspectives of American, Japanese and Japanese-American 
corporations one may develop an American Strategic Duration 
Perspective designed for operation within this unique economic 
complexion (Harper 1988 p. 43) (Gorovitz 1982 p. 9) (DeFrank 1985 
pp. 72, 76). 
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" . . . they could produce disaster, 
not success, if simply plugged into 
the American system." 
Thomas Maher, Condemning Japan While 
Imitating Her Management Techniques: 
No Solution for America's Problems 
SAM Advanced Management Journal, Vol. 
50, Winter, 1985, p. 32. 
The most important lesson America can learn from Japan is to develop 
a strategic perspective and model based on its own society, values 
and economic system. Essentially, that is what Japan did with 
American management techniques (Harper 1988 p. 43) (Rehder et al 
1984 p. 25), and it is the subject of this research in terms of an 
American Strategic Duration Perspective (Harper 1988 p. 46) • 
" They will need to be tailored to 
fit the unique circumstances of each 
American firm. " 
Stephen Harper, Now That the Dust has 
Settled: Learning from the Japanese 
Management, Business Horizons, Vol. 
31, No. 4, 1988, p. 46. 
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1. 4 Definition Of Terms 
Strategic Duration 
Perspective: 
Strategic Duration: 
is defined as the conceptual appreciation 
and concept of strategy and strategic 
management as related to a time 
perspective generally attributed to a 
particular Strategic Management Model, 
which in turn may be attributed generally 
to corporations and their staff operating 
in a particular operating environment 
within the global economy. 
is defined as the time-frame reference for 
a particular strategic model or a general 
Strategic Duration Perspective. 
Operating Environment: is defined as the inclusive, combined 
macro and micro dimension of a business 
milieu. 
Reality Factor: 
Objective Reality: 
Strategic Fatigue: 
is defined as the set of environmental 
elements that collectively represent the 
hard reality of the operating environment, 
as they unfold into the present and thus 
reality. 
is defined as a hypothetical perfect 
solution to every business challenge and 
or decision. 
is defined as real and possible factors 
contributing to the less than effective and 
or non-operation of a strategy or strategic 
program. 
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Applied Strategic 
Duration Perspective: 
Culturally Based 
is defined as the application of Strategic 
Duration Perspective in corporate 
operations and Operating Environment. 
Strategic Management: is defined as the process of developing 
principals of strategic management which 
reflect the fundamental holistic values of 
the respective Operating Environment. 
Objective Reality Based 
Strategic Management: is defined as the approximation of 
strategic management decisions and the 
Reality Factor. 
Strategic Time-Lapse: is defined as the inherent evolution of the 
internal and external Operating 
Environments which occurs between the 
point at which corporate resources are 
allocated by virtue of a corporate strategic 
decision and the point of investment 
return from that strategic allocation. 
Long-termism: 
Short-termism: 
is defined as a Strategic Duration 
Perspective which is long term in 
orientation and generally refers to the 
traditional Japanese model of strategic 
management. 
is defined as a Strategic Duration 
Perspective which is short term is 
orientation and generally refers to the 
American model of strategic management. 
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Strategic Management 
System: is defined as the all inclusive process and 
operation of a particular corporate 
strategic management program. 
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1. 5 Abbreviations 
A. 
AJ. 
DYCIM. 
J. 
JA. 
RF. 
OE. 
SD. 
SP. 
SOP. 
SM. 
WAP. 
SWOT. 
United States of America 
American corporations operating in Japan 
Dynamic Cross Impact Model 
Japan 
Japanese corporations operating in America 
Reality Factor 
Operating Environment 
Strategic D•.tration 
Strategic Perspective 
Strategic Duration Perspective 
Strategic Management 
Weighted Average Percentage 
An abbreviation for the Strength, Weakness, 
Opportunities and Threat analysis commonly used in 
strategic planning 
The abbreviations used in the graphs refer to the first letter/s from 
each word in the respective survey question option. 
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1. 6 Importance Of The Study 
Strategic management is an inherently innovative process and must 
therefore pursue theoretical competitive advantages to sustain its 
contribution to corporate management and commercial asset 
performance. 
11 estimates that demand for such advice 
(long-range planning) is rising about 
20% a year. 11 
Anne, B. Fisher, Is Long Range Planning Worth 
It'?, Fortune Magazine Vol. 121, No. 9, 1990, 
p. 137. (Researcher's emphasis in brackets) 
The time has come to manage the duration perspective of corporate 
strategy, an important management tool, at an optimum and 
specialized level. As Drucker in his article Long Range Planning, 
Management Science, April 1959 argued, no decision is isolated 
rather every decision has matrix corporate consequences in the 
present where they are made and in the future where their cause and 
effect takes place (Henderson 1984 p. 2) . 
Therefore, management and understanding of the duration 
perspective of these decisions is crucial. This argument was 
supported by a survey respondent, "This is an interesting and 
timely subject for your doctoral dissertation ... 11 excerpt from 
respondent's letter dated March 23, 1994 (see, Appendix 4) 
(responses are anonymous). 
This appreciation of the Duration Perspective necessitates the 
development and deployment of recent trends that have, and 
continue to emerge out of the competitive market environment, which 
redefine the strategic process within the corporation. 
Examples include, the short-term performance perspective, the 
development of time as a strategic advantage, flattening of the 
corporate structure and the deployment of vast technology which 
accelerates the metamorphosis of operations. 
The proposed study rejects the theory that a corporate strategic 
management program has either a long-term perspective or it is not 
11 
an effective strategy. In fact given the developments within the 
Operating Environment of American business today a narrow long-
term perspective would be a major error (Bartlett 1990 p. 139). 
The popular argument compares the long-term strategic perspective 
of the Japanese and their commercial success (Heenan 1990) with the 
relatively short-term perspective of the American corporations 
(DeFrank 1985 p. 64) and their recent economic problems (Burton 
1989 p. 172) (Marqurdt interview 1990) (England 1983); concluding 
that the solution is a rediscovery of the long-term strategic 
perspective to revitalize American resource allocation. 
The important point is that irrespective of the particular corporate 
strategic perspective, an approach to strategic management must be 
based upon a duration factor aligned with the unique elements and 
forces which make up a particular Operating Environment, rather 
then a predisposed "unattached" perspective (DeFrank 1985 p. 64) 
(Tung p. xviii). 
This factor is born out by the operating problems arising out of 
Japan's heavy investment (and more recent divesture) in American 
real estate in the 1980's, which has recently prompted a new 
Japanese investment strategy into high-tech American corporations. 
The latter strategy can be regarded as a more mature, quasi vertical 
integration investment strategy for the capital rich Japanese; as 
they desperately need American technology to fuel their product and 
market development needs (Powell 1991). 
It may be argued that in relation to the American markets, the 
development of the short-term performance based American strategic 
perspective is exactly that - an advancement of Strategic 
Management Theory! ( DeFrank 1985 p. 64) • 
Based upon the respective Operating Environments, America's 
strategic management requirements are very different from Japan's 
and therefore any extrapolation of Strategic Duration Perspective 
would be harmful (Johnson 1988 p. 35) • Further, the problem lies 
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not simply in the duration selected, but rather the use and 
management of a particular strategic perspective within the broader 
framework of corporate strategic management and the Operating 
Environment. This short-term trend (in America) represents a 
market driven response to the American Operating Environment, 
which Kono ( 1984} argues, Japanese managers would replicate under 
similar socio-economic conditions. 
"If they are to be fired by short-range 
performance, (talking about Japanese 
managers} which is usually the case in 
the USA, they would be short-sighted." 
Toyohiro Kono, Strategy and Structure of 
Japanese Enterprise, London, Macmillian, 
1984, p. 60. (Researcher's explanation 
in brackets) 
One of the important questions in this research is to test this 
argument for validity (and the degree thereof}, in an attempt to 
suggest an American Strategic Duration Perspective designed to 
successfully exploit the American Operating Environment as it is, 
and will be in the future, with its positive/negative attributes, from 
a strategic management point of view. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the exact character, 
definition and relationship with the market (investment factor and 
other factors) of this short-term Strategic Duration Perspective so 
as to devise a corporate strategic management model which is capable 
of providing both long-term mission culture and leadership, yet able 
to efficiently and effectively utilize the short-term performance 
strategic perspective to capitalize on the matrix dynamic of the 
Operating Environment in a manner cognitive of the multiple roles 
and pressures on the corporation within the American Operating 
Environment. That is a "living" Strategic Duration Perspective 
(Hambrick 1988 p. 48) (Gorvitz 1982 p. 10) (Burton 1989 p. 169) 
(Samiec: Saeed 1990 p. 57) . 
It is important to study the Japanese strategic perspective in order 
to understand how their approach deals with the increased level of 
operating complexity and dynamic in Japan. Further, to analyze the 
13 
Japanese corporate strategy as they operate and compete within the 
American commercial environment, ie. the Japanese-American Model. 
The hypothetical contention here is that these Japanese-American 
corporations will provide data pertinent to an evaluation and analysis 
of the American Strategic Duration Perspective in a comparative and 
relatively objective framework. 
"Naturally a company operating overseas should 
be able to find or create the management style 
most suitable to the host country. " 
Yukio Hasegawa, "Modifying the American Management 
System in the U.S." Tokyo Business Today, Vol. 58, 
No. 10, 1990, p. 52. 
If Japanese-American corporations have adopted (in some degree) 
the American Strategic Duration Perspective, then such will 
contribute to understanding the rational and quality of the short-
term Strategic Duration Perspective generally attributed to American 
corporations. To the extent that Japanese-American corporations 
have, or have not, adopted the American short-term performance 
SDP. reflects the degree to which the local Operating Environment 
contributes to this short-term Strategic Duration Perspective 
(Kagono 1985 pp. 114, 115). 
"The typical Japanese firm in the United 
States employs an approach to management 
distinctively different from the typical 
American firm. Rather then replicate the 
form developed in their native Japan, the 
firms modified their management to suit 
United States needs. Nonetheless, they 
retain a good deal of Japanese style and 
remain very different from most American 
firms. II 
William Ouchi, Theory Z: How American 
Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge, 
Addison-Wesley, 1981, p. 12. 
If, on the other hand the Japanese-American corporations have 
retained their traditional strategic perspective then this too reveals 
a great deal about the condition, motivation and direction of 
American corporate leaders. That is, if these Japanese corporations 
have retained their traditional Strategic Duration Perspective it 
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reflects the degree to which the American business's strategic 
perspective is motivated by extra-Operating Environmental factors, 
which is important. 
Ouchi's (1981) quote above strikes at the heart of the research's 
objective. That is, to evaluate the strategic perspective of Japan 
and America in their respective Operating Environments. Secondly, 
to compare these results with the Japanese-American Strategic 
Duration Perspective in an attempt to compare and understand the 
different perspectives of Japanese and American planners. Thirdly, 
to promote a Strategic Duration Perspective with the attributes to 
deal successfully with the future matrix of the American Operating 
Environment. 
"In these inherently riskier 
circumstances, strategic planning 
is no longer a luxury to be 
indulged only as time permits." 
Roy Amara, Business Planning for 
an Uncertain Future Scenarios & 
Strategies, Pergamon Press, 1983, 
p. 2. 
Japan and America were selected as research subjects because they 
represent, on many levels, what are considered to be apparent 
contrasting positions on the issue of Strategic Duration Perspective 
in corporate strategic management (Kono 1984 p. 12) (Lim 1981 p. 
21) . This is well represented in the Japanese purchasing strategy 
of long-term "Single Sarky", which as Ramsay (1990 pp. 2-5) 
describes, is in stark contrast to the Western Model. 
"We need a new model for American 
management that incorporates the 
strengths found in the Japanese 
and other systems." 
Stephen Harper, Now That the Dust 
Has Settled: Learning from the Japanese 
Management, Business Horizons, Vol. 31, 
No. 4, 1988, p. 50. 
Therefore, studying these respective approaches is enlightening, 
and by studying Japanese corporations operating within America this 
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researcher proposes to provide further insight into the American 
Strategic Duration Perspective (Rehder 1984 p. 26) . Further, this 
research will evidence the error of attempting to transpose or 
recreate the Japanese model in America. The optimum American 
Strategic Duration Perspective lies latent within the action and 
reaction matrix which is unique to the American operating milieu 
(Ramsay 1990 pp. 2-5). 
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1. 7 Proposed Model 
Operating environment of J. 
Strategic duration perspective of J. 
Operating environment of A. 
Strategic duration perspective of A. 
Operating environment of A. 
Strategic duration perspective of JA. 
Where: 
A. = 
AJ. = 
J. = 
JA. = 
OE. = 
SOP. = 
United States of America 
American corporations operating in Japan 
Japan 
Japanese corporations operating in America 
Operating Environment 
Strategic Duration Perspective 
The proposed model for this research must generate the following 
data: 
(a) The operating environment of J. 
( b) The strategic perspective of J. 
(c) The operating environment of A. 
( d) The strategic perspective of A. 
(e) The strategic perspective of JA. corporations 
(f) A comparative analysis of (b) and (d) 
( g) A comparative analysis of ( e) and ( f) 
The model has been designed to compare the realities of two 
operating environments and strategic perspectives of A. and J. 
respectively. 
Secondly, to isolate the strategic perspective of the respective J. 
and A. approaches, the model studies approach J. when operating 
within Operating Environment A., that is JA.. When considering 
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the Operating Environment of JA due caution will be given to 
amongst other things; longevity (Bowman 1986) of operation within 
America, establishing the degree and nature of affiliation (Ibuka 
1982 p. 3) with and to Operating Environment A. and the degree and 
conditions of affiliation with Operating Environment J. , in terms of 
"shadow management" accusations (Thackeray 1990) and "sandwich" 
structures (Amano 1979 p. 52). 
The study of Japanese-American corporations isolates the Strategic 
Duration Perspective of Japan within the American Operating 
Environment and provides an opportunity for a comparative analysis 
of the strategic perspectives of Japanese-American and American 
corporations. Such comparison will provide the data upon which 
solutions to the research question of identifying an optimum 
Strategic Duration Perspective for the American Operating 
Environment will be proposed. 
An analysis of these results is argued to reflect the variance 
between Japanese and American Strategic Duration Perspectives. 
Should such gap (between Japanese and American planners) not 
materialize this would be further indication of the American planners 
logic, rather then the extra-market influences argument, as such 
reconciliation of SDP. would indicate similar response based upon 
historically different perspectives. 
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1. 8 Organization Of The Research 
This research has been divided into six chapters including, 
acknowledgements, comprehensive bibliography and appendices. 
The first chapter deals with the definition of the problem and 
hypotheses. Chapter two focuses on the literature survey, 
developing a discussion on the various strategic management 
authors. Chapter three comprises of the research methodology and 
the respondent statistics. Chapter four analyzes and argues the data 
and hypotheses. Chapters five looks at South Africa and the 
application of Strategic Duration Perspective, discussing a similar 
study for this operating environment. Chapter six is the research 
summary and conclusion, followed by the bibliography. The 
appendices include survey instrument, supporting documents and 
correspondence. 
The emphasis has been on establishing a measurable level of the 
conceptual notion of Japanese and American Strategic Duration 
Perspective as it relates to the American operating environment. 
This objective draws on a broad range of factors for discussion and 
arguments, where appropriate the material and results are depicted 
graphically. 
The study has been based on two projects: 
Firstly, a literature based research project into the current and 
experimental material (including strategic management dissertations 
from American and Canadian universities) relevant to the Strategic 
Duration factor in strategic management within the (two) respective 
research Operating Environments and the respective Strategic 
Duration Perspectives of Japanese and American corporations. 
This is complimented by the second project, a cross sectional 
empirical survey of Japanese and American corporations trading on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange and USA Fortune 500 companies 
respectively. Due to the low response rate associated with this 
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method and targeted respondents, the study approached a sizable 
number of subject corporations so as to provide effective analysis. 
The survey is concise and simple to complete and return. An 
introduction explaining the SDP. concept was included. Participation 
was enhanced by a letter from the American Ambassador to Japan, 
Waltor Mondale. 
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1. 9 Scope And Methodology 
This research is an exploratory descriptive study to identify the 
Strategic Duration Perspective which is most likely to capitalize on 
the impending dynamic Operating Environment within the United 
States of America. 
Primary and secondary information sources were utilized for this 
research. The conclusions are based on published corporate level 
results, Strategic Duration Perspectives as gathered through the 
literature and a custom designed cross sectional survey targeting 
Japanese, American and Japanese-American corporate strategic 
decision makers. The objective is to access Japanese, American, and 
Japanese-American corporations from a spectrum of industries so as 
to justify the findings as being representative of a given Operating 
Environment rather then an industry or product-specific 
perspective. 
There are two attempts to isolate the conceptual element of Strategic 
Duration Perspective: 
One, the survey is designed to focus on the concept of Strategic 
Duration Perspective rather then on the execution and operation of 
strategy. 
Secondly, by comparing the Strategic Duration Perspective of 
Japanese corporations operating within the American Operating 
Environment (an environment that has resulted in a very different 
Strategic Duration Perspective approach then Japanese 
corporations) the researcher proposes that the data gathered from 
these Japanese-American corporations will contribute greatly to the 
understanding of the American Strategic Duration Perspective and 
two, the economic validity of the American Strategic Duration 
Perspective. 
As a further measure to produce reliable findings each of the three 
corporate categories (Japanese, American and Japanese-American) 
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were asked to offer their impression of the strategic management of 
the other categories. Comparing these results with the self-analysis 
done by these categories will depict the accuracy of these 
impressions and provide an (informal) comparative analysis of these 
perceptions. 
In return for their co-operation the survey participants will receive 
a summary of the results. 
Due to the realities of ti:ne and cost this study is reluctantly 
confined to an analysis of the American Strategic Duration 
Perspective. Therefore, the question considering the Strategic 
Duration Perspective reaction of American corporations operating 
within Japan (AJ) is suggested for further study. 
"There has to be investment for 
the future, sometimes at the 
expense of short-term profits. 
And at least in the last half 
century, the long-term future 
is more important then the 
short-term profit. " 
Kobayashi Yotaro, Managing a 
Cross-Boarder Joint Venture, 
Institutional Investor, Vol. XVI, 
No. 11, September 1991, p. 22. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
2. 0 Introduction To The Literature Survey 
"Decision making is a time machine which 
synchronizes into one present a great 
number of divergent time spans." 
Peter Drucker, Management, London, William 
Heinemann LTD, 1974, p. 125. 
This literature survey was conducted in 1992 in reference to the 
thesis title above. The survey covered over four hundred journal 
articles and over seventy books. 
The focus of this literature survey has been strategic management 
as developed in the American and Japanese Operating Environments. 
These Operating Environments reflect the research topic and 
represent the theoretical and applied focus of post 1945 strategic 
management theory. 
The objective of the survey is to review existing literature on the 
subject. The paper begins with a historical perspective, moves on 
to discuss the major theorists and reviews Strategic Duration 
Perspective in the literature. 
While the survey attempts to be reasonably comprehensive it is not 
exhaustive; therefore surveillance of the literature has continued to 
be an important component of the research. 
"We can make decisions only in the present 
and yet we cannot make decisions for the 
present alone; the most expedient, most 
opportunistic decision - let alone the 
decision not to decide at all - may commit 
us for a long time, if not permanently and 
irrevocably. " 
Peter Drucker, Management, London, William 
Heinemann LTD, 1974, p. 125. 
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2 .1 Brief Historical Review 
Strategy had its origins in the military references of the Ancient 
Greek generals, 550 BC. The verb "stratos" meaning army and 
"legein" meaning leadership, (Hurst 1986 p. 6) were combined to 
develop the military concept of strategy. Bracker (1980 p. 219) 
argues that the verb's meaning inferred the planned deployment of 
resources to destroy the enemy in battle. 
The concept of strategy as a military reference moved into the 
political arena around 500 BC. (Evered 1983). As military leaders 
assumed political roles they naturally applied and deployed military 
principals to their new agenda, including strategy. 
Bracker (1980) suggests that Socrates was the first to use "stratos" 
in reference to commerce, when he compared a general's military 
resource allocation role, to the business leader's responsibility in 
commercial resource allocation. Other writers of the time include 
Homer and Euripides. 
From the Roman Empire to the Industrial Revolution strategy was 
used in military and political spheres. Bourgeois (1978) states that 
Napoleon was the first to appreciate the combination of military and 
political strategy in achieving a comprehensive and enduring 
victory. The major contributors of the period were Shakespeare, 
Montesquieu, Kant, Mill, Hegel, Clausewitz and Tolstoy. Again the 
use of strategy was the allocation of resources to achieve planned 
end-positions. 
The initial strategic management systems were rigid, closed and 
appeared as standardized company policies and procedures in the 
1890's. The objective was to standardize so as to effect control over 
expanding corporate organizations. Change or adaptation was not 
built into the system, or envisaged at this time. 
From 1945 the use of strategy rose dramatically as the industrialized 
Western nations dealt with the aftermath of World War II, Hurst 
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( 1986) . The major contributing factors were; the redirection of 
military production and technology to consumer markets, the need 
to provide employment for the many returning soldiers, the 
rebuilding of Europe, the optimistic social and political outlook and 
the whole social acceptance at the time of the "military" as a 
reference in terms of strategy. This trend was accelerated by the 
numerous people (academics and managers) of the time who had 
military experience. For example Steiner and Ansoff had worked at 
Lockhead (Hurst 1986 p. 6), and for whom strategy was an accepted 
and desirable practice. 
"I believe one can make the argument that 
the emphasis on growth, expansion, and 
diversification in the 1960's is, at least 
in part, a reflection of the American 
economy at the time. " 
James Fredrickson (ed. ) , Perspectives on 
Strategic Management, New York, John Wiley 
& Sons, 1989, p. 12. 
The academics responded with scientific studies on the subject. 
University courses emerged on business policy, Fredrickson (1990 
p. 2) culminating in the emergence of the independent field of 
strategy in the 1960's Bowman (1990). The major contributors were 
Von Neumann 1947, Drucker 1954, Chandler 1962, Ansoff 1965, 
Cannon 1968, Newman et al 1971, Schendel et al 1972, Ackoff 1974, 
Glueck 1976 Steiner et al 1977, Mintzberg 1979, Schendel 1979, 
Porter 1980, Quinn 1980, Miles 1982, Henderson 1984, Andrews 1987 
and Deming 1989. 
The following is a concise chronology of the development of Strategic 
Management: 
1860 Policy and Procedures - Sought to stabilize and standardize 
corporate operations. 
1900 Implementation - set work standards. 
1910 Functional Structure - development of a functional based 
management structure. 
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Management by Objectives - human resources productivity based 
management. 
Mid 1940'S Budgeting - quantitative based management. 
Project Planning - large project coordination based management. 
Late 1950's Long Range Planning quantitative futurist 
environmental and extrapolation based management. Focused upon 
the internal union of the corporate functions. 
Mid 1950's Strategic Planning - overcame the non-conceptual nature 
and purely competitive focus of long range planning, but remained 
modular in terms of distinctive product/market missions. It lacked 
the budgeting and competition analysis found in the later Planning-
Programs-Budgeting (PPBS) process (Ansoff 1977 p. 16). 
1960 Planning-Programs-Budgeting (PPBS) - filled the quantitative 
gap of long range planning, combined strategic and long range 
planing with a corporate wide regard for the Operating Environment 
and moved away from pure extrapolation (Friedman 1963) planning 
to include contingencies for discontinuity in the future and came to 
be known as Entrepreneurial Planning. 
The 1960's brought in the "crosswalk" approach to PPBS which 
coordinated the static corporate structure and the dynamic decision 
making function into a more cohesive system (Ansoff 1977). The 
"crosswalk" technique also improved the interrelatedness of the 
independent product/market operations giving rise to General 
Electric's Strategic Business Units or SBU's. 
1970 Strategic Portfolio - developed a risk management system 
designed to ensure more even investment growth via dispersion of 
risk over more then one industry and or business. 
1974 Strategic Management - holistic internal, external past present 
and future multi-directional based management ie. a multi 
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dimensional approach. Strategic management is based upon the 
premises that managing the whole requires a different perspective 
and technique then managing the parts thereof Hatten et al ( 1978) . 
Drucker (1974) suggested that corporate strategic management 
requires doing the right things while operational or business 
strategic management requires doing things right. 
Strategy began looking through the "mirror" to the corporate 
standing and position within the particular industrial make-up 
(Fredrickson 1990). These industry elements were generally 
perceived as factors retarding corporate performance. 
The 1980's saw the emergence of global economics and competition. 
The focus of Strategic Management turns to the control of markets 
and profits in the face of international competition. There is a shift 
away from the adversarial to the multi-directional marketing to 
achieve a more positive relationship with the Operating Environment 
as a means of improving performance and operating efficiency. 
Ansoff's (1977) Rational and Analytic Model of strategic management 
suggests that the future of strategy in management may come from 
Strategic Portfolio management and or Strategic Issue management. 
Thus, the trend is not so much to widen the tools or perspective of 
strategic management but toward a more Real-Time strategic 
management system. 
The concept of real-time strategic management is important to this 
research as the objective here is to analyze the Strategic Duration 
Perspective in relation to an Operating Environment. Therefore the 
concept of real-time strategic management may be regarded as an 
undefined and ill-formulated short term Strategic Duration 
Perspective, in that real-time strategic management assumes a 
capability to compress the strategic management process to the 
extent that, in terms of time, strategic decisions approximate the 
operating reality as closely as possible. This trend was noted by 
IBM's Michael J. Kami, Director of Long Range Planning, when he 
made a comparison between the rate of technological change and 
management's need for a mechanism to deal with progressively 
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shorter decision lead times. Friedman (1963) concurred, arguing 
that there is no reason why strategic decisions would be excluded 
from this propensity. In fact given the leadership implications of 
strategic decisions they are more vulnerable to these reduced 
periods. 
Strategy has remained a means of environmental analysis from which 
objectives may be achieved within the framework of available 
resources. Its development began in the military, moved into the 
political arena and since 1945 has been an important tool in corporate 
management. The objective of corporate or primary strategic 
management is the successful positioning of the unit of competition 
(organization) so as to compete effectively or produce "economic 
rents" (Teece 1990 p. 45) at the business or secondary level of 
strategy within commercial environmental engagement, now and in 
the future ensuring that the past and present allocation/commitment 
of resources reflects positively into future economic trends and 
realities. 
Traditionally strategic management has been conceptual or 
descriptive, dealing with the general manger Mintzberg, with 
resource allocation Bower, environmental scanning Aguilar, strategy 
and organizational structure Chandler, the social and political issues 
Ackerman and Pascale. Strategic Management has emerged as the 
fundamental corporate management tool. 
Less attention has been given to the quantitative approach. Ansoff 
and Porter studied mergers and acquisitions, Rumelt, studied 
changes in strategy, structure, profitability and sales growth over 
twenty years. Gutmann, studied performance as related to industry 
environment and found high growth to be associated with market 
segmentation. The Boston Consulting Group worked on a cost to 
volume relationship which facilitated an appreciation of the values to 
be gained with high market share. The PIMS. (Profit Impact of 
Market Strategy) is a quantitative study of the factors affecting 
profitability. 
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Within the functional area, the trend is to explain profitability in 
terms of functional variables, usually in an operational model. As 
such their orientation is generally not strategic. 
The industrial organization focuses on environmental variables as 
they relate to the market structure, which in part determines 
business conduct, which influences performance. Topics include 
entry and exit barriers, product differentiation, seller 
concentration and the scale of economies. The more important 
conclusion is that industry concentration is related to performance 
ie. profitability. 
The present day strategic model is inclusive in that it takes 
corporate variables (controllable) from all functional areas, and 
relates these to environmental variables (non-controllable); 
attempting to reconcile the environmental and internal variables in 
a formula which gives effect to the strategic goals and mission of the 
corporation. 
Hatten et al (1978) argue that success is determined by strategy, 
thus homogenous data (industry, business or environment etc.) 
prove more reliable then heterogenous data. The way to accomplish 
this is to focus on firms competing in the same Operating 
Environment within the same industry. 
The Hatten et al ( 1978) study assumes that all strategic objectives 
revolve around corporate performance, and short term strategies 
form part of these long term objectives theoretically, without 
discounting for political static. Hatten et al ( 1978) suggest that 
firms should make their strategy selection on the basis of their 
unique circumstances and goals (this refers to survey Section 2: 
Question 7 - the data of which confirmed a relationship between 
competitive advantage and Strategic Duration Perspective) . For by 
looking to imitate the competition one's capabilities are de-
emphasised, ie. ones own competitive advantages are not developed 
or deployed. That which is de-emphasised may well represent the 
actual competitive advantage and Hatten et al ( 1978) note that 
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strategic corporate and other variables are inherently different 
which gives rise to asymmetrical competition upon which strategic 
management and commercial competition is based. 
The following is a history of strategic management as seen through 
the definitions of contributing theorists. Adapted from Bracker 
(1980) with additions: 
Von Neumann, and Morgenstern, defined strategy in 1947 as 11 ••• a 
series of actions by a firm that are decided on according to the 
particular situation. 11 
Drucker, defined strategy in 1954 as 11 • • • analysing the present 
situation and changing it if necessary. Incorporated in this is 
finding out what one's resources are or what they should be. 11 
Chandler, defined strategy in 1962 as " ... the determinator of the 
basic long-term goals of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses 
of action and the allocations of resources necessary for carrying out 
these goals. " 
Ansoff, defined strategy in 1965 as" ... a rule for making decisions 
determined by product/market scope, growth vector, competitive 
advantage, and synergy." 
Cannon, defined strategy in 1968 as " . . . the directional action 
decisions which are required competitively to achieve the company's 
purpose. 11 
Learned, Christenson, Andrews, and Guth, defined strategy in 1969 
as 11 • • • the pattern of objectives, purposes, or goals and major 
policies and plans for achieving these goals, stated in such a way as 
to define what business the company is in or is to be in and the kind 
of company it is to be." 
Newman, and Logan, defined strategy in 1971 as " ... forward-
looking plans that anticipate change and initiate action to take 
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advantage of opportunities that are integrated into the concepts or 
mission of the company. 11 
Schendel, and Hatten, defined strategy in 1972 as " •.. the basic 
goals and objectives of the organization, the major programs of 
action chosen to reach these goals and objectives, and the major 
pattern of resource allocation used to relate the organization to its 
environment." 
Uyterhoeven, Ackerman, and Rosenblum, defined strategy in 1973 
as " . . . provides both direction and cohesion to the enterprise and 
is composed of several steps: strategic profile, strategic forecast, 
resource audit, strategic alternatives explored, tests for 
consistency and, finally, strategic choice. 11 
Ackoff, defined strategy in 1974 as 11 ••• concerned with long-range 
objectives and ways of pursuing them that affect the system as a 
whole." 
Paine, and Naumes, defined strategy in 1975 as 11 ••• specific major 
actions or patterns of actions for attainment of the firm's 
objectives. 11 
McCarthy, Minichiello, and Curran, defined strategy in 1975 as" ... 
an analysis of the environment and selection of economic alternatives 
that will match the corporate resources and objectives at a risk 
commensurate with the profit and viability which the alternatives 
offer . 11 
In 1976 Glueck, defied strategy as 11 ••• a unified, comprehensive, 
and integrated plan designed to assure that the basic objectives of 
the enterprise are achieved. 11 
McNichols, defined strategy in 1977 as 11 ••• embedded in policy 
formation: it comprises a series of decisions reflecting the 
determination of basic business objectives and the utilization of skills 
and resources to attain these goals. " 
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Steiner, and Miner, defined strategy in 1977 as 11 ••• the forging of 
company missions, setting objectives for the organization in light of 
external and internal forces, formulation specific policies and 
strategies to achieve objectives, and ensuring their proper 
implementation so that the basic purposes and objectives of the 
organization will be achieved. 11 
Mintzberg, defined strategy in 1979 as ". . . a mediating force 
between the organization and its environment: consistent patterns 
in streams of organizational decisions to deal with the environment." 
Schendel, and Hofer, defined strategy in 1979 as " provides 
directional cues to the organization that permit it to achieve its 
objectives, while responding to the opportunities and threats in its 
environment. 11 
Bracker, on strategy 1980, " ... strategic management entails the 
analysis of internal and external environments of a firm to maximize 
the utilization of resources in relation to objectives." (Bracker 1980 
p. 221). 
The Collins Dictionary of Business (Andrew et al 1991 p. 586) 
defines strategy as 11 ••• a unified set of plans and actions designed 
to secure achievement of the basic objectives of a business or of some 
other organization. Business Objective represent the goals of the 
organization, ie. the economic (and social) purposes for which the 
business exists; strategy is the means used to attain these goals." 
It is clear from this collection of definitions that strategic 
management has developed from the traditional, authoritarian, 
unilateral model to an all inclusive, open, porous, holistic and 
receptive system covering increasing numbers of issues and 
reflecting the strategic importance of company wide perspectives in 
a more comprehensive, inclusive process. This evolution reflects 
both the development of related disciplines and the increasing 
complexity ("hyper-astronomical complexity" Vesper 1979) and size 
of the business environment internally, externally and in multiple 
32 
dimensions. 
Both of these related contributors, size and complexity, will 
continue to spur the development of the strategy field. Further, the 
strategic management of an organization within its Operating 
Environment totals more then the sum of managing it in terms of 
divisional, functional or other structural segment (Hatten, et al 
1978). Successful strategy injects a momentum to the business 
unexplained by quantitative analysis alone (Westley and Mintzberg 
1989). 
By implication, as Mitroff argued in 1981, strategy can not be 
understood in the single dimension of definition - for it is that and 
more. Within the discipline this is the area of complexity, yet it is 
here that corporate performance is defined and produced. This 
intangible force is described by Mitroff (1981) as "metaphysical 
judgement". 
Mintzberg (1972) had to operationalize strategy as a "consistency of 
decisions" to study strategy empirically. Yet, he understood that 
even then the research could not operationalize all that is strategy. 
An undefinable element of strategy remains, and should remain 
conceptual and metaphysical. 
Clearly the focus in strategic management must be on an inclusive 
system which accounts for the unique, three dimensional, 
operational and perspective complexities faced by corporate 
management. It is the intention of this research project to assist the 
development of strategic management theory by providing research 
on the increasingly important issue of Strategic Duration Perspective 
- a construct for the various subjective time-horizon perspectives 
used in strategic management and directly related to the Objective 
Reality of Time within an Operating Environment. 
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2 .2 Theories Of Strategic Management 
"But we still seem to be at a crossroads: 
not fully sure of where we have been, much 
less where we're headed; not sure we like 
what we see in our research, much less that 
we can expect others to like it. " 
James Fredrickson (ed. ) , Perspectives on 
Strategic Management, New York, Harper Business, 
1990, p. 237. 
Business Policy has traditionally been approached from Normative 
and Descriptive literature perspectives. The former is empirical data 
based, Ackoff (1970), Ansoff (1965), Andrews (1971), Vancil 
( 1976) . The latter Descriptive approach is case data based, Bower 
( 1970), Chandler ( 1962). 
Bourgeouis (1978) states that the Normative is a process seeking a 
match between environmental opportunities and internal abilities; 
while the Descriptive focuses on the formation aspect of strategy. 
Mintzberg ( 1972) argues that there are three main groupings of 
research in strategic management. The Planning mode which can be 
regarded as the classical theory where strategy is regarded as a 
systematic process of unilateral top-down directives. Secondly, the 
Adaptive mode is the incremental approach wherein strategy evolves 
around the Operating Environment, interest groups in a step by 
step and phase by phase manner. Lastly Mintzberg discusses the 
Entrepreneurial mode which is reliant upon a single dominant leader 
who dictates strategy and takes-on the future and its uncertainties. 
Later Mintzberg in a book edited by Fredrickson (1990) argued ten 
schools of strategy formation. He categorized these into three: 
One, the Prescriptive set deal with the formation function as an 
objective process rather then the actual strategy formulation. 
Design -conceptual process, Planning - formal systematic process 
and Positioning - in terms of strategic positions. 
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The second set approach strategy formation from the perspective of 
the mind of a single leader: the Entrepreneurial, the Cognitive and 
the Learning schools. 
The third set move beyond the individual in terms of strategy 
formation to include multiple actors and influences on the formation 
process. These include the Learning schools where formation is a 
learning process given the complexities involved. The Political 
schools where formation is a political power process at both 
individual, group and organization levels. The Cultural school 
perspective is that strategy formation arises out of the corporate 
culture. The Environmental perspective is that the formation power 
lies with the environment rather then the corporation which assumes 
a passive role in light of this environmental force. 
The third set is made up of the Configuration school which regards 
the formation process as integrative and inclusive of the above 
schools. The argument is that the strategic formation process will at 
different times, (related to the business life cycle) require multiples 
of the schools listed above. 
Strategic management has attracted many excellent scholars who 
have contributed to its present level of sophistication. It may be 
argued that their attraction lies in the awesome potential power 
wielded by successful strategy, yet ironically for all that power, 
strategy remains a consuming, fragile complexity, part quantitative 
part qualitative always dynamic. 
The following is a discussion of the important theorists in strategic 
management: 
Porter ( 1980) developed a topology of three generic strategies. 
One, Cost Leadership developed from Henderson (1979) and Buzzell 
et al ( 1975) . This strategy positions the organization as a low cost 
leader via attention to overall productivity of assets. The 
competitive advantage is lowest price pure and simple. 
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Secondly, Differentiation moves away from cost advantage. 
Differentiation adds value in "packaging" which augments the 
product-utility so as to add value for the client in a non-product 
format. 
Thirdly, Focus positions the organization in terms of the market it 
serves, generally narrow reflecting target, niche market and or 
product/service specialization. This can be a combination of cost 
leader and or differentiation. 
Miles and Snow (1978} argued that strategy is the definition of 
product/market domain; the complex nature is related to the multiple 
number of, and multiple layered perennial configuration of decisions 
involved in achieving objectives. 
Miles and Snow developed the following strategic topology: 
Defenders, where top management develops a stable market by 
focusing on a narrow product range aimed at a narrow market 
segment within a broader market. Defenders protect their niche, 
tend to be conservative and avoid change, seeking efficiency and a 
stable domain. 
Prospectors, almost the opposite of the Defender. The prospector 
operates in a dynamic environment and their main strength is 
product innovation and market opportunity. 
Analyzers, a mixture of the two above, in that their focus is to 
reduce risk like a defender but seeks opportunity and profit like the 
prospector. The analyzer is an adapter using defender and 
prospector attributes to achieve a balance based on innovation and 
protection of core product and customer bases. This dual approach 
can result in inefficiency as a result of insufficient commitment to 
either risk reduction or profits. 
The Reactor strategy is described as residual by Miles et al (1978} 
as it generally occurs where one or more of the above strategies have 
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been unsuccessful. A reactor strategy is continually unstable as it 
lacks the ability to deal with a changing environment resulting in a 
negative reaction-cycle. When change occurs it reacts, and because 
it lacks a coping mechanism its response is generally negative which 
produce negative results, which causes a loss of confidence and less 
then effective management. 
"Unless all of the domain, technological, 
and administrative decisions required to 
have an operational strategy are properly 
aligned, strategy is a mere statement, not 
an effective guide to behaviour." 
Raymond Miles et al, Organizational Strategy, 
Structure, and Process, Academy of Management 
Review, July 1978, p. 557. 
Miles et al ( 1978) offer a strategic topology of four organizational 
environmental adaptation modes and discuss the respective adaptive 
cycle. The authors advocate a holistic inclusive approach to 
strategic management. 
The PIMS (Profit Impact of Market Strategy) was begun in 1960 by 
Schoeffler together with General Electric. The study was later 
transferred to the Strategic Planning Institute, Anderson et al 
(1978). It is an important predictive quantitative study of the 
factors affecting profitability. 
The PIMS study explains profitability in terms of functional variables 
ie. controllable variables, each function having its own theory. 
Generally these models are operational rather then strategic ie. they 
are not concerned with changing the existing operations, nor do 
they take a global perspective of the organization. 
The strength of PIMS. is its vast data base of confidential 
information on corporations, including direct competitors. 
Consequently PIMS. is able to produce a variety of reports which 
provide access to otherwise unobtainable information and 
comparative analysis. 
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The PIMS. results are limited to the extent that strategy relates to 
highly specific and unique internal and external variable sets or 
groupings, which make generalizations about strategy difficult 
theoretically and of little consequence practically Anderson (1978). 
Further, the "how to" establish these profit strategies is not 
explained by PIMS. , very likely also due to the degree of 
specialization involved in strategic management deployment. 
"The notion of strategy leads to the 
expectation that, within a given industry 
or set of markets, different competitors 
with different resources should choose 
different means to attain their ends." 
Kenneth Hatten et al, A Strategy Model of 
the U.S. Brewing Industry: 1952 - 1971, 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 21, 
No. 4, 1978, p. 608. 
Day, ( 1983) argues that PIMS. lacks the important creative 
conceptual analysis, instead focusing on quantitative analysis 
exclusively. 
For all that, PIMS. has played an important role in the identification 
of long-run results of particular strategy /ies in particular 
circumstances and is useful as an overview of strategic options 
available to a corporation. Yet, given the unique circumstances from 
which the PIMS. data has been extracted it should not be relied upon 
as an assessment tool of a particular corporate strategy but rather 
an extracted reflection of a unique situation whose relevancy must 
be critically assessed. Day (1983) suggests that PIMS. proves its 
worth as a guide within a set of strategic references. 
Bourgeois III (1978), (1980a), (1980b), (1984), (1985) has been a 
consistent contributor to strategic management theory. 
Bourgeois ( 1985) points out that Business Policy literature advocates 
a strategic fit (threats and opportunities) between the Operating 
Environment and the organization's distinctive competence 
(strengths and weaknesses) . While Organizational theory purports 
38 
success as a derivative of structure and business administration 
relative to the external environment. 
These two approaches make up strategic management's strategic 
"match" or "fit" theory of the external and internal environments. 
Thompson ( 1967) described this as continual co-alignment in a 
continual adaptation/alignment process with the external conditions. 
While strategic management theorists arrive at co-alignment via 
operating market structure and the content of strategy, 
organizational theorists come to co-alignment through internal and 
external dynamics, as found in their contingency theory where 
positive strategic alternatives are unique in relation to the relevant 
Operating Environment. That is, strategy is a mediating factor 
defining the relationship between the organization and its 
environment. 
Bourgeouis ( 1985) approached co-alignment from the perspective of 
top management accounting for perceptional variations as a factor of 
the process and regarding the external as an objective industry 
factor. The author concurs with Snow ( 1976) that managerial 
perception of the objective environment is subjective which accounts 
for strategic differences in like Operating Environments. 
Bourgeouis (1985) goes on to point out that there are external 
strategic variables which in order to achieve objective organizational 
success/performance all top managers should perceive as objective 
ie. approximation to the Objective Reality. Thus, Bourgeouis argues 
that the environment should not be regarded as a purely subjective 
factor in the perception of top management; but a relative 
subjective, quasi subjective and or objective factor of co-alignment 
which Bourgeouis refers to, as termed by Starbuck (1976), as 
"perceptual relativity" • Bourgeouis found a positive relationship 
between performance and those organizations whose top managerial 
perception was justifiable or correct in terms of environmental 
volatility and stability. 
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Thus, it is argued that top managerial perception is a strategic 
subjective variable whose importance is considerable; causing 
positive (over and or under) or negative (over and or under) 
strategic results and performance when misperceptions relative to 
the Objective Reality occur. 
"To the extent that strategic decision 
making relies on information transmitted 
by top management, when top management 
misperceives its environment it probably 
reacts inappropriately to real situations 
and needlessly expends resources by implementing 
decisions based on faulty information." 
J. L. Bourgeouis ID, Strategic Goals, Perceived 
Uncertainty, and Economic Performance in Volitile 
Environments, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 
28, 1985, p. 565. 
Bourgeois ( 1985) found that the most favourable mode occurred when 
top management on average had an appropriate (in terms of objective 
accuracy) perception of the environmental realities in various 
aspects and functions of corporate management thus " . . . adequate 
representing the firm's various constituencies." Bourgeouis, 1985, 
p. 568. 
Hofer ( 1975) moved the research focus to a study of the implemented 
strategy rather then strategy formulation or implementation. The 
current research extends Hofer's research trend in an analysis of 
Strategic Duration Perspective within corporate strategy, including 
the human or management dynamic, for as Bourgeouis (1978 p. 35) 
argued -to do otherwise is to advocate the very type of natural 
determinism which strategic choice (Child 1972) serves to overcome. 
It may be argued that if one took a macro, holistic and historic time 
perspective of strategic management, that "strategic choice" could 
be argued to assume a deterministic orientation; but in respect of 
strategic management the role of "choice" is real and it is relative to 
the realities of the internal and external Operating Environments 
thereby accounting for good and bad strategy in "like" situations 
(Operating Environments) and hence this study's focus on American 
and Japanese-American Strategic Duration Perspectives within the 
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American Operating Environment. 
Primary strategy may be defined as corporate strategy in that it 
defines the product-market domain; while secondary strategy or 
business level strategy, which is narrower in concept, deals with 
product-market participation in terms of the competitive market 
engagement. 
Hofer ( 1976) states that Business Policy literature has approached 
strategy from both formation and implementation perspectivos. Hofer 
looks at strategy formation in his ( 1976) paper. 
Hofer types research on strategy formation into: one, the nature of 
strategy, in reference to a contingency approach defining the 
significant variables as "strategic" and two, themanagerial decisions 
in terms of these constituting the organizational strategy. 
The direct and indirect costs and benefits of managing the strategy 
of a corporation have traditionally been inferred, as little research 
exists and this area remains difficult to examine. 
In their study Thune and House ( 1970 pp. 81-87) paired firms which 
did and did not utilize formal strategy. Secondly they compared the 
formal planners before and after formal strategy was adopted. Their 
results point toward a positive relationship between performance and 
strategy in both cases. The former in terms of Return on Investment 
(ROI. ) and Return on Equity (ROE. ) and the latter in terms of sales 
growth, stock price and earnings per share appreciation. 
The Thune et al (1970) cause was taken up by Herold (1972 pp.91-
104) who followed with a smaller sample from the former study 
focusing on pre-tax profits. Herold concurred with Thune et al in 
his findings that formal planners' performance continued to surpass 
non-planners. 
Herold (1972) extended the research of Thune and Houe (1970) by 
focusing on the performance of formal and informal corporate 
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planners/strategists. Thune's (1970) research typed the 
participating firms as either formal or informal planners. Herold 
refined the categorization by verification on the basis of 
predicability of relations of variables in a theory. Both studies 
found formal planning to be a positive contributor to performance 
relative to non-formal planners, and secondly in the performance of 
the formal planners since adoption of formal planning within their 
organizations. 
One may conclude that formal planning does indeed play a positive 
role in terms of corporate performance. An equally important yet 
more difficult question is the shape, and form this planning should 
take given the numerous highly specialized and diverse corporate 
operating realities. 
Hofer (1972) asks what information and analysis are necessary to 
ensure a quality strategic management program'? Hofer refers to 
Aguilar's (1965) work on this topic, where he found that in terms of 
the environment people were the best source of information and that 
these "informers" provided a second dimension of high information 
quality in the form of the heightened relevance of their data. 
Stevenson (1966 p. 51) sought to establish how corporations gather 
and utilize data regarding their internal "resource evaluation" 
programs and their external "capability profile" analysis and what 
data is used. He found that this process followed the functional 
organizational structure. That all areas were important but financial 
implications tended to be more generally applicable. Here again the 
external information was primary while the internal data was formal 
and secondary. 
Naumes (1980 pp. 1, 12) found that a firm's environmental 
perspective is the sum of top management's environmental 
perspective. This ties in with Stevenson's (1966) argument that 
respondents were found to regard their strengths and weaknesses 
in a manner not unrelated to their level in the organization, the 
type of responsibility involved, functional background, time served 
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in the corporation and their personal background. Bower ( 1974 p. 
22) concurred, arguing that a manager's perspective is related to 
his position and interests, reward and or punishment within a 
specific project. Suggesting, as Mintzberg did, that top management 
could control the strategic process via their structural influence. 
This presents strategy formation with a difficult problem, that of 
subunit-strategic perspective the sum of which may or may not 
equate, in direction or performance, the corporate strategic 
objectives - thus undermining or at least diverting a portion of the 
corporate strategy effectiveness, to at least the same extent. 
Hofer found that the approaches to organizing the planning 
operation varied widely. The authors understood that CEO's could 
not cope alone so the question turned to, who should participate in 
the strategic management process. This question was asked by 
Friedman (1963) and later Wrapp (1967) who worked on this topic 
finding four styles; planning and operations, full-time planners, 
divisional planning and a long range planning group comprised of 
staff experts. Wrapp suggested five attributes for top management 
involved in strategy formation: consistent first hand knowledge of 
multi level operating decisions (Vancil 1970) to avoid "abstract 
isolation" (Cosier 1980 p. 92). Focus on the important and major 
impacting decisions, anticipate and plan the political processes and 
sensitivities, allow vagueness to play its part in the evolution of 
strategy formation, understand that time is an essential ingredient 
of strategy formation, create a corporate culture tolerant of change 
and incremental strategic development. 
" managerial reality is not an absolute; 
rather it is socially and culturally determined." 
Richard Pascale et al, The Art of Japanese 
Management: Application for American Executives, 
Simon & Schuster, 1981, p. 22. 
"Culture effects how these problems are perceived 
and how they are resolved. Societal learning also 
establishes horizons of perception." 
Richard Pascale et al, The Art of Japanese 
Management: Application for American Executives, 
Simon & Schuster, 1981, p. 22. 
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11 our managerial blind spots related to 
American culture and society. 11 
Richard Pascale et al, The Art of Japanese 
Management: Application for American Executives, 
Simon & Schuster, 1981, p. 22. 
Hofer ( 1976) argues that the social and political implications on 
strategic management are extensive. One major problem with 
discovering the extent of their influence is the generally implicit 
nature (Guth 1965 p. 123) of the subject and the time commitment 
required to learn the social / political make-up of organizations 
before beginning to deal or analyze the research issues. The 
literature to date has not been able to accomplish this in spite of 
using single or small unit research samples. 
A multi-disciplinary approach combining the social sciences and 
strategic management could produce an improved measure of political 
and social relevance in strategy formation research; as the social 
sciences could more efficiently measure the social and political 
activity within the organization. 
The content of strategy has been researched most effectively by 
Schoeffler's (1969) PIMS study as discussed above, and Hatten 
(1978). Both of whom found a relationship between strategic content 
and performance. Further, that a contingency approach is necessary 
as corporate internal and external operating realities are sets of 
uniquely structured, directional and dimensional (relative elasticity) 
relationships or linkages. 
Rumelt's (1974) work on two hundred American Fortune 500 firms 
from 1949 to 1969 was part of a five nation project to discover any 
relationship between economic performance, strategy and structure. 
The results point toward a positive relationship of economic 
performance, a related diversification strab:!gy and a structure along 
product-line division. 
Rumelt's ( 1979) paper was an important stock-taking of the strategic 
management literature. For Rumelt, strategy is the process whereby 
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organizations go about solving their most "ill-structured" (p. 196) 
challenges. He described the process as having three stages: one, 
composition of the problem, two, suggested solutions and three 
evaluation. This paper focuses on the evaluation of strategy and 
Rumelt matches this with the respective content concept; as strategy 
is highly conceptual. That is, its core function is the " ... 
adjustment of specific policies to particular situations." Rumelt (1979 
p. 196). 
For Rumelt, strategy deals with the relationship an organization has 
with its environment on a level that would result in major 
consequences if not addressed. The structure of the problems is 
generally vague, ill-defined and complex representing issues and 
complexities not yet faced, or for which there are no established 
solutions let alone a sound formulation of the problem. Strategy is 
not synonymous with solution, rather strategy provides a definition, 
a perspective or structure of the issues which facilitates a solution. 
Rumelt (1979) put four approaches forward for the analysis of the 
environment. The goals consistency test - removal of inconsistencies 
between goals. The frame test - a means of ensuring that the critical 
objectives are crystallized. The competency test - definition of the 
problem must be within the capabilities of the respective entity. The 
workability test - are the sum of these above logistically practical 
and effective in their application ie. in terms of "conquering" the 
problem? 
Rumelt argues that winning in a competitive environment 
necessitates some degree of asymmetry. It is within this asymmetrical 
stance that advantages exist, are created and can be exploited; as 
opposed to pure rivalry found in perfect symmetrical situations. It 
is within the asymmetrical nature of commerce that corporations 
invest and allocate resources. Thus, strategy must be based upon 
the principal of an asymmetrical advantage, or what is referred to as 
a competitive-advantage. 
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Henry Mintzberg has been an important author on the subject of 
strategic management. His contributions include (1972), (1976), 
(1977), (1987), (1978b), (1982), (1985), (1987) and (1989). 
It may be argued that in terms of assisting theoretical research 
Mintzberg's most important contribution was his "decision stream" 
(1977 p. 29) perspective used to describe strategy. This approach 
facilitated research on the pattern and consistencies of strategic 
decisions. He studied these streams of decisions in terms of one, 
their chronology, two, inforences from their chronology and 
consistency and three, analysis of all the background factors 
including environment, reports and individual perspectives. 
"In other words, strategy become 
consistencies in the behaviour of 
organizations, which renders the 
concept operational for the researcher." 
Henry Mintzberg et al, Tracking 
Strategy in an Entrepreneurial Firm, 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 
25, 1982, p. 466. 
Further, Mintzberg understood that the formulation of strategies 
occurs in various forms. These could be studied by comparing the 
intended objectives with the resulting realities of a strategy 
(Mintzberg 1985 p. 257). 
Intended strategy, which infers contemplation, can result in 
deliberate strategy where the resulting strategy is intended. Such 
strategies can range in terms of their degree of realization. 
These strategies can take the form of over-realized (as in the case 
of Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam in 1968) or under-realized strategy 
where an intended strategy result fails to reach the strategic 
objectives it served (under-realized is the researcher's point). 
Thus, corporations design the consequences of strategy ie. the 
objectives. The strategy itself represents the structural framework 
within which the goals can be achieved. The consequences or results 
of such strategy are retrospective definitions of strategy as they 
relate objectivity to the contemporary Operating Environment. 
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"Planning gives order to vision, and puts 
form on it for the sake of formalized 
structure and environmental expectation. " 
Henry Mintzberg et al, Tracking Strategy 
in an Entrepreneurial Firm, Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 25, 1982, p. 498. 
Retroactive strategy occurs where the organization "discovers" that 
in retrospect it has a strategy. Whether such is desirable or not is 
a separate issue. 
Mintzberg (1982 p. 498) argued that status quo extrapolation type 
planning is the result of the entrepreneurial mode of strategy 
formation inevitably being replaced by increasing formality brought 
on by the success of the entrepreneurial strategy and the external 
bureaucratic pressures to have an explicit strategy. 
"The success of the entrepreneurial 
mode evokes the forces - both in 
structure and in environment - that 
weaken it." 
Henry Mintzberg et al, Tracking 
Strategy in an Entrepreneurial Firm, 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 25, 
1982, p. 498. 
Mintzberg poignantly notes that strategy is not, as some of the early 
literature suggested, a clear-cut sequential process or issue. 
Strategy is messy in that there is vast array of multi-level 
information which needs to be imbibed, mulched and understood 
independently and within a porous, multi-dimensional composition. 
Mintzberg (1982) discusses a need for an important connection 
between the "conceptualization" and "operationalization" of strategy. 
Where this process represents separate groups there needs to be a 
close relationship to ensure effective "inter-interpretation" of the 
various perspectives, both conceptually and operationally, so that 
the result reflects these divergent positions. 
Further, that the effect of strategy in terms of corporate 
performance or non-performance (again on a multi-level basis) is 
monitored so as to ensure a continuous flow and inter-flow of 
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information, perspectives, consequences and decisions. 
"There is perhaps no process in 
organizations that is more demanding 
of human cognition then strategy 
formulation. " 
Henry Mintzberg, Strategy Formation 
as a Historical Process, International 
Studies of Management and Organization, 
Vol. 7, No. 2, 1977, p. 38. 
Mintzberg ( 1977) suggests that strategy as a process operates within 
a Life Cycle of Strategy namely: conception, development, decay and 
death. On a second level within the Life Cycle Strategy moves in a 
cyclical phase defined by type and manner. Consequently, strategy 
is made up of a complex web of multi-layered influences operating on 
different levels of contribution and impact, within a broad variety 
of respective time dimensions and resulting time perspectives or 
Strategic Duration Perspectives. 
This complex operation makes strategic change a difficult process to 
manage and analyze because of the complex inter-relationships 
involved as each strategic variable, both controlled and 
uncontrolled, proceed at independent, quasi independent/ dependent 
and dependent time frames, and in relation to independent, quasi 
independent/dependent and dependent factors. Its as if every 
aspect of strategic activities are at once connected yet independent 
and any attempt to solidify even one of these "inter-
interrelationships" reduces the productivity of the whole model. 
This network of conceptual and operational perspectives is fragile, 
limited in connection and application, yet the very basis of the 
strategy process. 
"To most bureaucracies - for example, 
the automobile assembly line - change 
is disturbing. So the leadership tries 
to concentrate the period of disturbance, 
and then leave the bureaucracy alone for 
a time to consolidate the change. But, of 
course, while the bureaucracy is being left 
alone, the environment continues to change, 
so that no matter how well chosen the 
strategy, eventually a new cycle must be 
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initiated. " 
Henry Mintzberg, Strategy Formation as a 
Historical Process, International Studies of Management 
and Organization, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1977, p. 37. 
Mintzberg (1977) discusses Planned strategy as a rarity, which 
takes place where formulation is done by senior management and 
implementation ts executed by actors who have no discretionary 
power. This represents a commitment which is difficult to alter, a 
virtual contrast to the entrepreneurial position which is very often 
implicit and subject to alteration and or adaptation by the 
formulator/implementor. It is clear that all Operating Environments 
change; therefore purely planned strategy may be described as a 
closed strategic system and suggests that in all but the most 
favourable situations it will prove vulnerable to failure caused by its 
unreceptive nature. 
A strategy whose actors support and identify with the vision in 
unison is labelled by Mintzberg et al (1985) as an Ideological 
strategy. The collective nature and the historic origins makes this 
type of strategy less flexible then the entrepreneurial, but more 
flexible then the planned strategies. 
The Umbrella strategy occurs where leaders have only partial control 
over their actors, they are only able to set general guidelines 
allowing the participants to manoeuvre within this framework. The 
corporate culture is tolerant of strategy initiatives, in fact the 
success of the enterprise may well depend on such innovation. 
With the Process strategy senior management manipulates strategy 
not at the general level (umbrella) but rather by controlling the 
process while the content of strategy is decentralized. This takes 
the form of making highly specific personnel appointments, ensuring 
the strategy through the appointment of known views, perspectives, 
skills nn0. values of the appointees. 
Unconnected strategy is a means of tolerating a small part of the 
organization for being strategically independent of the 
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organizational mainstream. The reasons for such vary, from 
retaining important personnel to Internal-Corporate-Venturing 
(!CV) (Bergelman 1983) to a form of applied research and 
development. 
The Consensus strategy allows the strategic participants to evolve 
strategy out of implicit, strong common conventions. 
Under certain operating conditions the environment plays a more 
assertive and influential role in terms of the organization's strategy. 
There are varying degrees of this, from Arctic weather to highly 
regulated products and or markets. In such cases the strategy is 
labelled Imposed strategy. Mintzberg et al ( 1985} point out that in 
one form or another all strategies have environmental boundaries. 
In terms of Emergent and Intended strategy Mintzberg et al (1985} 
suggest that all strategies have these contemplative attributes to a 
greater or lesser degree. While Intended strategies offer control and 
direction, the Emergent factor facilitates what the authors have 
termed "strategic learning". This suggests a receptive element in 
the system which allows the actors to interact with the system and 
contribute their external contacts to a system that is aligned to those 
internal and external issues which produce performance. 
In (1987} Mintzberg stated the following in discussing why 
organizations need strategies: 
"In this sense, a strategy is like 
a theory, indeed, it is a theory (as 
in Drucker's "theory of business"} -
a cognitive structure (and filter} 
to simplify and explain the world, 
and thereby facilitate action. " 
Henry Mintzberg, Strategy Formation 
as a Historical Process, International 
Studies of Management and Organization, 
Vol. 7, No. 2, 1977, p. 29. 
"Organizations have strategies to reduce 
uncertainty, to block out the unexpected, 
and, as shown here, to set direction, focus 
effort, define the organization. Strategy is 
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a force that resists change, not encourages it." 
Henry Mintzberg, Strategy Formation as a 
Historical Process, International Studies of 
Management and Organization, Vol. 7, No. 2, 
1977, p. 29. 
If strategy resists change and strengthens the status quo why are 
corporations so attracted to strategy'? Strategy, he argues, fixes the 
organization in a context, provides consistency in an unknown 
future, allowing the actors to perform in relation to this defining 
reference point called strategy, be it objectively good or bad. 
"But while prescription for strategic 
change in the literature may come easy, 
management of the change itself, in 
practice, especially when it involves 
perspective, comes hard." 
Henry Mintzberg, Strategy Formation as 
a Historical Process, International Studies 
of Management and Organization, Vol. 7, No. 2, 
1977 I P• 31. 
" . . . strategies (and the strategic 
management process) can be vital to 
organizations, both by their presence 
and by their absence. " 
Henry Mintzberg, Strategy Formation as 
a Historical Process, International Studies 
of Management and Organization, Vol. 7, No. 2, 
1977 I P• 31. 
Mintzberg argues that strategies are at the same time positive and 
negative. In that they provide a frame of reference, now and in the 
future, from within which to work. This is positive but the 
extrapolation nature and conformist effect of strategy can be 
negative in terms of organizational alignment with the Operating 
Environment which is perpetually evolving in direction and level -
each with independent and dependent impact or "non-impact" on the 
strategy and organizational performance. 
Wessema, Van Der Pol, and Messer (1980 pp. 37-47) describe 
strategic management as the vehicle of change in terms of moving 
from the status quo "strategic position to the desired strategic 
position." ( 1980 p. 41) as related to the Product-Market Combination 
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(PMC.). 
The authors describe six movements which may be used, in any 
combination or no combination, to achieve the competitive strategic 
position intended. 
These are: 
Explosion - rapid growth in a short period. 
Expansion - fast growth over a longer period. 
Continuous growth - sustainment of status quo. 
Slip - maintaining position in a growth market. 
Consolidation - growth is minimal, only to parallel market. 
Contraction - negative growth. 
Wessema et al ( 1980) developed the following manager types based 
upon six strategic crusades: 
Pioneer - flexible, creative and extrovert. 
Conqueror - a generalist thinker, takes calculated risk, non-
conformist. 
Level-headed - a systematic, structured, controlling team-worker. 
Administrator - extrapolator, introvert, maintainer. 
Economizer - bureaucrat, predicable, reactive and no unitive. 
Insistent diplomat - personable, stable, long term orientation and 
careful. 
Wessema et al (1980) suggest that the most effective strategic 
development takes place when the intended position is mapped out as 
one or more "strategic movements", and the movements are lead by 
management who display related, specialized managerial skills. 
Wessema et al ( 1980) matched the strategic movements to managerial 
types in the following format, from Wissema et al (1980): 
Explosive growth - Pioneer. 
Expansion - Conqueror. 
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Continuous growth - Level-headed. 
Consolidation - Administrator. 
Slip strategy - Economizer. 
Contraction - Insistent diplomat. 
Bourgeois ill (1978) argues that strategy is one of only a few 
management tools which can provide a coping mechanism for a 
corporation in an unknown, unpredictable and dynamic future; for 
it is in the future that the present is realized and the present that 
the future is decided. 
"But for the managers of an enterprise, 
it is in the discontinuities of change 
that lie the seeds of strategic impotence; 
for, in the absence of strategies to deal 
with them, these unpredictable shifts can 
pummel otherwise viable firms into a reactive 
mode of perpetual crisis management." 
John Bourgeois, ill, Strategy Making, Environmental, 
and Economic Performance: A Conceptual and Empirical 
Explanation, University of Washington, PH.D., 1978, 
p. 2. 
Bougrious defines environmental volatility in terms of discontinuities 
in the future, rather then the future itself, which he argues is 
besides the discontinuity generally and relatively predictable. 
Despite Bourgeouis' definition of strategic management which smacks 
of Contingency theory, he is a student of Child's (1972) Strategic 
Choice theory. He argues between Determinism, on the one hand, as 
an incomplete accounting of corporate development; arguing that the 
environmentally reactive description of the corporation under the 
Deterministic theory is inconclusive. Yet, on the other hand, 
Bourgiouis suggests that the Co-alignment or Independent 
Variable/Contingency theory can not explain the activities of 
corporations conclusively either. Like Child (1972), Bourgiouis 
believed that strategy formation is a human process and as such 
involves choice within a political process. 
Litschert et al (1978 pp. 211-219) refer to the strategic-fit between 
corporation and environment as being defined by the level of 
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organizational slack at any point in time; where organizational slack 
is low the fit will be more dependent upon the strategic variables 
then where the slack is high, in which case the fit is dictated by the 
dominant coalition. Thus, Bourgeouis's (1978) theory is influenced 
by organizational slack as a result of managerial susceptibility to the 
existing degree of organizational slack in their orientation and 
perspective to the organization's operation. 
Bourgeouis ( 1978) suggests that the more appropriate theory comes 
from Child's Strategic Choice theory which entertains that 
contributions will come from both, Co-alignment and Choice, 
theories, yet these constraining factors create the stage for the 
power of management to vary in their effectiveness and efficiency, 
rather then replace it. Bourgeouis shows an understanding (1978 p. 
18-19) for the most important ingredient in strategic management -
the human factor. 
"That is, although there are always some 
constraints present in any situation, whether 
they be external to the organization (governmental, 
economic, industrial, etc.) or internal (human 
needs, power structures, information systems, 
technological processes, etc. ) , the manager or 
the top management coalition always retain a certain 
amount of discretion to first, select the situation, 
domain, industry (or even company - see Barnard, 
1983) in which he or they choose to operate, and 
secondly - and more importantly - to choose goals 
which are not optimizing or economically rational 
but which merely allow the organization to generate 
enough "slack" to engage felicitously in what Simon 
( 1957) would term "satisfying" behaviour." 
John Bourgeois, III, Strategy Making, Environmental, 
and Economic Performance: A Conceptual and Empirical 
Explanation, University of Washington, PH.D., 1978, 
p. 17. 
"So, we have argued that the top management 
or dominant coalition always retains a certain 
amount of discretion to chose courses of action 
which serve to co-align the organization's 
resources with its environmental opportunities, 
and to serve the values and preferences of 
management. As has been argued elsewhere, this 
relegates the independent (usually contextual) 
variables of contingency views." 
John Bourgeois, III, Strategy Making, Environmental, 
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and Economic Performance: A Conceptual and Empirical 
Explanation, University of Washington, PH.D., 1978, 
pp. 18-19. 
The major contribution from Bourgeouis (1978) is; to the extent that 
uncertainty is an objective factor of environmental uncertainty it 
should be embraced, for to avoid it or worse, disregard it, creates 
an unreal environmental perspective from which only failure can 
come. 
Secondly, that the formulation and formation of strategy can be 
approached from more then just the narrow rational comprehensive 
approach where goals are followed by means. 
Thirdly, strategists in relation to secondary or business level 
strategy should focus on the incremental means rather then a 
comprehensive planning goals orientation. He reasons that some goal 
distortion is positive in that it keeps options open and allows ends 
to evolve by increment, inherent flexibility with a closer proximity 
to implementation and thus the Operating Reality. 
In primary strategy, the above mode should be reversed for 
corporate level strategic formulation. Bourgeouis argues that there 
should be a difference in focus between primary and secondary 
strategy sessions. The former is more creative and macro in 
orientation while the latter is more operational and micro in 
orientation in terms of the strategic variables it needs to 
accommodate. 
Hayes and Abernathy (1980 pp. 67-77) in a controversial paper 
argue that American business has lost its technological position of 
leadership and therein their competitive advantage. 
Hayes et al ( 1980) reject the traditional arguments referring to 
OPEC, tax and other explanations of American economic decline. In 
terms of OPEC they sight Germany which imports a much higher 
percentage ( 95%) of oil then America ( 50%) yet with less negative 
economic impact. Their argument is that these explanations are too 
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general in their application to be of any use in coming to terms with 
the essential failures of American businesses' competitive advantage. 
Their concerns go directly to America's loss of productivity growth, 
in absolute and relative terms. Hayes and Abernathy point out that 
American commerce has deviated from its traditional focus on product 
and production technology. Instead America has focused on the 
quantitative management of acquisitions and portfolio management. 
The authors suggest that America's competitive recovery needs to 
be based on more corporations focusing on their human resources, 
products/services, consumers and a long term commitment to 
technological development. In other words a concerted effort to 
improve the fundamentals (Wheelwright 1984) on a platform of 
innovation and creating value. 
"The key to long-term success-even survival-
in business is what it has always been: to 
invest, to innovate, to lead, to create value 
where none existed before." 
Robert Hayes et al, Managing Our Way to Decline, 
Harvard Business Review, August, 1980, p. 77. 
Wheelwright ( 1984 pp. 77-87) argues that "The primary objective of 
strategy is to develop and support a lasting competitive advantage." 
Steven Wheelwright, Manufacturing Strategy: Defining the Missing 
Link, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 5, 1984, p. 77. 
Wheelwright discusses strategy from the perspective of 
manufacturing suggesting that strategy is reflected in every corner 
of the enterprise. The realization of the importance of manufacturing 
can be seen in the radical economic development of Japan and more 
recently the Three Tigers of the Pacific Rim. All of whom have based 
their major competitive advantage/weapon on their ability to out-
manufacture the competition. 
The message Wheelwright has applied to manufacturing is an 
important lesson for strategists; in that strategy needs to be a 
through-put of the corporation as a whole, in each function, 
operation and employee, rather then an input or output of a 
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particular area or level in the organization. That is, strategy must 
form part of the corporation as a whole and the corporation needs to 
be apart of the strategy on all levels, resulting in a comprehensive 
organizational Strategy System which is at all times reflective of the 
Operating Environment's present and evolving conditions. 
Just as Wheelwright advocates strategy as an integral part of 
corporate success it may be argued that each function can provide 
a competitive advantage, which when appropriately aligned to 
corporate strategy and the other functional strategies will promote 
the corporation's competitive position and move the corporation 
toward the position objective. 
Quinn has been yet another productive contributor to the theory of 
strategic management (1980), (1977), (1978). 
In 1977 Quinn argued that strategic management should be tolerated 
if not encouraged from multiple sources. Quinn suggests that 
strategy should move away from the traditional top-down formula 
toward a corporate wide inclusive corporate culture responsibility. 
By making strategy an open corporate subject he not only wanted 
the important perspectives and contributions of all corporate 
sources, but to create an atmosphere and culture of creativity at all 
levels of corporate hierarchy. Quinn understood and believed in the 
political gains to be made in such an open and inclusive Strategic 
System approach, which facilitates the creative contribution of all 
associated with the organization. 
Further, his inclusive approach would achieve the level of employee 
buy-in needed to restructure, in part, the adversarial American 
human resource problems. Quinn advocated consensus to avoid the 
traditional opposition to pronounced goals and built upon incremental 
decision making, which facilitates flexibility allowing the final 
commitment of resources to be as delayed as possible thus extending 
the point of no return and therein risk. 
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Quinn went so far as to suggest that senior management should 
provide a few poignant pointers in terms of strategy and encourage 
the corporate body to originate strategy. Arguing that this was the 
most effective and efficient means of translating conceptual goals 
into operational means and ends. That, by translating conceptual 
strategy into the operational functional, divisional, market or 
product terminology one could increase strategic allegiance and 
commitment. 
"In fact, the essDnce of strategy is to 
identify this small number of truly 
essential thrusts or concepts and to 
consciously marshall the organization's 
resources and capabilities toward them." 
Brian Quinn, Strategic Goals: Process and 
Politics, Sloan Management Review, Fall, 
1977, p. 28. 
In 1978 Quinn argued that the realities of strategic management is 
not reflected in the literature; which at the time regarded strategic 
management as a closed, exclusive system rather then the open 
system Quinn advocated and which evolved with his contribution, at 
least in theory. Quinn being an "incrementalist" suggested that 
successful strategies do not come about as complete proclamations; 
rather they develop over time by increment, in phases or cycles with 
input and influence from all sources and interest groups. 
Here too, Quinn (1978) suggests that strategy be evolved by logical 
"incrementalism", united by a consensus of top management. Quinn 
regards the traditional American Strategic Management Model as 
biased in favour of a quantitative obsession; and that it is weak to 
the extent that it has been blind to the qualitative imperatives of an 
open, participatory system. That is, one which is both a contributor 
and recipient of the many other managerial, operational, divisional, 
functional, product and external systems, on many levels of 
interaction and contribution ie. a porus system. 
Quinn defines logical incrementalism as " ... a purposeful, effective, 
proactive management technique for improving and integrating both 
the analytical and behavioral aspects of strategy formulation. " Brain 
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Quinn, Strategic Change: "Logical Incrementalism", Sloan 
Management Review, Fall, 1978, p. 8. The author points out the high 
unrealized costs of a purely quantitative approach to strategy 
formulation; advocating the use of qualitative perspectives to ensure 
that a balanced approach to strategy is adopted. 
Due to the complex nature of strategic management, decisions are 
divided and subdivided so that the net result is a phase by phase 
decision process in which decisions are made, and finial commitments 
delayed until the resource commitment is as close to the point of 
execution as feasible within the circumstances. This facilitates 
"maximum" informed decisions, as the relevant variables are 
assessed on the most current data and observations. 
Quinn ( 1978) states that rigid strategy systems are doomed to fail; 
as strategy revolves around a powerful set of future variables which 
include a broad range of volatility. Quinn suggests that strategic 
matters should be approached in a vague and general manner with 
incremental focus on the future, and the present, where the future 
is decided and in the past where the present originates. 
"Strategy planning does not deal with future 
decisions. It deals with the futurity of 
present decisions. Decisions exist only in 
the present. The question that faces the 
strategic decision-maker is not what his 
organization should do tomorrow. It is, 
'What do we do today to be ready for an 
uncertain tomorrow?'" 
Peter Drucker, Management, London, William 
Heinemann LTD., 1974, p. 125. 
Burgelman ( 1983) argued that strategy as a process operates on two 
levels in a corporation. The classic process wherein management 
takes decisions within the current set of objectives and policies and 
on a second autonomous level. This latter process he termed Internal 
Corporate Venturing (ICV) which accounts for strategic renewal and 
development, and into which Mintzberg's (1985) Emergent strategy 
may be argued to fall. 
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Cosier, and Aplin, (1980 pp. 343-356) offer a critique of the 
Dialectical Inquiry System (DIS.). The authors suggest that the 
DIS. is effective under uncertain conditions, specifically those ill-
structured and complex strategic problems. It is a means of ensuring 
that the strategy making process is objective in terms of, the 
subjective and Objective Reality /ies of the variables involved and 
secondly, the managerial perspective (filtration) in approaching the 
issues from (all) the various perspectives be they conceptual, 
operational, logistic or other. 
Cosier et al (1980) describe the dialectical theory as having a thesis 
and an anti-thesis as a means of attaining objectivity. From these 
two arguments the decision makers come to a synthesis or "meeting 
of the minds" (consensus ad idem) so to speak. Mason (1969) 
supported this approach because he argued that strategy very often 
deals with assumptions, which are subjective, thus the objective 
nature of DIS. causes a more balanced analysis of the decision and 
the variables involved. 
Emnhoff and Mitroff (1978 pp. 49-60) suggest that the process 
leading to a synthesis of compromise weakens the decisions taken as 
a result of the hybrid nature of the strategic components reflecting 
the political struggles. 
"If a decision must be taken, the strategy 
is usually forged with political compromise." 
Emnhoff et al, Improving the Effectiveness 
of Corporate Planning, Horizons, Vol. 21, 1978, 
p. 54. 
Emnhoff et al (1978) suggest a process to avoid these problems, 
called Strategic Assumption Analysis (SAA. ) . It is made up of four 
stages: one, teams are set up to make strategic suggestions, this 
weakens the political alliances. Secondly, a dialectical process 
ensues based on the strategic assumptions, which gives rise to the 
third phase where assumptions are built into the strategy by 
synthesis. Lastly, from these "core" assumptions the strategy is 
defined and synthesis is built into the process rather then at the 
point of decision. 
60 
The expert approach in DIS. involves experts who concur on the 
assumptions, to draw out the strategy while the devil's advocate 
approach requires a plan and a critical analysis thereof. 
The authors state that DIS. is often inappropriate when strategic 
movement is needed, rather the DIS. approach reinforces the status 
quo and conservatinm generally. Cosier, and Aplin, suggest that an 
open minded approach may be able to contribute objectivity without 
the ultra conservatism of the Dialectical Inquiry System. 
Mi troff and Mason ( 1981 pp. 649-651) provide a response to Cosier' s 
( 1981) paper on the dialectic. They argue that the Dialectic system 
as presented by Cosier ( 1981) is more of a two way Devils Advocate 
then a Dialectic. Their reasoning is that true Dialectic involves not 
the presentation of two formulated policies but rather the same 
group formulating a problem from contrasting perspectives thus 
ensuring comprehensive coverage, thought and development of the 
issues from non-partizan perspectives. 
Further, that DIS. is suited to complex, ill-structured problems and 
by controlling the experiments the researcher creates structure 
thereby reducing the effectiveness of DIS. . Further, Mi troff and 
Mason argue that solutions to complex, important and resource 
committing decisions can not be explained by the facts alone; the 
policy issue itself involves "metaphysical judgement" (Mitroff 1981 
p. 651) which is not reflected in Cosier et al. 
Charles Snow, and Donald Hambrick, (1980 pp. 527-538) studied 
close on two hundred organizations in an empirical attempt to 
measure strategy. 
Snow and Hambrick use the Miles and Snow ( 1978) topology, which 
types an organization's relationship with its environment, to carry 
out an analysis of strategic change. 
Snow et al argue that there are many shapes and forms of 
organizational "change". That not all of these movements are indeed 
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strategic change. They suggest a practical measurement of when 
change is strategic and when it is something other, for example 
adaptation or a tactical movement. 
Their theory is that strategic change has taken place when there is 
substantial realignment with the environment and there is a related 
internal technological, structural and process change in order to 
effect this new relationship with/to the environment. 
Snow and Hambrick believe that corporate movement in respect of its 
relationship to its environment should not be regarded as strategic 
change but strategic adjustment until such time as the related 
internal changes take place, at which time strategic change is said 
to have taken place. 
Consequently, the trend in practice is toward modification rather 
then change itself, strategically, in terms of the corporate 
relationship to its environment. This argument is in line with 
Mintzberg's (1977) strategic Life Cycle theory, and the role of 
Cyclical phases therein. 
Snow et al's (1978) paper is important in that it discusses strategy 
as an alignment tool for the corporation within a specialized and 
peculiar Operating Environment and circumstances. The current 
thesis tackles this question in terms of the variations in Strategic 
Duration Perspectives, such being an important contributor to this 
perennial environmental alignment processes and how the 
corporation relates its change to environmental developments in 
terms of the numerous strategic variable's multi-dimensional, 
directional and varying impact. 
Hatten, Schendel, and Cooper, (1978 pp. 592-610) undertook a 
study of the American brewing industry to establish whether 
quantitative analysis of strategy can be successfully established 
from the corporate goals, the environment and the strategy. 
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The authors define corporate strategy in terms of the 
product/market choices, ". . . corporate strategy relates the goals 
and objectives the firm wishes to achieve to the products it is to 
offer, the markets it will serve, and the environment in which it 
exists. 11 Kenneth Hatten, A Strategic Model of the U.S. Brewing 
Industry: 1952 - 1971, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 21, 
No. 4, 1978, p. 592. 
Business strategy is defined as being more focused, "It defines how 
the firm will deploy its resources in a given product/market area 
.... to: ( 1) satisfy the constraints of corporate level strategy and, 
concurrent, ( 2) exploit the opportunities and avoid the threats 
emanating from the environment (Hofer and Schendel 1978) . 11 
Kenneth Hatten, A Strategic Model of the U.S. Brewing Industry: 
1952 - 1971, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1978, 
p. 593. 
A key question is the allocation of resource decisions relative to the 
competition. How can the firm produce a competitive advantage, 
competitive distinction, differentiation or product augmentation so 
as to more effectively allocate corporate resources to beat the 
competition. Hatten et al (1978) argue that one should begin from an 
understanding of the past as the basis for the future of the 
corporation and competition. They argue in favour of a quantitative 
basis of strategy over a conceptual approach arguing that the more 
objective analysis will be devoid of the subjective influences 
attributed to the conceptual models. 
Hatten et al (1978) argue that strategy can be formulated on the 
basis of perceived relationships between management controlled 
strategic variables, product/market combinations, pricing policies, 
resource allocation to R&D and advertising, and non-management 
controllable strategic variables or environmental variables. 
The authors reason that a quantitative approach provides a 
comprehensive understanding of the relationship between particular 
variables and performance via an objective assessment of variables 
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to performance measurements, for example market share and 
profitability. Strategies or what Hatten et al refer to as "multivariate 
combination or patterns of controllable variables" can be assessed in 
terms of their relationship to the objective performance 
measurements like profits. 
Secondly, by extrapolation the future can be simulated, to the 
unknown extent (environment dependent) that the past reflects the 
future. 
Thirdly, they argue that a quantitative model of strategy provides 
an objective reference to one or a set of strategic or management 
controlled variables, to simulate scenario (Fisher 1990) 
planning/budgeting on a zero or extrapolation basis. 
From the objective and public information of the competition the 
qualitative analysis can provide an opportunity to understand the 
strategies of the competition. 
Further, that via the competition's objective information in a 
quantitative analysis one can reconstruct the strategies of the 
competition and therein develop a more effective competitive position 
and a more accurate competitive weapon as a result of one's more 
accurate competitor analysis. 
It is clear from the extensive literature that strategic management is 
a complex discipline largely as a result of the uncertainty and the 
vigorous, unique relationship between the corporation and its 
evolving Operating Environment. Consequently there is a need to 
have a comprehensive appreciation of the strategic variables in order 
to argue the specifics of this research which focuses upon the 
conceptual notion of American Strategic Duration Perspective. 
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2. 3 Strategic Duration Perspective And Strategic Management 
"The time dimension is inherent in management 
because management is concerned with decisions 
for action. And action always aims at results 
in the future." 
Peter Drucker, Management, London, William 
Heinemann LTD, 1974, p. 44. 
This research project focuses on TIME as it relates to the 
management of strategy within the Operating Environment of the 
United States of America. 
"In the 1980's some enthusiasm for the strategic 
model began to wane because of disappointing 
results where it had been applied. Critics 
argued that it and other techniques had 
encouraged managers to take too short a 
perspective in the running of their businesses." 
David Hurst, Why Strategic Management is Bankrupt, 
Organizational Dynamics, Autumn, 1986, p. 9. 
The research topic originates from the harsh criticism of the short 
term time horizon attributed to American strategic management; this 
in-spite of the wide spread usage of this short term Strategic 
Duration Perspective in the American Operating Environment. The 
same literature consistently refers to the long term time horizon of 
Japanese strategic management (Fisher 1990) (McMillan 1980); 
suggesting that America take a lesson from the Japanese duration 
perspective. 
" . . . it was found that U.S. firms are more 
flexible in their strategic deployment of 
resources and that they emphasize short-term 
resource utilization, while Japanese firms 
emphasize long-term resource accumulation .... " 
T. Kagono et al, Strategic vs. Evolutionary 
Management, Amsterdam, North--Holland, 1985. 
(Researcher's underlining) 
"This contrast in resource deployment is the 
most significant difference between Japan and 
the U .s .. o ••II 
T . Kagono et al, Strategic vs. Evolutionary 
Management, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1985. 
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While this argument may have theoretical support, the feasibility and 
practical application have not been questioned as a specialized topic 
in any type of scientific, empirical study. This thesis will initiate 
this field and provide exploratory insight into the question of an 
American Strategic Duration Perspective (SOP. ) . 
"This finding corresponds to the difference 
in environment and objectives cited earlier: 
it is quite reasonable for the U.S. firms, 
which have higher priority to profitability 
and face a lower opportunity environment, to 
emphasize mobility and short-term capitalization 
of resources. " 
T. Kagono et al, Strategic vs. Evolutionary 
Management, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1985, 
p. 30. 
It was difficult to find any significant references in the literature on 
the specific research question beyond the broad consensus that 
America needs a longer term time horizon. Das, in a (1991) article 
concurs that " . . . very little is known about the process of setting 
planning horizons and its interrelationship with the setting of 
corporate objectives." T. K. Das, Time: The Hidden Dimension in 
Strategic Planning, Long Range Planning, Vol. 24, No. 3, June 
1991, p. 49. 
The following is a discussion of the time horizon factor in the 
strategic management literature. 
"It is, "What futurity do we have to build 
into our present thinking and doing, what 
time spans do we have to consider, and how 
do we use this information to make rational 
decision now?"" 
Peter Drucker, Management, London, William 
Heinemann LTD, 1974, p. 125. 
In 1963, Friedman (p. 42) argued that long range planning was 
partly responsible for the under-realized potential of the 1960's as 
a commercial "profit-bed". He argued that planning gave 
corporations similar information in terms of which investments to 
follow, resulting in highly competitive markets (reducing 
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asymmetrical competitive theory as espoused by Rumelt 1979) and 
consequentially lower margins. 
Tylecote (1987 pp. 51-64) argued that a short-term time perspective 
or discounted rate of time, is the result of the high cost of capital 
and managerial identification with the capital providers ie. 
institutional investors and therein their agenda. In addition it is 
suggested that the expectations and power of institutional investors, 
the cultural acceptance of a short term out-look and the increased 
application, access and speed of technology have accelerated this 
trend. In 1987 Tylecote suggested (p. 62) that this discounted rate 
of time would decrease productivity and retard innovation. 
For Stalk ( 1988 pp. 41-51) time represents a strategy of perennial 
assessment of one's competitive advantage in relation to the 
movement/s taking place in the environment. Further, that such 
vigilance is not only essential to corporate existence, it represents 
the real power of competitive advantage. That is, the ability to 
consistently reach the market with new products represents a power 
to which the competition can not respond without major multi-level 
internal restructuring. Stalk's argument here is what Das (1991) 
refers to as Time being a component of a corporate performance 
reflected in "time based competition" about which Stalk is an 
established authority. 
Evans et al (1989 pp. 5-13) provides a very enlightening discussion 
on time and its cultural interpretations. He suggests that Western 
cultures regard time as a continuum of devisable exact units, or a 
physical linear perspective of time. While Asian cultures have a more 
informal approach to time. Western labour exchange their time for 
wages which dictates their relationship to the corporation. Japanese 
life-time employment dictates a more comprehensive long term 
relationship. In contrast American corporations continue to hire 
variations of contract labour for an increasing number of positions. 
Evans argues that culture has implications for time which impacts the 
duration perspective of managers. 
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Evans's argument is central to this research because the existing 
literature advocates "superimposing" a long term Strategic Duration 
Perspective on the typical short term perspective of the American 
culture and structures of the Operating Environment. Based on 
Evans's study the feasibility of accomplishing this imposition is 
weak, if viable or desirable at all. Das (1991 p. 51), argues that 
Strategic Duration Perspective is unique on an indi.vidual basis to 
the extent that it becomes a "political 11 tool in reaching corporate 
consensus in corporate strategy negotiations. 
"While we are concerned with the temporal 
horizons of organizations, it is important 
to recognize that the organizational temporal 
horizon is constituted collectively by all 
the individual executives. 11 
T. K. Das, Time: The Hidden Dimension in 
Strategic Planning, Long Range Planning, Vol. 
24, No. 3, June 1991, p. 51. 
Das and Jaques argue that a temporal-horizon is a subjective 
orientation. Consequently, these orientations of the future play an 
important role in the actors' Strategic Duration Perspective and 
consequently their strategic choices. Generally, the attribute of 
future orientation is assumed to be uniform. The contra reality 
places Strategic Duration Perspective in an important position in 
terms of strategic management; as the corporate activity and 
corporate strategy are subject to a continuum of time. The degree of 
fusion between the subjective Strategic Duration Perspective of the 
strategic actor and the objective requirements for performance 
foretell the type of corporate performance. 
Lawrence et al ( 1967) argue that the time-horizon should be derived 
from the environment; thus a contingency approach to Strategic 
Duration Perspective is suggested which is important to this 
research, which questions the degree of validity in the American 
Strategic Duration Perspective. 
The hypothesis proposed here is that there is a trend toward a more 
integrated, real-time form of strategic management based on the pace 
and dynamic multi-level interrelationships involved. Secondly, that 
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generally the American culture and values run contrary to the long-
term Japanese perspective in terms of Strategic Duration. Thus, the 
economic costs of such cultural resistance in America are argued to 
be unsubstantiated in terms of the real-time strategy trend and 
secondly, the economic costs involved should such application even 
be possible. 
Therefore, this research focuses upon the alternative; to utilize the 
American "short-termism" Strategic Duration Perspective in a 
positive manner and achieve superior results as a result of the broad 
and realistic application and feasibility founded upon wide spread 
cultural deployment and in view of the global trend toward time 
based competitive advantages. 
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2. 4 American Strategic Management Model 
The objective of this discussion is to briefly cover the strategic 
management model of the United States of America. 
The United States of America has been the leader of the strategic 
management movement as a result of its strong academic, military 
and commercial base. Further, America's ability to evolve and re-
define itself is facilitated by the liberty extended to its population. 
Such evolution of Man has beer1 accelerated by the freedom to 
innovate, assimilate and progress which is reflected into Man's 20th 
Century resource gathering ie. commercialism. 
The strategic management movement has been further spurred by 
America's traditional economic position at the top, and legendary 
economic creativity, opportunism and technological leadership. All 
of these factors have created an increasing demand for strategic 
management to cope with one of the most sophisticated, complex, 
dynamic and simply engrossing economic systems in the world. 
More recently strategic management has been called upon to address 
short-falls in the American economy as she contends for the 
leadership battle more closely and attempts to consolidate in light of 
the powerful Japanese, Pacific Rim and emerging united European 
economies ( Maidaque 1983 p. 158) . 
The American strategic management model has evolved from a highly 
quantitative objective, closed and exclusive system toward an 
increasingly progressively qualitative, multi perspective and more 
balanced, porus and inclusive process. In spite of this trend, at the 
present time one may concur with Hurst (1986), Maidique (1983) and 
Hayes and Abernathy (1980) that American business and business 
management has come to the end of an era. 
There are as many theoretical solutions as there are writers: 
Abernathy et al focuses on process/product technology and an 
American industrial renaissance, Reich (1983) argues against the 
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"frontier" mentality and economy suggesting versatility in 
corporations as the means to remain flexible, in an uncertain and 
dynamic future, and calls for a national industrial policy to platform 
this progress. Others refer to the fact that the American economy is 
based upon an entrepreneurial mind-set and that this is the latent 
solution. Ouchi ( 1981) advocates a Japanese type human resources 
solution for America. Yet others refer to the global economic 
reorganization and America's new position and role therein. 
America is in the process of dealing with a new global economic and 
political order and her somewhat relegated position (Maidique 1983 
p. 158) . While these authors are correct it is suggested that the 
nature of an American Strategic Management system remains hidden 
within the complexities of global economics, cultural values, 
business evolution and managerial perception of the American milieu. 
The only known factor is that the status quo in American strategic 
management is by and large seen as not contributing to corporate 
management in quality or quantity that reflects a maximization of the 
potential of this powerful management tool. Maidique ( 1983) puts it 
more strongly when he discusses "The Death of Corporate Strategy" 
(p. 151). 
All of these papers (above) call for a back to the basics approach 
and it is suggested that one would be hard pressed to find opposition 
to this argument. The critical question in this research is simple; 
how does one go about getting back to the basics when the 
cornerstone of such approach is a long term strategic perspective'? 
Further, such long term strategic perspective is presently not 
reflected in the Operating Environment, and appears to flow 
contrary to the American cultural/social values and the current 
trends in strategic and operations management. 
It may be argued that such retrofitting (of a long term SDP. ) is as 
much a fallacy, as the failed importation of Japanese management into 
America, and the Japanese (1970's and 1980's) investment in 
American real estate. The principle remains the same; suggesting 
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management systems and philosophies inconsistent with the realities 
(Quinn 1978) of the society and Operating Environment within which 
one expects the theory to operate. It is suggested that such a 
detached approach will not constitute a resolution. 
It may be argued that the principal of employing the cultural/social 
value base in a positive manner is more effective in that one achieves 
a natural and immediate reception to the theory, on a sufficiently 
large scale as a result of the socio-political-economic alignment. Such 
scale of reception is representative of the needs of a Strategic 
Duration Perspective. 
Any sustainable solution needs to be applied within the bounds of 
the popular states quo which includes many of the less amiable 
factors from a theoretical point of view, but which reflect the 
realities encountered within the American Operating Environment. 
Much of the criticism of the current American economic condition is 
directed at the traditional quantitative obsession and rational 
myopia. 
"Our company's problem between 1964 and 1980 
was our overemphasis on the rational-thinking 
function. We forgot about visions and values 
that must lie behind the objectives and 
strategies. Instead of expressing the shared 
values of the organization as a whole, our 
corporate objectives reflected the narrower 
purposes of a small group of executives." 
David Hurst, Why Strategic Management is 
Bankrupt, Organizational Dynamics, Autumn, 
1986, p. 22. 
America's use of the quantitative approach arose out of her need to 
control fast expanding industries and corporations after World War 
II (Hurst 1986 p. 6) (Maiaque 1983 pp. 151-161) and has led to a 
theory of progressive cost efficiency, management based on top-
down, unilateral, detached-management, adversarial labour 
relationships, artificially sustained by rules, regulations and 
increasingly thicker company policy manuals. The results were not 
far behind. 
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"In business the point at which everything 
starts to go wrong is also the point at which 
management believes it can stand outside the 
system and manipulate the processes for its 
own benefit." 
David Hurst, Why Strategic Management is 
Bankrupt, Organizational Dynamics, Autumn, 
1986, p. 26. 
The detachment of management from the labour force was indicative 
of this quantitative approach and the natural progression was the 
detachment from the business (operations) itself. The end result was 
non-operational professional management running businesses as 
investment units instead of competitive tools. Gone were the hands 
on managerial generalist's perspective and entrepreneurial 
approach. In place were legal, financial experts and a generation of 
Harvard type financial MBAs and lawyers. Hurst (1986) and 
Maidique (1983) argue that the loss of industry and product 
perspective and background has done grave damage to the state of 
American strategic management and business. The new managers' 
allegiance was to the players in their financial and investment circles 
of mergers, acquisitions and institutional stock market investors. 
The products, service, markets and people were subsidiary items, 
no longer the ends but the means to their ends; just what Pascale 
and Athos (1981) argued against. 
"Most of our heroes are either paper 
entrepreneurs, assisted mightily by our 
tax laws, or technicians . • . . The result 
has been a profound loss of meaning for 
both the managers and the managed. " 
David Hurst, Why Strategic Management is 
Bankrupt, Organizational Dynamics, Autumn, 
1986, p. 25. 
Andrews ( 1978) argued that strategy became masked by management 
by numbers and objectives. In the midst of this quantitative and 
"analytic" (Yoshida 1989 pp. 10-17) style the important conceptual 
strategic perspective was unfortunately lost. Management focused 
on perfecting the parts while neglecting the (sum) direction and 
alignment of these efforts. 
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The 1980's saw financial leverage decisions which had no relationship 
to the inclusive nature of corporate strategic management. As Watson 
(1963) argued, strategic management lost touch with a vital business 
ingredient - the human resource and its related social, ethical and 
bottom line implications. The result of this managerial "detachment" 
was extreme incrementalism which as Mintzberg (1973b) argued 
preserves the status quo, which meant that America was loosing her 
entrepreneurial and evolutionary "edge" as mergers replaced 
innovation. 
In a desperate measure to remain competitive with the success of the 
Japanese, American managers made vein attempts to transplant the 
Japanese strategic model. It seemed logical at the time, as Japanese 
management practice was after all based directly on the American 
methods. 
The error, which turned out to be substantial, was the fact that 
strategic variables are so highly specialized and so much a part of, 
and dependent upon the economic, social, cultural and political 
application (past present and future, internal and external) that 
these initial attempts did little to enhance the reputation of strategic 
management in America. 
It is argued that what America needs in terms of a Strategic 
Management Model is based in principal upon the Japanese 
experience. That is, to research other strategic management systems 
and then to do a "zero" based exercise in terms of imbibing a 
strategic management system into the existing economic, social, 
cultural and political make-up that is the abstract labelled 
"American". The result will be a truly American strategic 
management process alive and living (Westley and Mintzberg 1989 p. 
18) within her people and corporations and therefore accessible to 
them, a "cultural expectational base" Lincoln et al (1981 p. 96) 
(populous-driven so to speak) by definition, and aligned with 
popular evolutionary needs subjectively and objectively. The basis 
for this theory is the Japanese experience where American 
managerial principals were worked into the cultural base and therein 
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found broad popular support. 
"Japanese business success began when 
Western ideas were grafted onto traditional 
holistic orientation of the Japanese." 
Kosaku Yoshida, Deming Management Philosophy: 
Does it Work in the US as Well as Japan, 
Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. 24, 
No. 3, 1989, p. 10. 
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2. 5 Japanese Strategic Management Model 
This discussion is intended to provide a brief review of the 
literature related to the Japanese Strategic Management Model. 
Japan has been characterised by a history of isolation. This 
exclusionary policy ended finally in 1945. After World War II 
American management principals were introduced into Japan by the 
Allied Command in charge of restructuring Japan. Japan's progress 
since 1945 has been described as an economic miracle, yet the 
Japanese economy has more recently experienced difficulties and 
traits of the isolationist policy persist despite American diplomatic 
and trade-policy attempts to pry their markets open. Even more 
recently Japan has experienced violent, hitherto unthinkable cracks 
in her homogenous cultural complexion. 
Japan's economic miracle was facilitated by numerous foreign and 
internal institutions and programs, including a powerful national 
strategy to subsidize and promote industry to effect economic 
growth. 
This national economic movement was and remains very powerful. It 
ranges from low cost finance to banks, who may hold equity and 
quasi managerial positions in client corporations, to massive 
industrial co-operation in the form of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (MIT!) which was responsible for channelling finance to 
select industrial sectors at low interest rates (Horiuchi 1984 p. 349). 
11 Japanese firms operate at significantly 
lower rates of return then their U.S. 
counterparts. 11 •••• "For the sample of 
266 firms, the average return on sales, 
assets, and equity are significantly 
lower for Japanese firms then their 
U.S. counterparts. " Rosalie Tung (ed. ) , 
Strategic Management in the United States 
and Japan a Comparative Analysis, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Ballinger Publishing Company, 
1986, p . 134. 
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A more recent example of this non-market manipulation is the 
regulations regarding Japanese pension funds stock allocations 
(Steiner 1994) . He argues that this control of the financial markets 
has become so extreme that the Tokyo Stock Exchange has been 
likened to the Finance Ministry's "puppet", as cash is channelled 
into selected investments labelled important. Traditionally the 
expectations of Japanese stock market has been strategic, patient 
and patriotic. However, more recently investors have being 
rebelling against the stock market policies, non-market influences 
and poor performance by placing their cash int..l banks rather then 
stocks. 
" . . . the Japanese financial market and corporate 
financial structure will more closely resemble that 
of the United States. According to Mr. !soda's 
projection, in the not too distant future, financial 
profit will play a role, equal in importance to 
operating profit, in Japanese corporate financial 
management." 
Rosalie Tung (ed. ) , Strategic Management in the 
United States and Japan a Comparative Analysis, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1986, p. xxili. 
Traditionally the Japanese have been prepared to accept low profits 
from their corporations in exchange for long term growth, Sheldon 
et al ( 1990); Tung ( 1986). This principal is imitated by banks which 
support long periods of negative cash flow etc. so as to achieve 
strategic goals. For example, market share penetration strategies as 
exercised with great success in the American auto industry. This 
type and depth of support is simply not available from the American 
investment-community. 
It may be argued that Japan's major strategic breakthrough has been 
her unique mesh of Japanese cultural-values and practices with 
American management principals (Sullivan et al 1986) (Yoshida 1989) 
(Sheldon 1990) . Further, that this marriage of culture and 
management principals has been the most important factor in Japan's 
economic success. 
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The Japanese strategic management model is formed around the 
human resources of the corporation and their contribution to the 
multi-layered process of strategy formulation. The Japanese have 
placed strategy development in the hands of their labour force 
("trust" Ouchi 1981) which enables the various corporate functional 
structures to contribute their unique operational perspectives to 
this process. Thus developing a cohesive and comprehensive 
operations strategy which is reflected on and into corporate level 
strategy. 
Sullivan et al (1986) argued that Organizational Learning Theory 
(OTL) has been the major force in Japanese management, more so 
then Ouchi's (1981) Social Orientation Theory. Nonaka (1985) (1986) 
( 1991) describes Japanese management within the OLT as having a 
top management echelon which creates uncertainty through "variety 
amplification" (Nonaka 1991 p. 130). This involves the corporation 
in generalities and vagueness (essential elements of compromise and 
consensus) . The second echelon is made up of junior managers 
whose function it is to reveal the certainty (within the uncertainty) 
by "variety reduction" (Nonaka 1991 p. 130). Sullivan et al suggest 
that the process produces productivity, creativity and 
effectiveness. In fact the more variety is amplified (by senior 
managers) the greater are these corporate effects, as the reduction 
of variety (by junior managers) is intensified to the extent that 
variety is amplified. 
That is, the increased vagueness (created by senior management) 
accelerates junior managers' motivation for developing certainty 
through their resolution of such vagueness, such vagueness may be 
defined as, corporate strategic challenges. 
This process can be described as: 
creating a variety of options with which to effect competitive 
success (variety amplification) . 
selection from this variety (variety reduction) is made on the 
basis of competitive engagement amongst junior managers. 
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Further, the process itself produces positive side effects, for 
example in the variety reduction process the junior managers must 
interact with the environment which facilitates the collection of 
important market information, perpetuates corporate learning, 
market alignment and develops market intuition. 
This Japanese concept of producing uncertainty by senior manager 
so that junior managers can reduce it by creating certainty or 
strategy is similar in concept to Mintzberg's (1977) theory that 
strategy satisfies the need for security and direction within the 
uncertainty of the future and the results which will ensue. 
Yoshida ( 1989) suggested that Japanese corporations believe that 
through the establishment of a company philosophy, strategy and 
strategic objectives will flow. That is, Japanese corporations 
suggest that within the realm of a major issue or focus, the specifics 
will be taken care of. Again this refers to the trust that Japan has 
in her labour force's ability to follow through. This vague and non-
specific management style is labelled "holistic" by Yoshida. Holistic 
management recognizes that no matter how good the parts of the 
entity are, the sum and direction of the process must be appropriate 
in order to achieve sustained performance. 
The Japanese Operating Environment has more recently experienced 
difficulties not all of which can be explained by cyclical economic 
trends. At least part, and some argue many (Steiner 1994) of these 
problems are more reflective of macro changes in the economic 
system as it evolves through the demise of the "bubble economy" into 
a new phase. 
"But Mr. Chudler, the investment advisor, 
argues, 'The Ministry of Finance has social 
responsibility not to allow an efficient 
market to take place" because the economic 
and social costs of a major liberalization 
today would be incalculable. '" 
R. Steiner, Trouble in Tokyo, The Wall 
Street Journal, October 26 1994. 
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Clearly the Japanese Strategic Management Model is unique, based 
upon an amalgamation of American management principals and 
Japanese culture, the result of which is an amazingly complex 
strategic management process, which with the aid of the Demming 
philosophy has proven highly effective to this point. The question 
remains whether this process has the ingenuity and dexterity 
redefine itself for the 21st century? 
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2. 6 Literature Conclusion 
Strategic Management literature is excellent at analysing the past/ 
present theories and current developments within the field. The 
weakness of the literature lies in the inherent limitation of dealing 
with a discipline whose success is dependent upon future results, 
while defining factors are evolving under increasing time pressures. 
The literature defines the American and Japanese Strategic 
Management Models clearly and therein indicates their respective 
Strategic Duration Perspectives. What the literature has difficulty 
with is matching research production with the evolution of the 
Operating Environment. While technology has improved access to 
data leading to shorter lead times for research papers (thus 
enhancing their relevancy and practical usefulness) , the activity 
within the Operating Environment out-paces researches' ability to 
sustain relevancy. Further, ongoing longitudinal studies are 
expensive and present many complex issues of matching, proportion 
and comparison. In spite of these limitations the literature is 
fundamental to appreciating strategic management's evolving role. 
"Sony's troubles in the U.S. entertainment 
industry, along with Matsushita's MCA sale, 
have been viewed as cautionary tales about the 
dangers of attempting to bridge Japan's formal 
corporate world of long-term planning and by-the-
book management and Hollywood's freewheeling, 
free-spending creative style" 
Laura. Laandro, et al, Getting The Hook, The Wall 
Street Journal, December 6 1995, Al. 
The comparison of Japanese and American Strategic Management 
Models is engaging as they, in essence, share management principles 
developed in America. Yet, the evolution of these respective models 
has resulted is vastly different hypotheses. The research data 
reflects a narrowing of this distinction in terms. of Strategic Duration 
Perspective (Japanese respondents were found to be have shortened 
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Perspective (Japanese respondents were found to be have shortened 
their SOP. over the past five years Section 1: Question D) given the 
trend of Real-Time strategic management systems. A convergence of 
the two models is unlikely given the influence of cultural values on 
the strategic actors and the close association between the 
(competitive advantage) resources of the respective national 
economies. 
It is clear that the United States of America is embarking on a new 
era in a politicdlly and economically restructured global economy. 
While the American economy will be changing to meet this challenge; 
strategic management will be at the forefront of corporate direction, 
ever vigilant on the impending operating and competitive 
environment. 
The efficiency of this broad contact between corporation and 
Operating Environment is the focal point of management; for it is 
here that the corporate competitive engagement proves or disproves 
the calibre of the sum total of decisions taken by the corporate 
entity. 
It is within this competitive engagement that Time is the dimension 
responsible for the dynamic nature of commercial and economic 
activity at all levels. Time is a non-controllable strategic variable 
which is the platform upon which risk and reward are based. Time 
is both relative and independent. Time is universal in effect yet 
relative in impact. Time is increasingly a major ingredient within the 
asymmetrical battle for advantage amongst corporations. 
Time is the remaining arena for competitive offence, for while it has 
taken its toll in the past and present it has begun to decide the 
future today. 
Future Research Areas: 
Future research needs to focus upon the match between the 
evolution of the Operating Environment, the strategic actors 
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subjective perspective and the Objective Reality of various national, 
international and multi-national (economic blocks) economic systems; 
extracting a measurement of the Strategic Duration Perspectives as 
a means of achieving closer proximity to the Objective Reality. 
Further, research is needed on an analysis of various SOP. types, 
compared with respective performance results. 
The most important and difficult aspect of Strategic Management is 
that the past has select or limited application to the future. The very 
nature of the discipline is the formation of systems and processes 
which will create future goal attainment; thus forcing strategic 
actors to constantly be adventurers, discoveries and therein 
shapers of the economic future. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
3. 0 Research Methodology 
The research methodology is designed to provide empirical data 
which is statistically representative and adequate to test the 
research hypotheses (Clover 1979). Further, the methodology is in 
line with the academic trends of Strategic Management thesis 
research as discussed by Shirvastava, et al (1989). 
"The mental process through which decisions 
are reached determine to a large extent the 
accuracy of conclusions. " 
Vernon Clover et al, Business Research 
Methods, Ohio, Grid Publishing, 1979, p. 13. 
This exploratory empirical work constitutes applied research, 
(McGuire 1986 p. 15) and as such is aimed at solving a specific 
problem namely; the identification of an optimum Strategic Duration 
Perspective for the American Operating Environment. 
This research questions the Strategic Duration Perspective as a 
critical alignment factor in the interface between corporate strategy 
on the one hand and the Operating Environment on the other. Thus, 
the research does not have a particular functional association but 
rather an inclusive functional application in that Strategic Duration 
Perspective relates to, and impacts on, the business conceptually 
and practically as a whole and as functional, operational and 
managerial parts thereof. This, within the conceptual theory of 
integrative contingency theory, where a holistic multidimensional 
relationship exists between the internal, internal-external and 
external dynamics. 
The research is context-free in orientation, that is the research 
seeks to determine Strategic Duration Perspective in the Operating 
Environment of the United States of America regardless of 
organizational context beyond the "organizational matching" which 
ensures a scientific comparative basis between the three corporate 
categories. Thus, the research is issue specific, namely Strategic 
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Duration Perspective for the American Operating Environment and 
organization generic, namely qualified matching corporations in the 
three categories American, Japanese and Japanese-American. 
According to the research categorization suggested by Shirivastava, 
et al (1989) this research could be termed "environmental". Yet, it 
should not be regarded as an environmental analysis but rather an 
analysis of the degree of alteration and or adaptation to a particular 
Operating Environment in terms of Strategic Duration Perspective. 
This research is conceptual and exploratory in nature which makes 
it difficult, but nonetheless significant. 
The research is cross-cultural, in that the comparison is made 
between Japanese and American concepts of Strategic Duration 
Perspective in relation to the American Operating Environment. The 
objective measurement in this research is the Japanese-American 
Strategic Duration Perspective, ie. Japanese corporations operating 
within the American economy. Consequently an appreciation of the 
methodological implications of cross-cultural research are important 
to the quality of analysis. According to Brislin et al (1973) the real 
challenge in such studies is the cross-cultural methodology. The 
applicable problems raised in their book are: 
i. cross-economy corporate matching. 
ii. language translation. 
iii. researcher cultural and national bias. 
iv. geographical distance and costs. 
v. cross-sectional study limitations 
The researcher plans to manage these by: 
i. the sampling plan (Brislin 1973 p. 21) will utilize an objective 
quantitative measurement (size, volume and industry) for 
sample corporations in both Japan and America. 
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ii. to professionally translate the English survey into Japanese 
and then verbally "back translate" it into English as a means 
of ensuring translation equivalency in questionnaires (Brislin 
1973 p. 33). 
iii. in spite of being based in America for much of the research, 
the researcher is a citizen of a third country thus reducing 
the effects of subjective cultural or national bias. 
iv. the research data will be gathered by a mail and literature 
survey (due to costs) , thereby providing a standard setting 
for data gathering. 
v. by referring to a study conducted in 1980 by the authors of 
a book titled Strategic vs. Evolutionary Management a U.S. -
Japan comparison of strategy and organization, Kagono et al 
Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1985 and secondly, by utilizing an 
extensive bibliography. 
These represent an effort to avoid, in part, some of the inherent 
limitations of strategic research based purely upon cross-sectional 
data. Further, the limits of "cross-cultural" studies are reduced to 
the extent that the origins of a Japanese-American Strategic 
Duration Perspective (ie. Japanese SDP.) is surveyed; thus 
providing the historical perspective for a Japanese-American 
Strategic Duration Perspective and a quasi-longitudinal view of the 
(evolutionary and adaptive) process of the "objective" Japanese-
American SDP .. 
The fundamental question asked in this study is the viability of the 
American short-term orientation or short-termism (Buckely and 
Brooke 1992) toward corporate strategic management within the 
American Operating Environment from a holistic and applied 
perspective of the issue. 
The catalyst for this topic was the criticism of this American short-
term strategic approach in the literature. This work is an attempt to 
improve the understanding of strategic management beyond the 
traditional organizational output-cost, volume and price references .• 
To deal with the Strategic Duration Perspective question from a 
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converse perspective and illuminate the objective soundness and 
validity, or not, of the American short-term Strategic Duration 
Perspective. 
The research method is the comparison of the Strategic Duration 
Perspective of three corporate categories namely; Japanese 
Corporations (J) operating in Japan with traditional long-term 
Strategic Duration Perspective (Brislin et al 1992 p. 391) 
approaches, American Corporations (A) operating in America with 
traditionally short-term Strategic Duration Perspective orientations 
and Japanese-American Corporations (JA) operating in America, 
whose Strategic Duration Perspective categorization will be 
established in the course of this research. 
A sample corporation is defined within one of these three categories 
by one, geographical location, two, ownership and three, 
management. 
The methodology is to measure the degree of Strategic Duration 
Perspective modification made by Japanese-American corporations in 
response to the American Operating Environment as compared to 
one, their traditional Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective which 
is postulated to be these (Japanese-American) corporations' typical 
or historic Strategic Duration Perspective. Secondly, to compare 
such modified Japanese-American SDP. with American SDP .. 
These comparisons [(JA with J) and (JA with A)] will facilitate a 
comprehension of the rational (or not) of American Strategic 
Duration Perspective by using the Japanese-American Strategic 
Duration Perspective as a quasi objective measurement. The 
objectivity of the Japanese-American corporations is deduced from 
their traditional long-term Strategic Duration Perspective 
orientation, and therefore any Strategic Duration Perspective 
modification made in America is theorized to be based upon tlie macro 
and micro, internal and external 11 American11 Operating Environment. 
It is this degree of change or adaptation made by these Japanese-
American corporations which will provide this study with an 
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objective base-measurement of Strategic Duration Perspective for 
the American Operating Environment. From this objective-base the 
American Strategic Duration Perspective can be reflected so as to 
argue the rational, or not, of the American Strategic Duration 
Perspective. 
The sample corporations comprise of public companies operating in 
the three categories and having their major management operations 
in the respective economies. The Japanese-American corporations 
need to have been operating in America for at least four years. 
Writers on the subject of American strategy appear to have adopted 
a presumptuous attitude and suggest a simplistic solution: namely, 
to adopt the longer-term strategic perspective generally attributed 
to Japanese corporations. This argument is reinforced beyond the 
obvious by the comparative economic miracle of the Japanese in 
recent times and American difficulties. 
Questions remain on two important levels: 
One, the practical application of a long-term Strategic Duration 
Perspective within a culture and economy which shows no 
dispensation to such. Could it be argued that the American "short-
term" performance-orientated Strategic Duration Perspective has 
resulted in a unique Strategic Duration Perspective based on the 
specific factors within the American Operating Environment'? As such 
could it represent a development in the overall field of strategy 
management'? This argument could be secured if the shorter 
Strategic Duration Perspective represents the most effective and 
efficient management of the American corporate environment: a 
comparative analysis of the respondent corporations will provide 
insight to this question. 
Secondly, the economic desirability of a longer-term Strategic 
Duration Perspective within the general trend of shorter, more 
flexible and adaptive business activity, let alone the impact of 
technology. 
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The whole question recently of the applicability and redefinition of 
long range business planning generally, makes this research 
relevant and important to corporate strategists in the 1990's and 
beyond. Can the long-term Strategic Duration Perspective 
suggested in the literature survive in an Operating Environment 
where all aspects of business and indeed commercial activity are 
being shortened in the name of time-based competition and 
commercial flexibility and productivity'? 
The whole question of Strategic Duration Perspective is complicated 
further by the fact (Drucker 1959) that strategic decisions are 
present time-fixed while their results and effects are future time-
variable within ever faster strategic and (operating) environmental 
evolution. Thus, the application, feasibility and desirability of a 
long-term Strategic Duration Perspective for the American Operating 
Environment needs to be questioned. 
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3 .1 Survey Respondent Statistics 
Surveys were mailed to American, Japanese and Japanese-American 
corporations. 
The objective is to determine the Strategic Duration Perspective of 
Japanese and American corporations in their respective Operating 
Environments. The research will then measure the degree of 
alteration and or adaptation in Strategic Duration Perspective made 
by Japanese corporations as a result of doing business within the 
American economy. 
A comparative analysis will then be done between the Japanese and 
Japanese-American Strategic Duration Perspectives to evaluate and 
determine the rational, or not or degree thereof, and direction for 
such movement or deviation from the respective traditional Strategic 
Duration Perspective model. 
From this point the focus shifts to a comparative analysis of the 
American and Japanese-American Strategic Duration Perspective 
data to test the hypotheses that the American Strategic Duration 
Perspective is a resourceful and innovative approach in relation to 
the specifics of the contemporary American Operating Environment. 
The survey methodology comprised of a survey mailing to ninety-
eight Japanese strategists, one hundred 
strategists and one hundred seventeen 
sixteen American 
Japanese-American 
strategists. Respondents were provided surveys in English or 
Japanese. The corporations were selected from a list of Fortune 500 
corporations in the August 23rd 1993 issue of Fortune Magazine. The 
Japanese-American Strategic Planners were selected from the 
Japanese respondents who had operations in America. This list was 
compiled manually with the assistance from the James J Hill Library 
in ST. Paul Minnesota USA. using the following Japanese 
directories: Japan Country Profile 1991-92, Japan Country Report 
No 11992, Japan Trade Directory 1985-1986, 1991 - 1992 Directory 
Japanese-Affiliated Companies in USA & Canada, Japan Company 
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Handbook First Section Spring 1993, Japan Company Handbook 
Second Section Spring 1993, Diamond's Japan Business Directory 
1992 and Japan Yellow Pages Spring 1993. 
A modification of the three wave method was used to maximize 
responses. The respondents were mailed the following 
correspondence: 
i. Pre-malling letter. 
ii. Questionnaire mailing cover letter and introduction with 
survey. 
iii. Reminder letter with survey. 
iv. Reminder letter with survey. 
v. Follow-up mailing cover letter with survey. 
vi. Survey received thank you letter. 
vii. Survey results and discussion malling letter. 
Schedule of correspondence: 
i. Pre-mailing letters were mailed 14 February 1994 to three 
hundred thirty one target respondents, in three research 
categories namely, American Corporations, Japanese 
Corporations and Japanese-American Corporations. 
ii. Survey mailed 22 February 1994 to three hundred thirty one 
targeted respondents as listed below (see List of survey 
targeted corporate respondents) . The response rates (see 
table below Survey response pattern table) was as expected 
for an exploratory study, targeting over surveyed and hard 
to survey respondent positions. 
The researcher estimates that approximately two hundred 
ninety of the surveys and correspondence dispatched reached 
their targeted destination and targeted corporate positions. 
The researcher then utilized reminder letters to increase the 
response rate to the rates indicated below. These reminder 
letters were mailed with second and third surveys to solicit 
sufficient responses to satisfy the study. 
iii. Thank you letters mailed as needed. 
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iv. Reminder letter one mailed from 5 March 1994. 
v. Reminder letter two mailed from 15 April 1994. 
vi. Reminder letter three mailed from 10 June 1994 with letter of 
support from Professor A J Strickland. 
vii. Reminder letter three was mailed in smaller batches 
throughout June, July and August 1994. 
viii. Survey Data collection completed August 1994. 
ix. A summary and discussion of the survey results where mailed 
to one hundred ten respondents in November 1994 in the 
Respondent discussion letter, (see Appendix 8) . 
I 
The response rate was achieved in late August 1994 when the 
response rate reached between thirty two and thirty nine 
percent of surveys reasonably estimated to have reached their 
targeted respondent corporate positions. 
Survey Response Pattern Table: 
II A II J I J~l Tot~I I Respondents' targeted I 116 98 117 331 
Less non-delivered (estimate 10% 15% 12% 12.33% 
+returns) 
I Net delivered surveys I 104.4 83.3 102.9 290 
Net surveys received by 41 36 33 109 
researcher 
Response rate of surveys 39.3% 43.2% 32.1% 38.18% 
delivered 
Average response rate for 
survey was 38 .18% 
The researcher acknowledges that such response rates are lower 
then average; but it should be noted that such response rates are 
average or slightly above average given the target respondents and 
the complex nature of the topic surveyed. The researcher was 
encouraged by the fax correspondence and notations made by 
respondents on the surveys and cover letters which indicate a 
heightened interest in the survey material (see Appendix 4) . 
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CHAPTER 4: 
4. 0 Analysis Of The Data 
The researcher would like it noted that this research is exploratory 
in nature, dealing with the investigation, measurement and analysis 
of a complex, descriptive and conceptual phenomenon - Strategic 
Duration Perspective. 
The Strategic Duration Perspective concept was new to the survey 
respondents; in spite of the fact that the respondents are a sample 
of the population which is (in part) responsible for the issues and 
behaviour upon which Strategic Duration Perspective was developed 
and identified. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a detailed analysis and 
discussion of the data. This will be accomplished by taking each 
question in turn and: 
i. Explaining the relevance of the question. 
ii. Discussing the anticipated response based upon the current 
literature. 
iii. Discussing the empirical response. 
iv. Representing the data from each questions numerically and 
graphically. 
v. Discussing the results from each sample category. 
Each of the four sections will be dealt with in a similar manner. This 
micro perspective of the data is followed by the more inclusive, 
macro discussion of the four hypotheses. 
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4.1 Analysis And Interpretation Of The Survey Questions 
SECTION 1: OPERATING ENVIRONMENT INFORMATION. 
Question A. 
How would you describe the Pace of change in the Corporation's 
Operating Environment? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. erratic. 
2. chaotic. 
3. fast. 
4. slow. 
Weighted Average Analysis l:A 
erratic chaotic fast slow 
A 3% 3% 28% 3% 
J 4% 5% 22% 0% 
J-A 4% 4% 18% 3% 
Combine 11% 13% 71% 5% 
Graphic Analysis 1: A 
1 0 ·-----···-·---·-·--···-·-···-··-··-······-···-·-···--·-····-----·----···· ···--· ··--·--···-··------·--··----
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era tic chaotic fast slow 
I-American --+- Japanese ~ Jap.-American 
94 
Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis l:A 
First - Fast 
Second - Chaotic 
Second - Erratic 
Second - Slow 
American Respondents 
First - Fast 
Second - Chaotic 
Third - Erratic 
Forth - Slow 
Japanese Respondents 
First - Fast 
Second - Erratic 
Second - Chaotic 
Third - Slow 
Japanese-American Respondents 
First - Fast 
Second - Chaotic 
Third - Erratic 
Forth - Slow 
Combined Respondents 
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Discussion: 
The above data suggest consistent support for the opinion that the 
three corporate categories perceive their Operating Environments to 
be changing at a "fast" pace. 
The perceived pace of change in the Operating Environment is 
important to the research as strategic management is the primary 
tool for reconciling the interaction between the internal and external 
behaviour and performance of the unit of competition (ie. the 
business) via the allocation or non-allocation of corporate resources, 
with the external Operating Environment. Hence the need to reflect 
such external change into the corporation both conceptually and 
structurally. 
The literature basis for this question is Ansoff's (1977) focus on 
narrowing the focus of strategic management as a means of dealing 
with the increasing pace of change in the Operating Environment as 
evidenced in the literature and the empirical data. 
Friedman ( 1963) argued that strategic decisions would not be 
excluded from the ramifications of increasingly shorter time frames 
within the Operating Environment and therein the need for a more 
real time strategic management system. Generally productivity and 
gains therein have been associated with innovation which have saved 
time; the culmination of such time savings may be argued to be 
today's time based competition and hence the trend toward real time 
strategic decisions. 
Further, time has been compressed by strategic management; and 
this has come full circle, to the point where the Operating 
Environment has become an independent source of time compression. 
The anticipated data based upon the literature is that the pace of 
change in the Operating Environment is at least fast if not chaotic. 
Consequently the pace of change taking place in the Operating 
Environment impacts strategic management theory and practice in 
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that this management tool must account for, and deal with the 
evolutionary forces impacting the management of corporate resources 
at a pace (in part) dictated by the collective rate of change within 
the Operating Environment. 
The pace of change in the Operating Environment is one of the 
factors argued in this research to be most influential in defining the 
Strategic Duration Perspective of corporations and ultimately an 
economy as a whole. Thus, the degree of alinement or miss-alignment 
between the managerial (subjective) perception and the Objective 
Reality, regarding the rate of change in the Operating Environment, 
is critical to optimum resource allocation decisions. 
Strategic management for this researcher assumes that the perfect 
or ultimate resource allocation decision exists in the form of the 
Objective Reality. Thus, the question of good or bad strategic 
management becomes one of perception which sequentially impacts 
the degree to which this hypothetical optimum decision, Objective 
Reality, is achieved or approximated. 
Within the confines of this question it is important to note that while 
the data reflects the selected pace of change in the respective 
Operating Environments it would be simplistic to draw extensive 
conclusions regarding the Operating Environmental factors. This 
question simply ascertains from the respondents their perception as 
to the pace of change taking place in their respective corporate 
Operating Environments. 
The assumption is (tentatively) made here that the majority of this 
pace of perceived change relating to the Operating Environment does 
indeed relate to geographical data of the respective respondent 
corporations. Yet, such perception should not be routinely aligned 
with national geographical data. Rather the data revels that given 
the Operating Environment of the respondent corporation the pace 
of change is "fast". The data collected in this question serves to 
answer the question regarding the perceived pace of change taking 
place in the Operating Environments of the three corporate 
97 
categories. As expected the result is a resounding "fast" from all 
three corporate samples. The data here confirms the literature which 
suggests the advances in technology, globalization of market, 
increasing private financial resources and growing democracy world 
wide have facilitated economic growth. 
This means that whatever the remaining results of the survey may 
bring the playing field has been levelled to the extent that the 
Operating Environments were defined as having a "fast" pace of 
change by all three corporate categories. 
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Question B. 
What is the Source of change in the Corporation's Operating 
Environment? 
(Please circle one or more responses) 
1. corporate performance goals. 
2. financial market's demand for results. 
3. equity market's demand for growth. 
4. new product technology. 
5. competition for market share. 
6. consumer demand. 
7. increased access to information. 
Weighted Average Analysis 1: B 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
A 6% 5% 3% 5% 10% 1% 5% 
J 1% 2% 2% 4% 1% 5% 5% 
J-A 5% 3% 1% 3% 1% 3% 2% 
Graphic Analysis 1: B 
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iati 
Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis l:B 
First - Competition for market 
share 
Second - Consumer demand 
Third - Corporate performance 
goals 
Forth - Financial market's 
demand for results 
Forth - New product 
technology 
Forth - Increased access to 
information 
Fifth - Equity markets demand 
for growth 
American Respondents 
First - Competition for market 
share 
First - Corporate performance 
goals 
Second - Consumer demand 
Second - Increased access to 
information 
Third - New product 
technology 
Forth - Financial market's 
demand for results 
Forth - Equity markets demand 
for growth 
Japanese Respondents 
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First - Competition for market 
share 
Second - Corporate 
performance goals 
Third - Financial markets 
demand for results 
Third - Equity market's 
demand for growth 
Third - Consumer demand 
-
Forth - Increased access to 
information 
Fifth - Financial markets 
demand for results 
Japanese-American Respondents 
First - Competition for market 
share 
Second - Corporate 
performance goals 
Third - Consumer demand 
Forth - New product 
technology 
Forth - Increase access to 
information 
Fifth - Financial market's 
demand for results 
Sixth - Equity markets demand 
for growth 
Combined Respondents 
Discussion: 
The importance of this question is to establish the three respondent 
categories's perspective of change in their respective Operating 
Environments. This is relevant to the issue of Strategic Duration 
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Perspective as variations in perspective here may account (in part) 
for respondent SOP. variations. 
The anticipated response is based upon the theory of asymmetrical 
competition whose differentiation in sources of change in the 
Operating Environment is the target of the question. McCarthy et al 
(1975) sought to define strategy as the corporate selection of 
economic alternatives based upon internal competencies. Thus, 
appreciating the respondents' concept of change is important to an 
appreciation of their respective Strategic Duration Perspective. 
Mintzberg ( 1979) placed strategy within a decision stream which 
reflect the Operating Environment; this question reflects each 
respondent categories' decision stream emphasis thus further 
completing the respective definitions of Operating Environment. 
Mintzberg's (1985) paper led to the contention that corporations 
define themselves and their strategy upon objectives; thus defining 
the three (respondent) sources of change assists in defining the 
objectives of the respective strategies. 
Hatten et al (1978) suggested that strategy can, and is founded 
upon subjective (management) evaluations of controllable and non-
controllable economic variables found internally and externally. 
The American respondents reflected that the sources of change came 
primarily from "Competition for market share" and "Consumer 
demand" . Of note was the absence of Equity market influences in 
these top two positions. In fact this data reflected equity markets 
corning sequentially last which is surprising given the generally 
accepted role of the Equity markets in publicly held corporations, 
such as the sample was comprised of. This data is more suggestive 
of a Japanese situation then an American, with an emphasis on 
market share and a de-emphasis of equity markets. These results 
may be argued to suggest a movement in focus by corporate America 
from investor myopia to a market share approach based upon the 
Japanese success of this growth strategy deployed from the late 
1970's onward. 
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The Japanese respondents suggested "Competition for market share" 
and "Corporate performance goals" as joint primary sources of 
change in their Operating Environment. These were followed closely 
by "Consumer demand" and "Increased access to information". As 
one may expect Japanese respondents de-emphasised equity markets 
and financial market's demand for results and growth respectively. 
The Japanese-American respondents followed the American and 
Japanese results by reflecting Competition for market share as their 
primary selection for change in their Operating Environment. This 
was followed by Corporate performance goals and then three joint 
third places for Financial markets demand for results, New product 
technology and Consumer demand. The Japanese-American 
respondents emphasised the financial and equity markets more then 
the Japanese corporations or the American corporations. Such 
financial emphasis by the Japanese-American sample may be argued 
to suggest a phase of economic development where investors return 
on investment and the company's future capitalization needs are a 
higher priority for these relatively new investments. 
The combined sequential data reflected Competition for market share 
as the most popular primary source of change amongst the Operating 
Environments. This overwhelming concurrence on the source of 
change leads the researcher to conclude that market share is the 
primary offensive strategy used in corporate competition today. The 
long term benefits of gaining market share are indisputable and thus 
it may be argued that within this strategy an aligned Strategic 
Duration Perspective is emerging whereby the long term strategy of 
these corporate respondents has been tied to their market share 
strategy. This is extremely interesting given the likely un-
intentional (Mintzberg's 1985 Retrospective Strategy) nature of this 
SDP. development. 
The implication for Strategic Duration Perspective is significant, in 
that a long term strategy is inherent in the selection and deployment 
of market share as the popular source of change in the Operating 
Environment. Could this diminish the impact of developing an 
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optimum Strategic Duration Perspective given that such duration 
perspective is inherent in the growth strategy selected, ie. by 
deploying a growth strategy which is inherently long term does the 
corporation, to such extent, forfeit the flexibility to utilize Strategic 
Duration Perspective as a tool for adaptation and flexibility in 
relation to the evolution of the Operating Environment? 
This argument is weakened to the extent that the whole concept and 
value of Strategic Duration Perspective and an understanding of a 
particular duration perspective, in terms of a resource allocation 
strategy, is the assumption that the Operating Environment is 
evolving at various frequencies pushed and pulled in all directions 
by a complex matrix of internal and external, controllable and 
uncontrollable factors each exerting force in varying positive and or 
negative combinations. All of which makes it incumbent upon the 
corporate strategists to deal with the strategic interaction between 
the internal and external Operating Environments in such a manner 
that optimum performance is achieved and maintained to the highest 
possible degree. 
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C. How effective a tool is Strategic Management for managing the 
interaction between the Corporation and the Operating 
Environment? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. very effective. 
2. somewhat effective. 
3. not very effective. 
4. not at all effective. 
Weighted Average Analysis 1: C 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
A 8% 24% 4% 1% 
J 9% 19% 4% 0% 
J-A 5% 19% 4% 0% 
Graphic Analysis 1: C 
5 ····--·-·--···-- ---··-·--·---·---···--··--·······-·······--··········-·-··········-·········· ····---··-···-······-···-···-·---·--·--··-·-·····--···-··-·--············ 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis l:C 
First - Somewhat effective 
Second - Very effective 
Third - Not very effective 
Forth - Not at all effective 
American Respondents 
First - Somewhat effective 
Second - Very effective 
Third - Not very effective 
Forth - Not at all effective 
Japanese Respondents 
First - Somewhat effective 
Second - Very effective 
Third - Not very effective 
Forth - Not at all effective 
Japanese-American Respondents 
First - Very effective 
Second - Very effective 
Third - Not very effective 
Forth - Not at all effective 
Combined Analysis 
Discussion: 
This question is important as it goes to the heart of the issue of 
strategic management's effectiveness in relating internal and 
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external Operating Environments with and to each other so as to 
achieve subjectively defined strategic objectives. 
Mintzberg (1979) talks about strategic management as a "mediating 
force" between the internal and external environmental variables. 
Further, the research comparison between respondent categories 
seeks to establish which approach is most appropriate for the 
American Operating Environment. Thus, the measure of 
effectiveness of strategic management is relevant to the comparison 
between and amongst the three Strategic Duration Perspectives. 
The anticipated results are that strategic management is an effective 
tool given the absence of any comprehensive alternative, two, its 
effectiveness is subjectively defined and three the Japanese-
American sample would find it the least effective tool as a result of 
the added complexity of Strategic Duration Perspective transfer to 
the American Operating Environment. 
In the sequential analysis of this question, the results from the 
three corporate respondents are the same; that Strategic 
Management is a "some what effective" tool for managing the 
interaction between the corporation and the Operating Environment. 
The second sequential position was "very effective", followed by 
"not very effective". These results reflect the notion that strategic 
management, like most management tools, is imperfect and should be 
utilized in conjunction with other management tools as a collective 
means of approximating the Objective Reality. 
It may be argued that given the complexity of strategic management 
the results are appropriate and relate well to the generally accepted 
views in the literature. The allocation of corporate resources must 
be accomplished in anticipation and as a result of the contact 
between the internal corporate environment and the external 
Operating Environment. Every allocation of resources is focused on 
the point of market-contact as it is here over time and by repetition 
that the corporate balance sheets are developed. 
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The point of market-contact defines the corporation's relationship to 
its market and may be regarded as the resulting attempt at 
approximating the Objective Reality by the corporation's subjective 
efforts and strategy to capture the market and achieve strategic and 
operating goals. 
Further, this point of market-contact is fragile, in that corporate 
strategy over time tends to become subjective in favour of the 
corporation and therefore less objective, caused by a myriad of 
factors including organizational slack. Corporations tend to rely on 
market manipulation only to find that objectively the market is 
adjusting, and in some form moving in an independent (yet corporate 
collectively dependent) ebb and flow of economic cyclical evolution. 
Strategic management is the only comprehensive management tool for 
managing this complex interaction between corporate and Operating 
Environment market-contact, here defined by the data as "somewhat 
effective". In a recent journal article Henry Mintzberg (1994) 
concurs with the data and discussion above; his logic is a confusion 
of the strategic planning and strategic thinking processes. This 
assimilation of what Mintzberg argues to be two distinct functions 
leads to an over formalization of strategy which sequentially results 
in strategy too often damaged by what this study refers to as the 
time-laps effect. Mintizberg suggests a strategic support and 
advocacy by strategic planners, for use and deployment by strategic 
thinkers ie. a separation of these strategic planning and thinking 
functions and their sequential usage. 
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D. How has the evolution in Operating Environment over the past 
5 years affected your Strategic Duration Perspective (SOP.)'? 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
shortened no effect lengthened 
SOP. on SOP. SOP. 
Weighted Average Analysis l:D 
Shortened No effect on Lengthened 
SOP. SOP. SOP. 
A 18% 7% 11% 
J 20% 10% 3% 
J-A 20% 8% 1% 
Graphic Analysis 1: D 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis l:D 
First - Shortened SOP. 
Second - Lengthened SOP. 
Third - No effect on SDP. 
American respondents 
First - Shortened SOP. 
Second - No effect on SOP. 
Third - Lengthened SOP. 
Japanese respondents 
First - Shortened SOP. 
Second - No effect on SDP. 
Third - Lengthened SOP. 
Japanese-American respondents 
First - Shortened SDP. 
Second - No effect on SDP. 
Third - Lengthened SOP. 
Combined respondents 
Discussion: 
This question provides the research with the respondents' regard 
for the respective modification/s to their Strategic Duration 
Perspectives over the past five years as impacted by the Operating 
Environment. Thus, it places the research within the context of the 
SDP. evolutionary process as perceived by the three respondent 
categories. 
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As Schendel and Hatten (1972) suggested the role of the Operating 
Environment can never be.discounted without effect. Thus, the role 
of the Operating Environment on SDP. development is crucial to 
SDP's. contextual understanding. Further, if strategic management 
is the process of internal and external resource/opportunity 
reconciliation, then the parallel between such subjective and 
objective perspectives are important aspects of the same design. 
The anticipated results are that the Japanese-American data will 
show a shortening of SDP. relative to the Japanese; such to be 
attributed to the American Operating Environment. 
The American data here is noteworthy because it reflects the 
American Strategic Duration Perspective as being shortened over the 
past five year period. This should be regarded within the context 
of, a generally accepted, pre-existing short term performance 
Strategic Duration Perspective. Thus, the data shows the trend of 
increasingly shorter Strategic Duration Perspective in the American 
sample. 
Secondly, the second sequential selection by the American sample 
reflected a lengthening of their Strategic Duration Perspective. This 
too should be regarded within the context of the existing Strategic 
Duration Perspective platform; here the data reflects a lengthening 
of Strategic Duration Perspective by a portion of the American 
sample which indicates that relative to the Operating Environment's 
past five year evolution their Strategic Duration Perspective was 
longer. It may argued that this trend, although smaller, by 11% 
Weighted Average Percentage, then the "shortened SDP." trend 
above, points to a movement of position in terms of Strategic 
Duration Perspective by the American respondents to a slightly 
longer term Strategic Duration Perspective, again placed in a 
historical short term Strategic Duration Perspective context. Such 
data coincide with the market share strategy indicated in Section 1: 
Question B above by the American sample. 
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Similarly, it may be argued that a portion of American corporations 
have for a variety of reasons utilized a longer term Strategic 
Duration Perspective; and such existing pattern is being reflected 
here. The data is relevant and may point to a slight miss-perception 
about the Strategic Duration Perspective nature of American 
corporations; ie. that a longer SOP. propensity is evident. 
The Japanese sample was most absorbing as it significantly pointed 
toward a redirection, relative to the generally accepted views in the 
literature, regarding the Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective. 
Traditionally Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective was and is 
regarded as long term, as discussed at the outset of this research. 
Against that long term background the data reflects a shortening 
activity in Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective. This is 
important in terms of being a (possible) reflection of strategic 
management's need to redefine its narrow long term role to possibly 
a broader shorter term inclusive approach. 
This shift toward a shorter Strategic Duration Perspective by the 
Japanese sample may be argued to be a result of their export 
orientated economy, global participation and the influences of (in 
this study) the Japanese-American corporations which operate in an 
Operating Environment where, given their historical context, the 
norm in terms of Strategic Duration Perspective is arguably shorter 
then in Japan. Further, this trend may be argued to reflect not only 
the "fast" paced Japanese (Section 1: Question A) Operating 
Environment, but given the global economic connections of the 
Japanese, a broader need for a more real-time strategic management 
model. 
The Japanese-American sample reflects a trend toward a shorter 
Strategic Duration Perspective. This is fascinating because, given 
the long term Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective origins of 
these organizations this movement in SOP. toward a shorter term 
Strategic Duration Perspective is greater in significance then can be 
deduced from a simple measurement of the data. This movement 
should be regarded as compounded, given the latent resistance and 
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conservatism of the Japanese parent companies, as indicated in the 
data from Section 1: Question B below. 
Secondly, considering the American Operating Environment the 
implication of the data on the hypothesis is that a short term 
Strategic Duration Perspective by American corporations is not only 
logical but sound economics and management, given the 
circumstances and operating norms. It serves to tentatively make the 
case for the hypothesis that a viable short term Strategic Duration 
Perspective has evolved in the American Operating Environment and 
that it has come of age. 
The combined Weighted Average Percentage sequential analysis 
points to the general shortening of Strategic Duration Perspective 
by the three sample populations. This is reflected by the popular 
selection of "shortened Strategic Duration Perspective" followed by 
"no effect on Strategic Duration Perspective" which as argued above 
needs to be regarded against the historical trend of Strategic 
Duration Perspective within the confines of the respective Operating 
Environments of the three sample categories. This may be theorized 
to be suggestive of a broader, arguably global trend toward a 
shorter term performance based Strategic Duration Perspective as 
reflected by the respective Operating Environments and time based 
competition. 
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SECTION 2: STRATEGIC DURATION PERSPECTIVE INFORMATION. 
A. Are your Strategic Plans becoming more or less relevant to the 
day-to-day corporate operations'? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. more relevant. 
2. less relevant. 
Weighted Average Analysis 2:A 
More relevant Less relevant 
A 36% 2% 
J 29% 4% 
J-A 23% 7% 
Graphic Analysis 2:A 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 2:A 
First - More relevant 
Second - Less relevant 
American respondents 
First - More relevant 
Second - Less relevant 
Japanese respondents 
First - More relevant 
Second - Less relevant 
Japanese-American respondents 
First - More relevant 
Second - Less relevant 
Combined respondents 
Discussion : 
McCarthy et al ( 1975) and Schendel et al ( 1972) to name a few refer 
to the important link between corporate objectives and Operating 
Environment as being strategic planning. As the numerous variables 
change, the relevancy of this important linkage needs to be 
established and re-established as a continuum/process of market 
reflection . 
The anticipated response is that given the trend toward 
organizational down-sizing and vertical strategic deployment that 
Strategic Plans would be found more relevant. Further, the issues 
facing Japanese-American respondents with their unique accelerated 
strategic adaptation to a "new" Operating Environment will produce 
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new insights as pressure is placed upon their traditional strategic 
management model. 
The conclusion reflected by survey data is that in spite of the 
limitations of the strategic management tool, as discussed in Section 
1: Question C above, there remains a strong and increasing 
relevancy of strategic plans to the day-to-day operations of the 
respondents' corporate perspective. The reason why this question 
refers to the relevancy of the "day-to-day" operations is to gain 
insight as to how close these strategic plans are getting to the point 
of market-contact. 
Traditionally strategic planning has been an executive top-down 
process often accused of being removed from the point of market-
contact. Now with empowerment strategies and the advancement of 
a entrepreneurial corporate spirit (for example the recent IBM 
restructuring into entrepreneurial business units) which is being 
forced down into the corporate body there is a paralleled 
dissemination of strategic planning. The result is that strategic 
planning and management is taking place increasingly closer to the 
action and consequently is more real-time in production and 
execution. This is re-enforced by Bourgeoui's (1985) Perceptual 
Relativity theory and enhanced by Quinn's Delay theory (1977) of 
strategic resource allocation. The data thus confirms the literature, 
that strategic management needs to "fashion" market forces in the 
most creative and efficient manner. Thus, the Operating 
Environment provides the data; and it remains the strategic 
managers' subjective perception which determines approximation or 
not of the strategic performance to the Objective Reality. 
" as both creatures and creators of a material 
environment, the area outside the organization in 
which opportunities lie but in which threats to the 
success and the survival of every business also 
originate." 
Peter Drucker, The Information Executives Truly Need, 
Harvard Business Review, January-February, 1995, p. 
55. 
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This trend has been accelerated by management cut-backs, 
corporate mergers and corporate "flattening" of structure which 
inherently carry a dissemination of power to the horizontal 
structure, not to mention the change management involved in such 
gambits. For, by doing more (or the same) with less management 
strata the implication necessitates a redistribution of managerial 
authority, resource allocation decisions and proximity to the 
"boardroom". 
"As technology has become pervasive in the 
business, it has changes the way we work at 
Wal-Mart. We are placing in the hands of our 
associates more information then ever in order 
for them to make decisions closer to the customer 
and respond quickly to competitive situations. 
Every company that has, like Wal-Mart, empowered 
a broader number of employees to make a greater 
number of decisions knows that this process 
entails changes in how, when, and where decisions get 
made as well as challenges in managing the 
associated risk. " 
Bob Martin, "Perspectives", Harvard Business Review, 
September-October 1995, p. 162. 
It may be argued that the closer strategic plans and management 
come to the point of market-contact the shorter the Strategic 
Duration Perspective will be; as the Strategic Duration Perspective 
gets caught up in the operational-agenda of the organization. 
It may be suggested that this dissemination of strategic power is one 
of the factors which resulted in a short term performance Strategic 
Duration Perspective in America. As the pace of change in the 
Operating Environment increased the corporate strategy was forced 
to become increasingly real-time to attain or sustain a measure of 
control and consequently got closer to the point of market-contact 
as a means of dealing with the increased complexity within the 
Operating Environment. 
Arguably at this level strategic management incorporates the 
expectations of operations in order to be effective. The result of 
pushing strategic management out of the Boardroom into the depths 
and physical contacts of the corporation, was to alter the role of 
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strategic management and to align it naturally with the operational 
goals and point of market-contact agenda, resulting in a shorter 
term Strategic Duration Perspective. 
It should be noted that such re-deployment of strategy as a 
management function carries the burden of disseminating, to the 
extent this function is disseminated, the highly desirable 
metaphysical (Mitroff 1981) element of strategic planning and 
management. Thus, Mintzberg's (1994) point regarding the 
separation of Strategic thinking and planning are increasingly 
appropriate. Based upon Mintzberg' s paper strategic thinking, 
vision and macro corporate allocation should be retained in the 
executive offices, supported by strategic planners/analvzers and 
thirdly, that the management of strategy be disseminated through 
the (now) flatter entrepreneurial profit centres. 
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B. Is the pace of change in the Operating Environment making 
Strategic Planning redundant'? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. yes. 
2. no. 
Weighted Average Analysis 2:B 
Yes No 
A 0% 37% 
J 11% 21% 
J-A 10% 20% 
Graphic Analysis 2: B 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 2:8 
First - No 
Second - Yes 
American respondents 
First - No 
Second - Yes 
Japanese respondents 
First - No 
Second - Yes 
Japanese-American respondents 
First - No 
Second - Yes 
Combined respondents 
Discussion: 
This question was intended to balance the results of Section 2: 
Question A immediately above by providing data on the impact of the 
pace of change on Strategic Planning. 
The anticipated result is that Strategic Planning could be found 
lacking here as its tradition of long-termism flows contra to the pace 
of change in the Operating Environment. 
Question A. above refers to the relevancy of strategy to the day-to-
day corporate operations and the results were affirmative. Question 
B. refers to the pace (see Section 1: Question A) of change in the 
Operating Environment and questions the redundancy of strategic 
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planning in such a "fast" paced Operating Environment. 
The results reflect a resounding no. For each of the three corporate 
categories strategic plans were not redundant despite the fast paced 
change in the Operating Environment. One may argue that by 
casually summing the patterns of Section 2: Questions A and B the 
data reflect that strategic plans are more relevant and less 
redundant to the day-to-day operations and pace of change in the 
Operating Environment respectively. 
The relevance of these results for Strategic Duration Perspective are 
an indication of what the corporate needs are for strategic 
management in relation to one, the internal operations of the 
corporation and secondly, the external Operating Environment. On 
both accounts the data reflect a positive need and role for strategic 
management and planning. 
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C. Which of the following would you suggest is THE most 
effective in terms of your Corporation's performance'? 
(Please circle your response) 
1. long range strategic plans. 
2. medium range strategic plans. 
3. short range strategic plans. 
Weighted Average Analysis 2:C 
Long range Medium range Short range 
strategic plans Strategic plans strategic plans 
A 4% 24% 10% 
J 2% 23% 8% 
J-A 6% 13% 11% 
Graphic Analysis 2: C 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 2:C 
First - Medium range strategic plans 
Second - Short range strategic plans 
Third - Long range strategic plans 
American respondents 
First - Medium range strategic plans 
Second - Short range strategic plans 
Third - Long range strategic plans 
Japanese respondents 
First - Medium range strategic plans 
Second - Short range strategic plans 
Third - Long range strategic plans 
Japanese-American respondents 
First - Medium range strategic plans 
Second - Short range strategic plans 
Third - Long range strategic plans 
Combined respondents 
Discussion: 
This question is significant, as it indicates which time horizon is 
regarded as most effective in relation to corporate performance. 
The literature has traditionally looked down upon short-termism in 
favour of long-termism. Yet Mintzberg and others often make 
reference to the parallel linkage between internal and external 
resource/ opportunity reconciliation. Such principal comes without 
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any time horizon constrains, and hence the need to question the 
practical application of the principal. 
The anticipated result is an increasing tendency toward strategic 
short-termism, or at least a movement away from long-termism 
reflecting the operational movement in this direction. 
The results of this question are poignant with regard to this 
research as they reflect the trend toward a shorter term Strategic 
Duration Perspective by the Japanese and Japanese-American 
samples. The American sample in fact reflected the highest weighted 
average in favour of medium range strategic plans. 
The American data point toward medium and short range strategic 
plans as THE most effective in terms of corporate performance. While 
one may have expected short range strategic plans to have taken 
first sequential place here, the trend by this sample reflect a viable 
trend toward the increasing usage of medium range strategic plans 
in American corporations. 
Again it is most important to place these weighted averaged results 
in a "contextual weighted average perspective" by appreciating that 
each of the three respondent categories define long, medium and 
short range strategic plans in likely different terms (Evans 1989). 
With this in mind, it is useful in building the overall thesis for 
Strategic Duration Perspective, that the Japanese reflected a slight 
tendency toward medium range strategic plans. Which, given the 
historical context of Japanese SOP. , is a remarkable move toward the 
shorter term strategic perspective. Here too one should read such 
movement as compounded by the inherently torpid nature of decision 
making and apparent reluctant approach to change in the Japanese 
management style. 
The Japanese-American sample reflected a much stronger tendency 
toward the shorter range strategic plans then the Japanese. This is 
very enlightening, as it demonstrates support for the hypothesis 
that while operating in the American Operating Environment the 
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Japanese-American sample has shown a strong movement toward the 
shorter range strategic plan. The rational is that should the 
Japanese-American sample reflect movement toward the American 
model such supports the research hypothesis that the American 
short term performance model is a positive given the Operating 
Environment. 
If the Japanese-American sample had retained its traditional 
Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective within the American 
Operating Environment then such would bring into question the 
rational and motivation of the American model. Such model which has 
traditionally been short term and performance in orientation, and 
which is declared in the literature to be based primarily upon the 
powerful existing financial structures and quantitative-orientation -
which is a direct extension of such financial intuitions. 
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D. How would you describe the Strategic Duration Perspective of 
your Corporation'? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. very short-term. 
2. somewhat short-term. 
3. somewhat long-term. 
4. very long-term. 
Weighted average 2: D 
Very Somewhat Somewhat Very long 
short term short term long term term 
A 2% 16% 20% 1% 
J 0% 7% 23% 2% 
J-A 0% 10% 13% 6% 
Graphic Analysis 2: D 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 2: D 
Discussion: 
First - Somewhat long term 
Second - Somewhat short term 
Third - Very short term 
Forth - Very long term 
American respondents 
First - Somewhat long term 
Second - Somewhat short term 
Third - Very long term 
Forth - Very short term 
Japanese respondents 
First - Somewhat long term 
Second - Somewhat short term 
Third - Very long term 
Forth - Very short term· 
Japanese-American respondents 
First - Somewhat long term 
Second - Somewhat short term 
Third - Very long term 
Forth - Very short term 
Combined respondents 
This data is important as it assists in defining the Strategic Duration 
Perspective of the three corporate categories namely; American, 
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Japanese and Japanese-American. 
Based upon current literature the respondents' are expected to 
respond with; American sample as very short term, Japan as very 
long term and Japanese-American as somewhat short term as a result 
of their adaptation to the American Operating Environment. 
The data from the American sample reflects a close concentration of 
opinion around firstly, "somewhat long term" 20% Weighted Average 
Percentage and secondly, "somewhat short term" 16% Weighted 
Average Percentage. This proximity of weighted average result 
lends itself to the argument that given the historical context and 
reputation for Strategic short-termism by corporate America, that 
the American respondents to this survey suggest a tentative and 
historically pertinent movement toward longer-termism which 
coincides with the market share growth strategy (see Section 1: 
Question B) . This data needs to be qualified as being significant 
given the historical Strategic Duration Perspective position of 
corporate America relative to this movement toward a longer 
Strategic Duration Perspective. 
The Japanese on the other hand selected the same two first and 
second options yet with dramatically different emphasis. The 
Japanese selected "somewhat long term" 23% Weighted Average 
Percentage, which is 16% weighted average percentage points more 
then their second selection "somewhat short term" at 7% Weighted 
Average Percentage; thus in sequence the American and Japanese 
appear similar yet in fact as derived by comparing weighted 
averages they are pols apart. 
The Japanese-American sample arrived at the same sequential results 
as the Japanese sample; but here, and this is pivotal, these 
Japanese-American respondents placed first "somewhat long term" 
13% Weighted Average Percentci.gc: and placed second "somewhat short 
term" 10% Weighted Average Percentage; these are only 3% weighted 
average percentage points apart. 
128 
Therefore, it may be argued that in this case the Japanese-American 
respondents reflect a distinct movement away from the Japanese 
Strategic Duration Perspective toward the American Strategic 
Duration Perspective. Further, this movement is clearly an 
indication that the Operating Environment of a corporation impacts 
its Strategic Duration Perspective; suggestive of the hypothesis that 
the American Strategic Duration Perspective is appropriate given the 
American Operating Environment. 
The combined sequential analysis revealed a popularity for 
"somewhat long term" which, in the context of strategic management 
generally rather then any particular Operating Environment, is 
seemly. The notable feature here is the close proximity of "somewhat 
short term" to the "somewhat long term" choice. Clearly in this 
study the trend toward a shorter term in strategic management is 
evident within, and across all three corporate categories. Thus, 
shortening the scope of strategic management in a shorter term 
Strategic Duration Perspective has important implications for this 
management tool. The traditional modis operandi of strategic 
management and planning was latently bureaucratic, exclusive and 
"top-down" in origin. With the dissemination of information and 
control through the organization strategic management has modified 
it's definition, capacity and function without comprehending and or 
projecting-out the evolving definition, capacity and organizational 
function - a "Mintzberg" ( 1982} messy, emerging strategy. 
It may be argued that strategic management in its purest traditional 
form has indeed not altered and that what is disseminating and being 
causally referred to as strategic management is yet another title 
allocated to appease the incessant need for new (political} 
acclamation within the organization. Further, that the significant 
guiding of corporate resources remain essentially in the 
"boardroom". Real as the decentralization of authority may be, the 
real power of strategic allocation may not have been diluted to the 
extent held-out by the progressive management policies and 
horizontal organizational chart. 
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While part of this cynical argument may indeed be valid, it is very 
difficult to prove, and at this stage should merely be noted as one 
rational of the new role of strategic management. 
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E. If the Operating Environment is evolving at an increasingly 
fast pace; Strategic Management must become more Real-Time 
if it is to remain a fundamental management tool. 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
Weighted Average Analysis 2: E 
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strong 
disagree disagree agree ly 
agree 
A 0% 3% 2% 7% 22% 4% 
J 0% 1% 3% 15% 11% 4% 
J-A 0% 2% 3% 6% 17% 2% 
Graphic Analysis 2: E 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 2: E 
First - Agree 
Second - Slightly agree 
Third - Strongly agree 
Forth - Disagree 
Fifth - Slightly disagree 
Sixth - Strongly disagree 
American respondents 
First - Slightly agree 
Second - Agree 
Third - Strongly agree 
Forth - Slightly disagree 
Fifth - Disagree 
Sixth - Strongly disagree 
Japanese respondents 
First - Agree 
Second - Slightly agree 
Third - Slightly disagree 
Forth - Disagree 
Fifth - Strongly agree 
Sixth - Strongly disagree 
Japanese-American respondents 
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First - Agree 
Second - Slightly agree 
Third - Strongly agree 
Forth - Slightly disagree 
Fifth - Disagree 
Sixth - Strongly disagree 
Combined respondents 
Discussion: 
This inquiry looks into which format Strategic Duration Perspective 
should take in strategic management when the assumption is made 
that the Operating Environment is evolving at an increasingly fast 
pace. Does this un-controllable variable necessitate a more "real-
time" strategic management format? 
The literature (Mintzberg 1982 and others) define strategic 
management generally as the moderator between the internal and 
external economic variables given the internal objectives, hence the 
importance of the parallel between the evolution of the Operating 
Environment and the system whose mission it is to manage such 
point/s of market-contact. Thus, changes in the Operating 
Environment need to be reflected into the strategic management 
system. 
Based upon current writing one may expect the data to reflect 
agreement on the principal, yet politics and tradition may infer some 
resentment to change in SOP. especially in the case of Japan which 
is arguably the most conservative sample category. 
The data here is poignant in that each category, given its traditional 
historical, Strategic Duration Perspective (American - short-
termism, Japanese - long-termism and Japanese-American - unknown 
but theorized to be long term in origin yet increasingly short term 
as a result of the American Operating Environment} offers data 
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which reflect an acknowledgement that "agree" and "slightly agree" 
that strategic management must become more real-time to remain a 
fundamental management tool in today's organization and Operating 
Environment. 
The American sample with its short-termism Strategic Duration 
Perspective offered-up the strongest affirmative support to the 
question; "Agree" having a 22% weighted percentage and "Slightly 
agree" taking a weighted average of 7%. These results reflect the 
conclusions drawn in the literature, by Quinn ( 1978) for the delayed 
deployment of strategic resources. 
The Japanese data surpriSingly support •islightly agree" 15% 
Weighted Average Percent (WAP.) followed closely by "Agree" with 
11% Weighted Average Percentage. This indicates a realization by 
even the long-termism Japanese that strategic management inevitably 
requires a closer proximity between strategic management and the 
point of market-contact and therein a shorter term Strategic 
Duration Perspective given the velocity of the Operating 
Environment and the increasing commitment of resources to support 
the market share strategy (see Section 1: Question B) • 
The Japanese-American data was compelling as it approximated the 
American response more then the Japanese data. The Japanese-
American sample selected "Agree" with 17% Weighted Average 
Percentage followed by "Slightly agree" with 6% Weighted Average 
Percentage. This distinction by "Agree" here reflects a strong 
acknowledgement in favour of a more real-time Strategic Duration 
Perspective in strategic management as resource allocation decisions 
are placed increasingly closer to the point of market-contact and at 
the same time strategic decisions are disseminated down through the 
organization. Both of which call out for, and result in a more real-
time application of strategic management. 
The combined results indicate the same trend (above); that 50% 
Weighted Average Percentage returned data in agreement, that a 
more real-time approach to strategic management is necessary given 
the pace and circumstances of their Operating Environments. 
134 
F. The concept of Strategic Duration Perspective has multiple 
sources; how would you -assign these sources amongst the 
choices listed below. 
(Please answer as a percentage where 0% = not a source of 
Strategic Duration Perspective and 100% = the only source of 
Strategic Duration Perspective) 
Basis of Strategic Percentage apportioned 
Duration Perspective as basis of SOP. 
culturally based 
competition based 
equity market based 
debt market based 
consumer market based 
technology based 
CEO based 
TOTAL 100% 
Weighted Average Analysis 2: F 
Cult Com Equit Debt Consu Tech CEO 
urall petit y mkts mer no lo 
y ion rnkts. rnkts. gy 
A 5% 10% 6% 1% 7% 5% 6% 
J 2% 7% 2% 3% 9% 5% 3% 
J-A 2% 9% 2% 2% 6% 4% 2% 
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Graphic Analysis 2: F 
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First - Competition 
Second - Consumer markets 
Joint third - Equity market 
Joint third - CEO 
Joint forth - Technology 
Joint forth - Culturally 
Fifth - Debt markets 
American respondents 
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First - Consumer markets 
Second - Competition 
Third - Technology 
Joint forth - CEO 
Joint forth - Debt markets 
Joint fifth - Equity markets 
Joint fifth - Culturally 
Japanese respondents 
First - Competition 
Second - Consumer markets 
Third - Technology 
Joint forth - CEO 
Joint forth - Debt market 
Joint forth - Equity market 
Joint forth - Culturally 
Japanese-American respondents 
First - Competition 
Second - Consumer markets 
Third - Technology 
Forth - CEO 
Fifth - Equity market 
Sixth - Culturally 
Seventh - Debt markets 
Combined respondents 
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Discussion: 
The hypothesis is that Strategic Duration Perspective is comprised 
of latent economic-socio-cultural-political forces which collectively 
result in a complex matrix web of weighted factors, each 
independent yet interdependent, evolving into a formula of Strategic 
Duration Perspective of conceptual forces within an Operating 
Environment (Tung 1986 p. xviii). As Pascale (1981) put forward, 
strategy is part culturally defined; that is, the social mores and 
-
culture impact the socialization which to some degree manifests in a 
particular strategic management model. 
This question is important to the definition of Strategic Duration 
Perspective as a principal of Strategic Management Theory and with 
respect to each respondent category. 
Based upon current literature the anticipated results should find the 
Japanese emphasising culturally based, competition based, consumer 
market based, debt markets (Tung 1986 pp. 141, 119) and 
technology based sources of Strategic Duration Perspective. The 
American data is expected to focus on the CEO, equity markets, 
competition, consumer and technology as the sources of Strategic 
Duration Perspective. The Japanese-American data is unknown, yet 
founded in Japanese thinking with increasingly American influences 
resulting from input from the American Operating Environment. 
The logic applied here is that SOP. is a subjective variable and as 
Bourgeouis ( 1985) suggests - top managerial perception is important 
to the effectiveness of their decisions. Thus, according to the 
literature the Japanese-American sample should react to their 
American Operating Environment in a more "American" fashion, 
giving support to the hypothesis that American short-termism SOP. 
is appropriate. 
The rational is that ultimately such environmental evolution is made-
up of people; who from a variety of Strategic Duration Perspectives 
interact on local and international (economic) basis. Thus, this 
138 
question seeks to make a determination as to the composition of this 
highly complex conceptual force - Strategic Duration Perspective. 
The American sample suggested that although there were more and 
less influential factors in Strategic Duration Perspective, there was 
a clear distribution of the sources of Strategic Duration Perspective 
amongst the alternatives listed in the survey. Thus, the American 
response reflects the sources as inclusive rather then exclusive; 
although "Competition based" was the most popular selection at 10% 
Weighted Average Percentage and "Consumer market based" at 7% 
Weighted Average Percentage was a close second place. The pre-
survey expectation of a particular influence by the financial 
markets, third place at 6% Weighted Average Percentage, was 
unrealized in this data to the extent expected. 
The Japanese sample as expected was very "Consumer" driven with 
9% Weighted Average Percentage followed by "Competition" at 7% 
Weighted Average Percentage; thus reflecting the Japanese emphasis 
of a consumer driven competition based approach, here reflected in 
their definition of Strategic Duration Perspective. Here, the 
expectation of a de-emphasis of the financial markets was realized, 
such reflecting the structure of the Japanese financial markets' 
commitment to the long term involvement directly and indirectly in 
their major corporate cliental. 
The Japanese-American sample reflected the American data slightly 
closer then the Japanese data in their first two selections namely; 
competition based 9% WAP. and consumer markets 6% WAP .. This is 
argued to reflect the shift from Japanese to American perspective as 
a result of the American Operating Environment. It should be noted 
that this Japanese-American movement may appear insignificant due 
to the slightness of change. Yet, given the torpid nature of change 
in Japanese organizations and the pre-existing long termism SOP. 
disposition, it may be argued that this movement toward the 
American SOP. should be regarded as proportionally significant. 
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The combined analysis sequentially reflected a distinct selection of 
"Competition" at 26% Weighted Average Percentage, closely followed 
by "Consumer markets" with 22% Weighted Average Percentage as 
sources of Strategic Duration Perspective. Further, from 
"Technology" at 14% Weighted Average Percentage there was a fairly 
consistent, diminishing distribution to "Debt markets" at 7% 
Weighted Average Percentage. 
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G. Strategic decisions are taken in the present while the effect 
of these decisions unfold in the future; thus reducing the 
effectiveness of Strategic Management? 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
Weighted Average Analysis 2: G 
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strong 
disagree disagree agree ly 
agree 
A 6% 19% 2% 5% 7% 0% 
J 0% 7% 9% 10% 7% 0% 
J-A 0% 10% 8% 10% 3% 0% 
Graphic Analysis 2: G 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 2:G 
First - Disagree 
Second - Agree 
Third - Strongly disagree 
Forth - slightly agree 
Fifth - Slightly disagree 
Sixth - Strongly agree 
American respondents 
First - Slightly agree 
Second - Slightly disagree 
Joint third - Disagree 
Joint third - Strongly disagree 
Joint forth - Strongly agree 
Joint forth - Strongly disagree 
Japanese respondents 
Joint first - Slightly agree 
Joint first - Disagree 
Second - Slightly disagree 
Third - Agree 
Joint forth - Strongly disagree 
Joint forth - Strongly disagree 
Japanese-American respondents 
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First - Disagree 
Second - Slightly agree 
Third - Slightly disagree 
Forth - Agree 
Fifth - Strongly disagree 
Sixth - Strongly agree 
Combined respondents 
Discussion : 
The objective in this question is to explore the degree of confidence 
corporate strategists have in the future unfolding reality of 
strategic decisions taken in the present. 
Drucker (1974) provides an important definition for the role of 
strategic management when he puts forward the concept of strategy 
dealing with the futurity of contemporary decisions. The current 
literature espouses long-termism which is argued to be in contrast 
to the increasing consolidation of time horizons in the operational 
arena. This apparent contradiction between literary long term 
espousal and the operating reality of time has been accelerated by an 
increased pace of change within the Operating Environment 
facilitated by technological deployment and increasing difficulty in 
managing a complex and dynamic short term Operating Environment 
with long term strategies. 
Further, no contradiction was found in the literature between the 
principals of paralleled evolution (between internal and external 
environments) , and their application to short-termism. In fact it is 
suggested here that such short-termism based upon the same 
principals of internal and external parallelism is currently 
successfully deployed in America with modifications aligned to the 
current set-up of environmental variables. Further, that the 
Japanese-American data will also reflect such trend. 
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The anticipated result is that strategic decisions will be weakened to 
the extent that their realization is expected within a long-termism 
model. Thus, the Japanese are ·expected to have the highest 
agreement here as a result of their long term approach, Japanese-
American respondents close behind followed by the American sample 
whom one would expect to have the shortest SOP. and thus 
proportionally the least impact from the time-laps effect. Further, 
that such American short-termism may be argued to arise from the 
very in-efficiencies of applying long-termism management to a short 
term Operating Environment. 
The concept of time-laps is inherent in corporate strategic 
management and is THE most difficult and challenging aspect of the 
discipline. Many justifiable, rational and well thought out strategic 
decisions taken at one point in time appear ridiculous, 
incomprehensible and in some cases humorous in retrospect. It is 
during the time-laps period where, decision logic once applied to 
circumstances, can erode in shape manner and form. 
The retrospective view of major corporate strategy is evidence of the 
fact that theoretically there is inevitably an Objective Reality which 
is here defined as the perfect allocation of resources given the 
circumstances, now and in the future. The rational is that there 
must be a completely correct decision which if made, or even 
approached, will result in a maximization of return over the long and 
short term. Further, such Objective Reality would lead to the next 
logical corporate position; in the same pattern as a master chess 
player moves "chess resources". The difference for chess players 
is that moves are made in sequence each side having an opportunity 
to respond immediately to the resource allocation of the other player. 
In the realm of corporate strategic decisions resources are allocated 
and investments made in infinite, sequence and formation, the 
results of which may remain latent for an undeterminable period. 
During this time the internal and external Operating Environments 
continue to evolve at indefinable rates and in innovative directions 
which impact the original strategic decision with little opportunity 
to make corrections as these environmental changes occur and the 
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time-laps effect erode perceptions. The invisible nature of portions 
of the Operating Environment frustrate the resource allocation until 
such time as the current set of some what crude quantitative 
analytical tools reveal the intangible impact on corporate 
performance, at which point alternatives are considered so as to 
continually reflect the contemporary and impending Operating 
Environment. 
- application of corporate 
resources. 
- corporate resource commitment. 
- evolution of the operating 
environment. 
- evolution of the corporate 
resource allocation. 
- corporate resource allocation 
out-come. 
- under-over-un expected 
strategy. 
Thus, the question arises as to the validity of strategic decisions 
made whose results and return (on investment) are to be fully 
realized over and or after varying lengths of time. Further, that due 
to the great difficulty of making such complex vulnerable strategic 
decisions "into" a largely unknown future the question here seeks 
to establish the degree of validity, effectiveness and confidence 
attributed to such long term strategic decisions. 
mven the fragility of strategic commitment it is easy to appreciate 
the growing attraction for the short term investment and commitment 
of corporate resources which lend themselves to more measurable 
returns given their duration and more defined measure. The 
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question arises whether such resource allocation systems generate 
an increasingly incremental corporate growth strategy which lacks 
the visionary element so decisive in effective corporate performance. 
The data from this question was enlightening; the American sample 
disagreed, 19% Weighted Average Percentage, with the question's 
statement; suggesting that in spite of the time-laps implications 
inherent in strategic decisions, as discussed above, that the 
effectiveness of strategic management is maintained. There was a 7% 
Weighted Average Percentage reflection by the American sample that 
agreed with the question's statement; suggesting a frustration with 
the implications of strategic time-laps. 
The Japanese data reflects a more even distribution of opinion; the 
highest 10% Weighted Average Percentage went to "slight agreement" 
with the question's statement. This was followed by 9% Weighted 
Average Percentage for "slight disagreement". These first and 
second opinions suggest a middle of the road opinion about the 
effectiveness of strategic decisions, given the strategic time-laps 
effect on strategic decisions. This is indicative of the Japanese 
Strategic Duration Perspective which has realized valuable results 
from long-termism and is only now beginning to modify its model (see 
Section 1: Question D) . 
The Japanese-American results reflect varying options about the 
impact of the strategic time-laps on strategic decisions; 10% Weighted 
Average Percentage for "slightly agree" and 7% Weighted Average 
Percentage for "disagree". These results may be argued to be 
somewhat appropriate given the situation of the Japanese-American 
respondents; with their traditional long term Strategic Duration 
Perspective and short term Strategic Duration Perspective Operating 
Environment. This apparent contradiction in the data may be argued 
to reflect the contradictory operating and historical circumstances 
of the Japanese-American corporation. 
The remaining data from the Japanese-American sample was 8% 
Weighted Average Percentage for "slightly disagree" and 3% 
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Weighted Average Percentage for "agree". Here too, the lack of a 
unified direction may be argued to reflect the cosmopolitan 
composition of the organization and the influences of the Japanese 
parent organizations. The latter should be regarded as influential, 
as a result of indirect Japanese organizational influences and the 
direct influences arising from the Japanese managers sent for 
varying lengths of time (three to five years average) to these 
Japanese-American organizations. 
The combined sequential data reflect a disagreement with the 
question's statement. This may be argued to suggest that strategic 
decisions are held as effective given the phenomenon of strategic 
time-laps. 
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H. How proficient is the Corporation at translating its Operating 
Environmental Perception into Corporate Performance? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. very proficient. 
2. somewhat proficient. 
3. not very proficient. 
· 4. not at all proficient. 
Weighted Average Analysis 2:H 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
A 11% 21% 6% 0% 
J 9% 22% 2% 0% 
J-A 2% 19% 8% . 0% 
Graphic Analysis 2: H 
vp sp nvp naap 
j --- American -+- Japanese ~ Jap.-American 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 2:H 
First - Somewhat proficient 
Second - Very proficient 
Third - Not very proficient 
Forth - Not at all proficient 
American respondents 
First - Somewhat proficient 
Second - Very proficient 
Third - Not very proficient 
Forth - Not at all proficient 
Japanese respondents 
First - Somewhat proficient 
Second - Not very proficient 
Third - Very proficient 
Forth - Not at all proficient 
Japanese-American respondents 
-
First - Somewhat proficient 
Second - Very proficient 
Third - Not very proficient 
Forth - Not at all proficient 
Combined respondents 
Discussion: 
The relevance of this question is its reflection upon the perception 
of the strategic actors as to their aptitude to decipher, interpret and 
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transpose their "filtered" perception of the Operating Environment 
into corporate performance. 
The contemplated data is that the American and Japanese samples 
will rate their respective ability higher then the Japanese-American 
sample given the latter's relative inexperience with its Operating 
Environment. 
The sequential weighted average data indicates a confidence by the 
respondents in their ability to translate their corporate perception 
of the Operating Environment into corporate performance. 
The American, "Somewhat proficient" 21% Weighted Average 
Percentage, and Japanese, "Somewhat proficient" 22% Weighted 
Average Percentage, samples showed very similar results reflecting 
their perceived ability to read the Operating Environment and utilize 
the information to achieve corporate performance. In both cases they 
selected "Very proficient" as their second selection with 11% 
Weighted Average Percentage and 9% Weighted Average Percentage 
respectively. This data confirms such studies as Thune and House 
(1970) and Herold (1972) discussed earlier. 
The Japanese-American sample reflected the same (as the American 
sample) first place "somewhat proficient" with a 19% Weighted 
Average Percentage result; but showed a noted variation in their 
second selection "Not very proficient" 8% Weighted Average 
Percentage. Here the Weighted Average Percentage for this second 
selection is dis-similar to the American and Japanese second 
selections. This may be argued to reflect the Japanese-American 
sample's inexperience and problems with reading the Operating 
Environment; reflecting their relative lack of American socialization. 
Secondly, it may be argued that such results by the Japanese-
American sample reflects the possible contradictions creeping into 
the management of these corporations arising from at least two 
sources; the influences coming out of the Japanese parent company 
in terms of financial and administrative support and secondly, 
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influences exerted by American managers working for the Japanese-
American corporations. The often negative implications for American 
managers working in Japanese-American corporations has been well 
documented in the literature (Novotny 1984), (Zippo 1982), (Rice 
1988). 
It may be suggested that the results of the Japanese-American 
sample above reflect a small part of such cross-corporate, same 
Operating Environment management variations. Further, it may be 
argued that such data· reflect the increased difficulty in achieving 
a sound perception of an Operating Environment in a cross-cultural 
situation, and that it is consequentially more difficult to translate 
such reading of the Operating Environment into corporate 
performance. 
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I. There is an American Corporate Strategic Management Model 
with its own distinctive characteristics. 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
Weighted average data 2:1 
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strong 
-
disagree disagree agree ly 
agree 
A 2% 6% 7% 11% 9% 1% 
J 0% 3% 0% 10% 21% 1% 
J-A 1% 0% 2% 14% 12% 0% 
Graphic Analysis 2: I 
20 .................... -........... ---·---····-·---·---·---·-------··----·-·--·--------------·-·--·----··------··-·--·--···········---·-··-····--·--·---·-----------·-----· ..... ----·---····--·------····---------·-··--···-···--·---------·-·--
15 ... _ ............ _ ............. ·-····-----·---------------------·---------·-···------------·----······ 
sd d sd sa a sa 
j -e- American --+- Japanese ---')IE- Jap.-American 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 2:I 
First - Slightly agree 
Second - Agree 
Third - Slightly disagree 
Forth - Disagree 
Fifth - Strongly disagree 
Sixth - Strongly agree 
American respondents 
First - Agree 
Second - Slightly agree 
Third - Disagree 
Forth - Strongly agree 
0% 
0% 
Japanese respondents 
Joint first - Slightly agree 
Joint first - Strongly disagree 
Second - Agree 
Third - Slightly disagree 
0% 
0% 
Japanese-American respondents 
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First - Agree 
Second - Slightly agree 
Third - Slightly disagree 
Forth - Disagree 
Fifth - Strongly disagree 
Sixth - Strongly agree 
Combined respondents 
Discussion: 
This question and Section 2: Questions K and M below, deal with the 
hypothesis that there exists a differentiation of strategic 
management models amongst the three corporate categories; 
American, Japanese and Japanese-American. 
The importance of these three questions (see Section 2: Questions 
I, K and M) is to establish the perceived distinction between and 
amongst the strategic management models studied. That is, do the 
respondents regard their strategic management model as distinctive, 
and secondly to what degree such distinction is perceived. 
The importance of the data is that it will not only indicate whether 
each corporate category perceives itself as having a distinctive 
strategic management model, but will also indicate how each 
corporate category perceives the other sample corporate categories. 
This will assist the research in making determinations and 
recommendations on the thesis topic namely recommendation of an 
optimum Strategic Duration Perspective for American corporations. 
This question along with questions K. and M. below will assist in 
comprehending these respective strategic management model 
definitions and perceptions. 
The anticipated opinion here is that the Japanese and Japanese-
American samples will regard the American model as more distinctive 
then the American sample will judge its own distinction. The same 
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principal. of less "self" (sample category) distinction perception is 
anticipated for questions K. and M. below. 
Further, it is suggested that the American Strategic Management 
Model can be labelled Entrepreneurial., the Japanese Model 
Ideological. and the Japanese-American Model as Emerging. 
The American data reflects a self-perception of slight agreement at 
having an American Strategic Management Model with distinctive 
characteristics, "Slightly agree" 11% Weighted Average Percentage, 
"Agree" 9% Weighted Average Percentage and "Slightly disagree" 7% 
Weighted Average Percentage. 
The Japanese data reflect a much stronger opinion that the American 
Strategic Management Model is distinctive, "Agree" 21% Weighted 
Average Percentage, Slightly agree" 10% Weighted Average 
Percentage. The Japanese-American data is similar in sequence to 
the American sequence for the first three positions, with stronger 
Weighted Average Percentages, 14% Weighted Average Percentage 
for "Slightly agree", 12% Weighted Average Percentage for "Agree" 
and 2% Weighted Average Percentage for "Slightly disagree". 
The American sample agreed slightly that they have a distinctive 
Strategic Management Model, while the Japanese regarded the 
American Strategic Management Model as · more distinctive then 
perceived by the American self-analysis, and the Japanese-American 
data was in slight agreement that the American Strategic Management 
Model was distinctive. Collectively this data indicates that it is more 
difficult to point out ones own distinction and easier for others to see 
it. This was the case here with the Japanese data which reflected a 
greater distinction in the American Strategic Management Model then 
the American data reflected of itself. 
The contrasting position given to the Japanese-American data 
throughout this paper again proves enlightening; as the Japanese-
American data was in Weighted Average Percentage sequentially 
similar to the American data but stronger in terms of Weighted 
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Average Percentage. This indicates that it was easier for these 
cross-cultural (same Operating Enyironment) respondents to 
visualise the distinctions attributed to the American Strategic 
Management Model. 
The conclusion here is that there is an American Strategic 
Management Model regarded as distinctive by its own corporate 
sample and that of the Japanese and Japanese-American 
respondents. 
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J · The principal of Competitive Advantage as it refers to various 
economies is an established economic principal. Would you 
agree or disagree that these same economic factors which 
make-up a particular competitive advantage are also 
responsible for the development of a particular Strategic 
Duration Perspective? 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disa~yree disagree agree agree 
Weighted Average Analysis 2: J 
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strong 
disagree disagree agree ly 
agree 
A 0% 2% 2% 11% 22% 1% 
J 0% 0% 1% 14% 16% 0% 
J-A 1% 1% 2% 10% 16% 1% 
Graphic Analysis 2: J 
sd d sd sa a sa 
\ -w-- American --+- Japanese ~ Jap.-American 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 2:J 
First - Agree 
Second - Slightly agree 
Joint third - Slightly disagree 
Joint third - Disagree 
Forth - Strongly agree 
0% 
American respondents 
First - Agree 
Second - Slightly agree 
Third - Slightly disagree 
0% 
0% 
0% 
Japanese respondents 
First - Agree 
Second - Slightly agree 
Third - Slightly disagree 
Joint forth - Strongly agree 
Joint forth - Disagree 
Joint forth - Strongly disagree 
Japanese-American respondents 
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First - Agree 
Second - Slightly agree 
Third - Slightly disagree 
Forth - Disagree 
Fifth - Strongly agree 
Sixth - Strongly disagree 
Combined respondents 
Discussion: 
The economic principal of Competitive Advantage is defined in the 
Collins Dictionary Of Business (Pass et al 1991) as ". . . the 
possession by a firm of various assets and attributes (low cost 
plants, innovative brands, ownership of raw material supplies, etc. ) 
which give it a competitive edge over rival suppliers. " Within this 
definition of note is the reference to the possession of a collection of 
resources, which in a unique combination facilitate the deployment 
of resources in a unique format which in turn provides the entity 
with a competitive position which rival entities cannot, or find 
difficult to match or out flank at a particular point in time. 
Thus, competitive advantage is an ability to be competitive based 
upon the amalgamation of resources collected within an organization 
or economy giving rise to asymmetrical competition. The importance 
of this question is the inquiry whether the economic ingredients (the 
unique blend of resources) upon which a particular competitive 
advantage is based would account for a particular Strategic Duration 
Perspective? 
No mention of a possible connection between Competitive Advantage 
and Strategic Duration Perspective was found in the literature. 
However the argument is consistent with Hatten et al (1978) who 
argued that strategic objectives should be selected upon corporate 
competitive advantages. McCarthy et al (1975) put forward a similar 
suggestion that strategy should be the result of surveying the 
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Operating Environment and selecting strategy /ies which are in line 
with internal competencies. More recent diversification strategy has 
focused upon investment in managerial and or product competencies 
rather then purely quantitative approaches. 
Should the data reflect such overlap between SDP. and Competitive 
Advantage then the research would have a basis for looking into the 
theory of competitive advantage as yet another piece of the thesis 
puzzle. It is argued that since the basis for a particular Competitive 
Advantage is a unique blend of economic resources that such 
resources would therefore influence if not constitute the respective 
Strategic Duration Perspective. 
The American data reflected agreement 22% Weighted Average 
Percentage and slight agreement 11% Weighted Average Percentage. 
The Japanese sample opinion was 16% Weighted Average Percentage 
and 14% Weighted Average Percentage slight agreement. The 
Japanese-American data suggested agreement by 16% Weighted 
Average Percentage and 10% Weighted Average Percentage slight 
agreement. The Combined data shows a 54% Weighted Average 
Percentage for agreement that the same economic factors which 
make-up a particular competitive advantage are also responsible for 
the development of a particular Strategic Duration Perspective. This 
was followed by 36% Weighted Average Percentage for slight 
agreement and 5% Weighted Average Percentage for slight 
disagreement. 
In light of the conviction of the data it may be argued that in the 
individual, weighted averaged and combined opinion of the 
respondents there exists an overlap between the economic 
principal/s comprising Competitive Advantage and Strategic 
Duration Perspective. 
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K. There is a Japanese Corporate Strategic Management Model 
with its own distinctive characteristics. 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
Weighted Average Analysis 2:K 
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strong 
disagree disagree agree ly 
agree 
A 1% 1% 4% 8% 20% 2% 
J 0% 0% 0% 9% 18% 7% 
J-A 0% 1% 2% 14% 11% 2% 
Graphic Analysis 2: K 
18 -·----·--···-· - ·--·· . 
16 ·-·-··-··············-············-··- ············-············ 
14 ·--··-··--···--·-·········--·---··-·- ····-···-·-····--·-····-- ······-···-···-·--········--·--
12 J- ---·-··---·· . -·-·-·-·-· . -·-· -
1 0 ······-··----~······-···-··-·---···-·-·-· 
8 ···--·-···-··-·····-············-···················-
6 --·-···-··-·······-············· 
4 ··········-··········-·--·····-······--····-······ 
2 ·-·····-·-··---·-··-·-·····---···-
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 2: K 
First - Agree 
Second - Slightly agree 
Third - Slightly disagree 
Forth - Strongly agree 
Joint fifth - Disagree 
Joint fifth - Strongly disagree 
American respondents 
First - Agree 
Second - Slightly agree 
Third - Strongly agree 
0% 
0% 
0% 
Japanese respondents 
First - Slightly agree 
Second - Agree 
Joint third - Strongly agree 
Joint third - Slightly disagree 
Forth - Disagree 
0% 
Japanese-American respondents 
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First - Agree 
-
Second - Slightly agree 
Third - Strongly agree 
Forth - Slightly disagree 
Fifth - Disagree 
Sixth - Strongly disagree 
Combined respondents 
Discussion : 
The American data reflected a strong 20% Weighted Average 
Percentage in favour of the existence of a distinctive Japanese 
Strategic Management Model. The Japanese sample agreed that their 
Strategic Management Model has its own distinctive characteristics, 
18% Weighted Average Percentage and 9% Weighted Average 
Percentage "Slightly agree". The Japanese-American data exhibit a 
"slightly agree" 14% Weighted Average Percentage and a 11% 
Weighted Average Percentage agreeing that the Japanese Strategic 
Management Model is distinctive. 
Here too as in Question I. above, the data from the American sample 
regarding the Japanese Strategic Management Model was stronger 
then the Japanese self-analysis. This pattern may be regarded as 
supportive of the argument suggested above; that it is indeed more 
difficult to -evaluate the degree of distinction by self-corporate 
respondents. The Japanese-American data here was less forceful 
then the American or Japanese yet reflected a similar result. This 
may be argued to reflect the same argument as utilized above 
regarding self-:-evaluation; thus to the extent that Japanese-
American corporate respondents are Japanese such reduced their 
ability to recognize their-own Strategic Management Model as 
distinctive. 
The combined data reflect an agreement that the Japanese Strategic 
Management Model is distinctive. This result corresponds with the 
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results of Question I. above. Question M. below regarding the 
Japanese-American Strategic Management Model will complete the 
argument of distinctive strategic management models in American, 
Japanese and Japanese-American strategy. 
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L. What is your definition of the following Strategic Duration 
Perspectives (SDP. )'? 
(Please answer as a number of years) 
short term SDP long term SDP 
.....• years ...... years 
Averaged analysis 2: L 
Short term Long term 
A 3 years 10 years 
J 3 years 7 years 
J-A 3 years 8 years 
Collective 3 years 8.3 years 
Graphic Analysis 2:L 
9 ····-·····--···-·-·····-···-·----·-·-·-·-·······----------·· -·-·········-·--····················-················· 
8 ···--·-····---·--·-··----··------··------·-·······------··-·· ··-··············-······---····-········· 
7 ···---··-·····-·--·-·-···---··-·-------··-··--·------···-····-····---······· ·········· ·····-······· 
6 ·---------------------------------------······-------·- ····-·····---···········-········ ········-·····-·-···-·--·-······--···-··-········------··-··-···-···--···-··· 
5 ···-···--·-·-·········-·--·-··-·-··--·-·-··---·------·--···-··--·-············-··· ·····-·············-····· 
4 -····-·--·--·······--·------·-·--·-···------····--··············--·················· 
American Japanese Jap.-American 
1--- short t -+- long t 
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Discussion: 
This question helps the research establish an quantitative measure 
of a concept, namely Strategic Duration Perspective. The literature 
lacked any such measurement beyond long and short term. The 
anticipated data should reflect the conceptual definition of Strategic 
Duration Perspective for each of the three samples. Hence the 
Japanese are expected to have the longest, the American sample the 
shortest and the Japanese-American a SOP. measurement closer to 
the American data. 
The data here is assembled as averages of each corporate category's 
opinion. 
The opinion of the respondents as to the definition in years of short 
term and long term Strategic Duration Perspectives is important to 
the thesis. The American sample, whose literature reputation is one 
of short-termism returned an average opinion of three years for 
short term Strategic Duration Perspective and ten years for long 
term Strategic Duration Pe.rspective. The Japanese sample whose 
literature reputation is one of long-termism returned an average 
opinion of three years for a short term Strategic Duration 
Perspective and seven years for a long term Strategic Duration 
Perspective. The Japanese-American sample whose Strategic 
Duration Perspective reputation was unknown returned an average 
opinion of three years for short term Strategic Duration Perspective 
and eight years for long term Strategic Duration Perspective. 
This data was surprising given the pre-survey literature 
reputations of each respondent category; generally one may have 
expected America to have offered the shortest Strategic Duration 
Perspective definition, Japan the longest and Japanese-American 
respondents were to offer original opinions here. The Strategic 
Duration Perspectives as defined above do not of necessity have to 
equate the period covered in actual corporate strategic plans. 
Strategic Duration Perspective is the conceptual reference utilized 
by corporations to align their strategic resource allocation decisions 
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with the Operating Environment in such a manner that these 
strategic decisions are closer to the Objective Reality. 
Consequently, the results as listed above for the three corporate 
categories need to be regarded in this light; that Strategic Duration 
Perspective can and will often be different, in both concept and 
actual years, from the period allocated to a specific corporate 
strategic planning system. 
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M. There is a Japanese-American Corporate Strategic Management 
Model with its own distinctive characteristics. 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
Weighted Average Analysis 2:M 
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strong 
disagree disagree agree ly 
agree 
A 1% 10% 5% 11% 2% 0% 
J 1% 8% 8% 13% 4% 0% 
J-A 0% 6% 1% 13% 9% 1% 
Graphic Analysis 2: M 
12 ····-···········-·····-··-············-··--··-····-·-·····-······---------··--····-····-··········· 
6 ··-···-·-------···-·-
4 ··-·-·-··-···--·-·· 
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1--- American -+- Japanese --*-- Jap.-American 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 2: M 
First - Slightly agree 
Second - Disagree 
Third - Slightly disagree 
Forth - Agree 
Fifth - Strongly disagree 
0% 
Ameri.can respondents. 
First - Slightly agree 
Joint second - Slightly disagree 
Joint second - Disagree 
Third -Agree 
Forth -Strongly disagree 
0% 
Japanese respondents 
First - Slightly agree 
Second - Agree 
Third - Disagree 
Joint forth - Slightly disagree 
Joint forth - Strongly agree 
0% 
Japanese-American respondents 
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First - Slightly agree 
-
Second - Disagree 
Third - Agree 
Forth - Slightly disagree 
Fifth - Strongly disagree 
Sixth - Strongly agree 
Combined respondents 
Discussion: 
As in Questions I. and K. above the data reflects a "Slight 
agreement" by each corporate category, American, Japanese and 
Japanese-American that a distinctive Japanese-American Strategic 
Management Model exists. 
While the American response was mixed with 11% Weighted Average 
Percentage for "Slightly agree" it was followed by 10% 
"Disagreement". This may be symptomatic of the theory suggested 
above regarding the complexity of distinguishing what is very 
similar to one's own strategic management model. Please note that the 
researcher is not drawing this conclusion at this time; but rather 
suggesting that if it were indeed found that the Japanese-American 
Strategic Management Model was indeed similar to the America model 
then it would in part explain the contradictory opinions of the 
American data regarding the Japanese-America Strategic Management 
Model. 
The Japanese data reflect a more distinct opinion with a 13% Weighted 
Average Percentage for "Slight agreement", followed by an 8% 
Weighted Average Percentage for each "Slight disagreement" and 
"Disagreement". Here too the data suggests ambiguity in sample 
opinion, yet the trend may be argued to be toward the recognition 
of a distinctive Japanese-American Strategic Management Model by 
the Japanese relative to their (Japanese) strategic management 
model. The opinion may be suggestive of the variations which have· 
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emerged between Japanese Strategic Management and that which 
evolved as a result of transplanting Japanese businesses into the 
American Operating Environment. 
The Japanese-American self-analysis suggests that it's Strategic 
Management Model is distinctive as evidenced from the 13% Weighted 
Average Percentage in favour of "Slight agreement" followed by 9% 
for "Agreement". This data may be argued to be the result of 
noticing the distinction between the Japanese Strategic Management 
Model on the one hand and the American Model on the other. 
Presumably since this Model would be the most recent, relative to the 
Japanese and or the American, it is plausible that as such it was less 
complicated for this sample to recognise its degree of distinction 
from the Japanese and or American Models due to the fact that the 
Japanese-American corporations are forced to deal with both 
Japanese and American Strategic Management Models as an integral 
part of daily operations thus highlighting the differences. This 
would arise from corporate links, responsibility and allegiance to 
Japan and the operating logistics of doing business in an American 
Operating Environment. 
The combined data reflect a clear "Slight agreement" of a distinctive 
Strategic Management Model attributed to the Japanese-American 
Corporations. To the extent that this can be utilized it may be 
suggested that this data enables this research to utilize the 
Japanese-American Strategic Management Model as the unit of 
comparison for the research objective of identifying the optimum 
Strategic Duration Perspective for Corporate America. 
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SECTION 3: JAPANESE CORPORATIONS OPERATING IN THE USA. 
The questions in Section 3 of the ·survey are collectively aimed at 
directing the research toward data which will assist in developing 
arguments for and or against the research hypothesis that a viable 
and optimum Strategic Duration Perspective has been developed in 
America based upon appropriate intrinsic economic-socio-political-
cultural factors inherent in the American Operating Environment. 
The Japanese-American data goes to the very heart of the thesis; if 
the Japanese-American respondents' opinion is that they have 
adapted to the American Operating Environment in a manner which 
exhibits tendencies away from the Japanese Strategic Management 
Model, (generally accepted as long-termism) and toward an American 
Strategic Management Model (generally accepted· as short-termism) 
then the hypothesis that the American Strategic Duration 
Perspective is optimum for the American Operating Environment is 
to this extent strengthened. If, on the other hand, the Japanese-
American sample indicates retention of their Japanese strategic long-
termism, then the basis for the American short-termism is put into 
question regarding its economic and strategic basis. 
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A. As a Japanese Strategic Planner working in a Japanese-
American corporation, in which direction have you changed 
from the - traditional Long-Term Japanese Strategic 
Management as a result of planning for an American Operating 
Environment'? 
-
(Please circle one response) 
1. shorter-term strategic management approach then 
Japanese. 
2. slightly shorter-term strategic management approach then 
Japanese. 
4. no change in Japanese strategic management approach. 
5. longer-term strategic management approach then Japanese. 
Weighted Average Analysis 3:A 
1. 2. 4. 5. 
J-A 24% 22% 22% 2% 
Graphic Analysis 3:A 
10 ---···-···-·--···-···-··-···-····-·····-·· 
5 ····--·--·-·--··-···-·-·-··-·-···----····-··--···-·················-·················-··-·-··--·-···--····----·--··--·-··---··--····---····-··· 
o...L..~~~~~~~~~~-,-~~~~~~~.--~~~~~~--.~~~~ 
stsmatj sstsmatj ncijsma ltsmatj 
J -- Jap.-American j 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 3:A 
First - Shorter-term strategic management approach then 
Japanese 
Joint second - Slightly shorter-term strategic management 
approach then Japanese 
Joint second - No change in Japanese strategic management 
approach 
Third - Longer-term strategic management approach then 
Japanese 
Forth - 0% 
Japanese-American respondents 
Discussion: 
This question is important as it defines the directional changes made 
by the Japanese-American sample as a result of and or in response 
to the American Operating Environment. 
The literature suggests that Japanese management exposed to the 
American Operating Environment will not only adapt to such but be 
changed by the experience, Kono ( 1984) , Ouchi ( 1981) • 
Mintzberg's ( 1985) degree of strategy realization theory is important 
to the issues developed in this question. The Japanese Strategic 
Management Model comes to the American Operating Environment 
with at least their traditional Model which then interfaces with the 
local operating variables and the result of such is aligned with 
Mintzberg's intended and over realized theory of strategic 
realization. Thus, the question is to what extent is the Japanese-
American Strategic Model representative of the intended strategic 
management model? 
The anticipated result is that Japanese-American respondents will 
indicate a shortening of their traditional strategic long-termisim in 
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dealing with the American Operating Environment. Further, in terms 
of Mintzberg' s theory, the contemplated response is that an 
emergent strategic management model exists. That such is founded 
upon the Japanese traditional model yet soundly influenced by the 
local Operating Environment and hence, increasingly, more American 
then Japanese, as Kono (1984) argued, the Americanization of 
Japanese principals over time and exposure to the local Operating 
Environment. 
The data here suggests a probing, tentative movement by the 
Japanese-American sample from Japanese long-termisim toward 
American short-termisim. The sample selected "Shorter-term 
strategic management approach then Japanese" by 24% Weighted 
Average Percentage and "Slightly shorter-term strategic 
management approach then Japanese" by 22% Weighted Average 
Percentage. This second selection was balanced by a joint second 
selection of "No change in Japanese strategic management approach" 
by an equal 22% Weighted Average Percentage; hence the use of the 
term "tentative movement" above. 
This data reflects the nature of the Japanese-American Strategic 
Management Model as having adapted to the American Operating 
Environment; yet having strong ties to Japanese Strategic 
Management Model. Arguably an emerging hybrid strategic 
management model with an inclination for adaptation to local the 
conditions. 
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B. How supportive is your Japanese Management in Japan for you 
to make changes to the traditional Long-Term Japanese 
Strategic Management approach for the American Operating 
Environment'? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. very supportive. 
2. somewhat supportive. 
3. not very supportive. 
4. not at all supportive. 
Weight~d Average Analysis 3:B 
1. 2. 3. 4. 
J-A 5% 35% 28% 5% 
Graphic Analysis 3: B 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 3:B 
First - Somewhat supportive 
Second - Not very supportive 
Joint third - Very supportive 
Joint third - Not at all supportive 
Japanese-American respondents 
Discussion: 
This question seeks to measure any resistance faced by Japanese-
American corporations to changes in their traditional strategic 
management model as a result of their adaptation to the American 
Operating Environment. Further, should the resistance be found to 
be substantial it proves the gauntlet these Japanese-American 
managers had to face to push through their new more American 
strategic concepts and thus adds credence to the necessity of such 
changes which heightens their importance. All of which could point 
to the appropriateness of the American Strategic Duration 
Perspective. 
The literature discusses this issue indirectly in articles about the 
dis-satisfaction (generalization) on the part of American managers 
employed in Japanese-American corporations, Thackeray ( 1990) and 
Bowman (1986). These include allegations of shadow management, 
artificial authority and being used as "front" management. 
Quinn ( 1978) regarded closed inflexible strategic management models 
as highly fragile as their rigidity was incompatible with the evolution 
of the Operating Environment. Thus, should the Japanese resist too 
strongly the changes necessary for Japanese-American development, 
then one may (based upon Quinn's 1987 theory) argue their 
vulnerability due to a less then porus approach to strategic change. 
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The anticipated result is that the Japanese are reluctant supporters 
for Japanese-American changes to Japanese long-termism. Such 
reluctance is based upon the conservative Japanese approach to 
change and the problems associated with self analysis and scepticism 
of non Japanese influences generally. 
This question serves to measure the degree of tolerance by Japanese 
corporations for change to the traditional long-term Japanese 
Strategic Management approach, made by Japanese-American 
corporations operating in the American Operating Environment. The 
data reflects a "Somewhat supportive" opinion as suggested by the 
35% Weighted Average Percentage, followed by a 28% Weighted 
Average Percentage opinion for "Not very supportive". 
These results indicate a reluctant and conservative tolerance for 
changes made to the Japanese long-termism by Japanese-American 
corporations. Given the joint second opinion of "Not very 
supportive" 28% Weighted Average Percentage, it may be suggested 
that such change came reluctantly and only after strategic difficulty 
in dealing with the hard realities of the American Operating 
Environment. Further, although it is unknown, it is arguable that 
the degree of change to the traditional Japanese Strategic 
Management Model in Japanese-American organizations is impacted 
by the number and positions held by American managers in the 
organization. 
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D. As a Japanese Corporation operating in America how much 
have you altered your Japanese approach to Strategic 
Management? 
(Please circle your response? 
1. total change. 
2. most has changed. 
3. slightly changed. 
4. very little change. 
5. no changes. 
Weighted Average Analysis 3:D 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
J-A 5% 48% 57% 29% 0% 
Graphic Analysis 3:D 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 3:0 
First - Slightly changed 
Second - Most has changed 
Third - Very little changed 
Forth - Total change 
0% 
Japanese-American respondents 
Discussion: 
The importance of this question is to establish the perceived degree 
of change made by Japanese-American respondents to their 
traditional Japanese Strategic Management Model. 
The literature questions when strategic change is said to have taken 
place. Snow et al (1980) suggest that not all evolution is in fact 
strategic change. The authors define strategic change as taking 
place when there is substantial realignment with the Operating 
Environment combined with internal change in technology and 
process so as to realize this new relationship with the Operating 
Environment. Thus, the question here is whether the changes made 
by the Japanese-American sample constitutes strategic change based 
upon Snow et al's definition? 
The data indicates the amount of change perceived to have taken 
place in the Japanese approach to Strategic Management as a result 
of operating in the American Operating Environment. In Section 3: 
Question A above the data showed that the Japanese-American 
sample reflected a tentative move toward a shorter-term strategic 
management approach in America vis-a-vis the Japanese Strategic 
Management approach. In Section 3: Question B above the sample 
reflected that the Japanese parent corporations were "somewhat 
supportive" of changes made to the Japanese strategic management 
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model. In Section 3: Question D the data reflects a "Slight change" 
57% Weighted Average Percentage made by Japanese-American 
corporations to the Japanese strategic management approach. 
Further, the data reflects a 48% Weighted Average Percentage "Most 
has changed" response, and 5% Weighted Average Percentage for 
"Very little change" made by Japanese-American corporations 
operating in America. 
The data overall reflects a slow, hesitant and reluctant adaptation 
of the Japanese Strategic Management Model to a Japanese-American 
Strategic Management Model which shows tendencies toward the 
American Model. This is reflected by the data's Weighted Average 
Percentage selection and appears in the sequential analysis as well; 
in that the primary opinion suggests a shift toward an American 
model yet the second and in some cases third selections reflect a 
retreat or suggest no adaptation to the American Operating 
Environment. 
Based upon Snow et al's definition for strategic change one would 
need additional specific data on the degree of internal change to 
draw a conclusion. What is useful is Snow et al 1 s definition of 
corporate adaptation to local environment which is argued not to be 
strategic change until the internal technological and process changes 
have been implemented. Thus, using Snow et al's definition of 
strategic change one may argue that strategic adaptation has taken 
place within the Japanese-American sample and that strategic change 
itself will be said to have taken place when the internal structural 
changes have been implemented. 
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E. Would you agree or disagree that while operating in a foreign 
economy strategic planners SHOULD use the Local Strategic 
Duration Perspective to achieve corporate strategic goals and 
objectives? 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
Weighted Average Analysis 3:E 
Strongly Disagree Slightly Slightly Agree Strong 
disagree disagree agree ly 
agree 
J-A 0% 7% 0% 31% 26% 5% 
Graphic Analysis 3:E 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 3:E 
First - Slightly agree 
Second - Agree 
Third - Disagree 
Forth - Strongly agree 
0% 
0% 
Japanese-American respondents 
Discussion: 
This question relates to the hypothesis that the optimum strategic 
management model is most likely to be the one which is most aligned 
with the local Operating Environment's economic-socio-political-
cultural value system already in place. The rational for this is the 
Japanese strategic management model whose long-termism is a great 
strategic fit with the pre-existing economic-socio-political-cultural 
value system which formed the foundation for the development of 
strategic long-termism widely accepted as the trade mark of the 
Japanese Strategic Management Model. This in contrast to the 
American short termisim, performance base_d model. 
This research questions the legitimacy of the criticism focused on 
the American Strategic Management Model, the hypothesis is that a 
Strategic Management Model will inevitably reflect (to varying 
degrees) the pre-existing economic-socio-political-cultural value 
system. Thus, the question arises whether foreign corporate 
strategic planners should utilise the local Strategic Duration 
Perspective to achieve corporate strategic goals and objectives 
within the foreign Operating Environment faster at a higher level of 
performance and with increased cost effectiveness. 
The literature is strong on principals which relate the internal 
corporate agenda with opportunities in the Operating Environment, 
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for example Schendel and Hatten (1972). The question here goes one 
step further; should this interf ac~ utilise the local Strategic 
Duration Perspective when operating in a foreign local? 
The expected result is that based upon the logic that the local 
Strategic Duration Perspective is a product of the local mores and 
conventions, that it thus represents objectively the most efficient 
modes operandi and should be regarded as an important management 
alignment tool. Thus, should the data reflect a positive result it will 
support the theory of local Strategic Duration Perspective utilization 
by foreign corporations. Further, Rumelt ( 1979) notes that strategic 
issues are complex and binding, thus by adopting local SDP. one 
may reduce the risk of miss-alignment based upon pre-conceptions. 
This theory was tested here using the American Operating 
Environment as the local Operating Environment, and the Japanese-
American corporations as the foreign corporate entities doing 
business in the local American Operating Environment. The data 
reflected by the Japanese-American sample showed a "slight 
agreement" for this theory by a 31% Weighted Average Percentage, 
followed by a 26% Weighted Average Percentage for "agreement", 7% 
Weighted Average Percentage for "disa~eement" and 5% WAP. for 
"strong agreement". 
The results here suggest a general agreement that while operating 
in a foreign Operating Environment the local Strategic Duration 
Perspective_should be utilized in achieving strategic goals. 
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F. As a Japanese Corporation operating in America have you been 
able to retain a long-term approach to Strategic Management'? 
(Please circle your response) 
1. yes. 
2. no. 
Weighted Average Analysis 3: F 
Yes No 
J-A 47% 53% 
Japanese-American respondents 
Graphic Analysis 3: F 
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Weighted Average Percentage Sequential Analysis 3:F 
First - No 
Second - Yes 
Japanese-American respondents 
Discussion: 
This question seeks to establish whether the Japanese-American 
respondents have been able to perpetuate a Japanese type Strategic 
Management Model whilst operating in the American Operating 
Environment. The American Operating Environment is well known for 
it's rapid pace of change, operations deployment and complex, 
volatile market competition with a broad acceptance of short term 
SDP .. 
Newman and Logan ( 1971) define strategy as guided, anticipatory, 
pro-active opportunism; thus it is suggested that Japanese-
American corporations' investment in the American Operating 
Environment is a result of just such behaviour. Consequentially, 
using Pascal's (1981) theory of cultural input and Von Neumann et 
al's (1947) contribution of strategy in response to a particular set of 
variables the Japane~e-American corporations were faced with 
opportunism which required an evolving set of strategic approaches 
in order to achieve success. These Japanese-American corporations 
came to America with a traditional Japanese long-termism Strategic 
Duration Perspective - the question is whether their achievements 
in America have occurred without compromising traditional Japanese 
Strategic Duration Perspective'? 
The data does not reflect a clear opinion but rather a preference for 
an inability to sustain a long-term Japanese approach to Strategic 
Management by a 53% Weighted Average Percentage, this was 
followed by a 47% Weighted Average Percentage for an ability to 
retain a Japanese type Strategic Management approach. Given the 
proximity of the results this research can not be conclusive in its 
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argument here. Yet it may be argued that the data is reflective of an 
increasing trend of Strategic Duration Perspective adaptation to the 
local Operating Environment. This is supported by the shortening 
of Strategic Duration Perspective as indicated by the Japanese 
respondents in Section 1: Question D. 
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SECTION 4: DEMOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION. 
A. 1. age --- years. 
2. sex - male / female 
3. corporate position----------
4. years in this position --- years. 
Analysis 4:A 
1. 2. male 2. female 3. 4. 
A 47 32 3 
-· 4 
J 49 0 0 - 5 
J-A 45 0 0 
- 6 
Average 47 
- - - 5 
Graphic Analysis 4:A 
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4. 2 Analysis And Discussion Of The Hypotheses 
In Nature evolution is equal to survival; that is adaptation to an 
evolving habitat has sustained some animals while an inability or slow 
response to environmental change has lead to the extinction of 
others. 
Twenty first century Man is acting-out similar perpetual evolution. 
Thus, business evolution is not only reflective of such survival 
adaptation, but each management tool is a means of malang corporate 
evolution more efficient and effective given the goal of survival, 
growth and dominance. The net result is that via the deployment of 
strategy Man has influenced the evolution process in pace and 
sophistication. Hence the need for management systems which will 
reflect such change and management. 
As discussed earlier these hypotheses arose out of the researcher's 
concern for, and interest in the validity (or degree thereof) of the 
disparaging literary appraisal of the short term American Strategic 
Management Model, suffering from institutional investor myopia and 
corporate indulgence of quarterly time horizons to the detriment of 
strategic performance, positioning and asset productivity. 
It . occurred to the researcher that given the fact that commercial 
activity commonly referred to as Capitalism, as it is practised in the 
United States of America, may be defined as the epitome of optimum 
resource allocation given the "rules of the game" and the structural 
economic and cultural boundaries (as suggested by Mintzberg) of the 
American economic system. Given the fact that playing the game 
more effectively produces better results - the question arose, why 
the most effective resource gathers and allocators (namely major 
American corporations and their corporate officers and planers) 
would be making what the literature depicted as less then optimum 
strategic decisions'? 
Surely, this group of American corporations which exhibited a 
common short term, performance based strategic management style 
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(generalization) had a rational economic self-preservation logic for 
their strategy? Is it feasible that this American short-termism 
reflects, not a lesser advanced, but rather the most advanced from 
of evolution, adaptation and alignment with their contemporary 
Operating Environment? 
It seemed odd that Corporate America which is so proficient at 
gathering and allocating resources in the most effective and efficient 
manner would be so wrong in their Strategic Duration Perspective at 
a time when technology and global political advancements were 
facilitating extraordinary efficiencies and opportunities for these 
capitalist competitors in the fields of information analysis and 
resource allocation management. 
With the issue defined the question turned to finding a test for the 
legitimacy of the American short term Strategic Duration 
Perspective. The model selected was a comparison between the 
American Strategic Duration Perspective, which was widely reported 
to be short-termism, against a contrasting Strategic Duration 
Perspective. Then to evaluate the changes made by the latter when 
such (latter's) Strategic Duration Perspective competed in the 
American Operating Environment. 
The Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective was selected as the 
comparative sample because the Japanese Strategic Duration 
Perspective was widely reported to be long-termism. Secondly, the 
Japanese have a sizable corporate presence in the American 
Operating Environment which has had sufficient time to adapt to the 
American Operating Environment, at least to the degz.:ee that such 
Japanese-American respondents could project their adaptation in 
Strategic Duration Perspective to the American Operating 
Environment relative to their Japanese Strategic Duration 
Perspective roots. Thirdly, Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective 
had produced fabulous results for Japan (leading to the conclusion 
that it was highly effective) . Fourthly, Japanese Strategic Duration 
Perspective was often referred to in the literature as a desirable 
alternative to the American Strategic Duration Perspective. 
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The following is a discussion of the hypotheses as they relate to the 
literature survey and empirical data g~thered in the written survey 
sampled from three respondent groups namely; American, Japanese 
and Japanese-American corporations. These discussions are 
intended to bring out the patterns which may facilitate an improved 
cognizance and approach to the design and conceptual appreciation 
of an optimum Strategic Duration Perspective for the American 
Operating Environment. 
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4. 2 .1 Hypothesis One 
The first hypothesis is that a unique and positive American Strategic 
Management Model had emerged in the United States supported by a 
complex paradoxical performance-based short term Strategic 
Duration Perspective. 
This American Strategic Duration Perspective may appear on the 
surface to be an immature, undeveloped and short sighted allocation 
and investment of vast economic resources. The concern is that this 
American performance based investment and allocation of strategic 
resources, although spectacular, may result in the long term 
strategic deterioration of the American economy, returning to 
torment investors, the American economy and in turn the stability 
of the global economy. 
The important aspects of this hypothesis are; one, whether in fact 
a unique American short term performance based Strategic 
Management Model has emerged which is based upon the inclusive 
components of the American Operating Environment (Operating 
Environment here used in its broadest definition ie. including the 
economic-socio-political forces from internal and external economic 
factors) and in essence offering an optimum approach to American 
corporations for competing in the American Operating Environment 
in its present form. 
Secondly, the usage and or component usage of such a Strategic 
Management Model by corporate America as a means of increasing the 
factors of efficiency and effectiveness in the strategic allocation of 
desirable and valuable corporate resources which, once allocated 
represent a reduction in operating flexibility, Quinn (1978), and a 
commitment to a particular, or set of strategic goals and objectives 
regardless of the distinction (significant or insignificant) between 
the corporate expectation of the evc1hring operating reality and the 
evolving objective (operating) reality ie. the time-laps effect. 
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This corporate "lock and load" consequence of deploying strategic 
corporate resources lies at the heart of the importance of Strategic 
Duration Perspective. Strategic Duration Perspective is the 
conceptual notion which guides corporate strategists in matching 
investment returns with strategic resource investment given the 
interruption thereto (or not or some degree thereof to such) by the 
evolving objective operating realities unknown (in fact) when the 
allocation decision is taken and strategic deployment of corporate 
resources is committed. 
Further, the strategic management appropriate for a particular 
Operating Environment necessitates a substantial understanding of 
that particular Operating Environment. Consequently, there is a 
need to utilize this appreciation of the Operating Environment so as 
to match the subjective Strategic Duration Perspective of managers 
with expected future results. Thus, it may argued that there is a 
causal relationship between the subjective perception of the 
Operating Environment and the Objective Reality of such Operating 
Environment. This causal relationship will be reflected in the 
performance (or not) of the asset allocation strategy. Hence the 
value and importance of an alignment between the subjective 
Strategic Duration Perspective and the Objective Reality of an 
Operating Environment. 
Thus, the short-termism of the American strategic management model 
is reflective of matching management practice with the objective 
realities of the Operating Environment. Further, short-termism is 
itself part of the Objective Reality due to its wide spread usage. 
Therefore the positive aspects of this Strategic Duration Perspective 
need to be developed. 
It may be argued that the origins of American short-term 
performance based Strategic Duration Perspective lie for the most 
part in the Operating Environment which rendered long-termism a 
miss-matched approach in terms of, not only the practices of the 
American Operating Environment, but the economic-socio-political 
values and economic structures of the society. From presidential 
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four year terms, to recently proposed congressional term limits, 
quarterly Wall Street numbers, to the "Mc Donalds" mentality - short-
termism is a fact of American culture, society and daily expectation. 
The empirical data gathered in Section 1: Questions A through D 
offer the study insight into the American respondents perspective 
of their Operating Environment. Question A reflects an Operating 
Environment in America which has a "fast" pace of change. This is 
important when pursuing the logic for matching management practice 
-
with the operating realities. The pace of change is a measure of the 
pressure and tolerance which is required in the American Strategic 
Management Model, so that such management practice can be an 
effective utility. A miss-match between the pace of environmental 
change and the Strategic Duration Perspective of an organization will 
inevitably lead to a lesser then effective allocation of resources, with 
the typical negative impact of such to deal with such 
misappropriation of resources in terms of the needs of the Operating 
Environment ie. compounded miss-alignment. The development and 
commitment by the organization to a strategy which will result in 
confusion as to the definition of the problem and a perspective of the 
issues from which the solution or improvement may not be visible 
without resorting to external assistance to realign the internal 
(subjective) perception with the Objective Reality of the Operating 
Environment. Note, that throughout such miss-alignment period the 
Operating Environment continues to evolve exacerbating the degree 
of miss-alignment. 
Further, once such miss-perception is in play, reaction to such 
miss-alignment of Operating Environment and Objective Reality is 
generally remedied only after the damage has taken hold. While the 
consequences of miss-alignment are not visible and often intangible, 
they continue to impact corporate performance long before they can 
be recognized by our largely quantitative systems of analysis. The 
corporate reaction is likely the replacement of leadership, often the 
CEO. A recent example is the resignation of Continental Air's CEO, 
Robert Ferguson m, in light of the carrier's recent less then 
satisfactory performance. This pattern has been accelerated by CEO 
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categorization into specific pigeon-holes such as liquidator, 
consolidator, turnaround specialist and expander to name a few. 
Section 1: Question B reveals that the source of change in the 
American Operating Environment as a multifarious, complex, 
enigmatic and interactive process whose evolution, development, 
formation and reformation takes place as a result of numerous 
compounded factors to the point where the future becomes as 
unpredictable as any natural process. Hence the need for Strategic 
Duration Perspective to influence this natural determinism. The 
hypothesis suggests that the evolution at this point in time is so 
dynamic and advanced that strategic management is a weak 
management tool which has resulted in a shortening of Strategic 
Duration Perspective as a means of preserving and regaining some 
element of control over the un-controllable variables. Based upon 
the Japanese-American data it may be argued that the faster and 
more uncontrollable the Operating Environment the shorter Strategic 
Duration Perspective will become. 
The pace and dynamics of the Operating Environment exist in two 
important spheres, one the subjective perception of the strategist 
and two, the Objective Reality. This model is compounded to the 
extent that the strategist's perception does or does not approximate 
the Objective Reality. 
The survey reviewed the source of change in the corporations' 
Operating Environment from a selection of operating factors. The 
results were as complex as the area of investigation, but they may 
be regarded as a fairly balanced set of causes amongst the selection 
offered to the respondents. The American sample selected 
"competition for market share" as the leading source of change in 
their Operating Environment. This is consistent with the Natural 
Theory of capitalism which identifies great similarity between the 
competition in nature with the competition in business; leading to the 
conclusion that in spite of the development of sophisticated 
techniques Man's behaviour has not measurably deviated from the 
natural state of resource gathering and allocation. The wisdom of 
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which if defined by approximation to the Objective Reality of that 
particular Operating Environment as perceived by that species 
(which for our purposes is the corporate unit of competition) and its 
utilization of Strategic Duration Perspective to facilitate the 
deployment of valuable and empowering resources (possibly but not 
necessarily scarce at the major corporate level) within a time horizon 
which at once reduce the inherent risks of the time-laps effect and 
produce a competitive return on investment ie. performance. Both 
of which need to be efficient in terms of the investment-market 
opportunities and place the corporation in a position (at the 
conclusion of such investment) which is advantageous to the future 
(predicted) Operating Environment and the overlapping strategic 
movement and direction which the corporation would need to pursue 
prior to the expiration of the initial strategic investment. 
These options for sources of change in the American Operating 
Environment represent the internal and external factors which 
influence the corporation in behaviour, but are distinct from the 
"competing" itself which is the primary rational for the corporation's 
continued existence. The sources of change may be defined as 
secondary in that they collectively define and make specific the 
competing, but remain servants of the primary objective which is 
existence as defined by competition ie. survival. The sources of 
change in the Operating Environment are the dynamics by which the 
primary objective is or is not achieved, or approximated. It is 
through the investment of corporate resources in these sources of 
change, that the corporation can effectively compete and therein 
exist. 
The Operating Environment of the United States is a dynamic which 
is managed by corporate units of competition via the allocation of 
resources under the auspice of strategic management, which itself 
is comprised of hard data and the perception of management. The 
absence of a substitute or replacement for this management tool 
leaves managers with the task of developing a strategic management 
system which facilitates and satisfies the corporation's 
competitiveness and existence within the operating (environment) 
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dynamic. Thus, the effectiveness of this management tool is 
important as it relates to the proficiency of its usage. That is, one 
can not assume that strategic management is suitable; for if the tool 
itself has limitations then the very basis of the resource allocation 
process is or is not retarded to the extent that the tool itself is 
appropriate or not for the assigned task, within the context of a 
particular Operating Environment. 
The American sample along with the Japanese and Japanese-American 
sample suggested that strategic management was only "somewhat 
effective". It may be argued that this is positive reinforcement of 
the management tool given the complexity and enormity of the task. 
But, it does suggest that tlie tool itself, regardless of usage, can 
develop to more fully satisfy the requirements of the assignment as 
it evolves in relation to the circumstances of utilization ie. not to 
presume that the strategic-management-tool is ideally suited to the 
task; therefore the application and use of such tool should be 
deployed according to a particular context. 
The Operating Environment of the United States of America appears, 
from the data in Section 1: Question D, to have further shortened 
(over the past five years} the Strategic Duration Perspective of the 
sample corporations. This indicates an adjustment to an increasingly 
complex and dynamic Operating Environment, which as mentioned 
above was widely reported in the literature. The trend appears from 
the literature and the empirical data to be an increasingly fast pace 
of change managed by a shortening of Strategic Duration 
Perspective. Here again there is evidence of a matching process 
between the Operating Environment and the management of corporate 
assets. This reinforces the logic that strategic management will 
endeavour to match its Strategic Duration Perspective with the 
realities (as perceived by the strategist} of the Operating 
Envircnment at a given point in time. The natural outcome of this 
trend would be the development of a more real-time Strategic 
Duration Perspective, Quinn (1978}. This point was reinforced by 
Ansoff (1977} Mintzberg (1987} and the data in Section 2: Question 
E where respondents "agreed" and "slightly agreed" that real-time 
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strategic management is becoming an increasingly appropriate 
process. 
The uniqueness of the American Strategic Management Model is 
theorized to be founded upon the assumption that strategy be 
developed in response to an appreciation of the apparent and latent 
opportunities which exist in the market (Lawrence 1967), and the 
allocation and deployment of resources to capture the returns 
available and possible. The degree of success of such process is 
directly related to the extent that strategy approximates the 
Objective Reality available in the Operating Environment. The 
Objective Reality is the hypothetical optimum strategic allocation of 
resources resulting in a maximization of the profitability of such 
investment given the proportions of the resource allocation and 
investment potential. 
Consequently as Lawrence (1967) argued, strategy should be 
developed in direct relationship to the return on investment 
opportunity/ies available in the Operating Environment. This means 
that the strategic management of a particular Operating Environment 
will of necessity reflect the optimum Strategic Duration Perspective 
possible discounting the limitations and political static caused by 
humans in approximating the Objective Reality ie. Mintzberg' s ( 1985) 
adaptive approach. Thus, the suggestion is that where one has a 
peculiar economic-socio-political-cultural system in place, one will 
find a parallel in the Strategic Duration Perspective as a result of 
the composi~on of values reflected in the Operating Environment 
which is reflected in the strategic management of corporate 
resources within such Operating Environment. Therefore, the 
American value system creates, in an evolving process the 
structures and systems which are satisfied by the units of 
competition upon a reading of the Operating Environment and an 
allocation of resources based upon such, in proportion to the 
projected return on investment. 
Section 2: Question I supports the notion that a distinctive American 
strategic management model exists. The data shows that in Questions 
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I and K the L, where this question was solicited, the (Japanese or 
American) respondent sample whose strategic management model was 
being referred to (in that question) was less able to project the 
distinction compared with the remaining respondent sample, who in 
each case not only identified the distinction, did so overwhelmingly, 
(see Section 2 : Questions I, K, and L) . 
Section 2: Question J relates the economic principal of competitive 
advantage to Strategic Duration Perspective. The data suggests an 
"agreement" that the factors of competitive advantage are reflective 
of the resulting Strategic Duration Perspective which may be argued 
to support the notion that there is a matching of Operating 
Environment with strategic management models and Strategic 
Duration Perspective. Hence, the uniqueness of a strategic 
management model given the bias within the natural resources of a 
given Operating Environment and therein the connection to 
competitive advantage based upon a presumption of asymmetrical 
competition. 
Section 2: Question F provides a review of the three categories' 
perception of the sources of Strategic Duration Perspective. The 
data reflects the distinction in perception given the uniqueness of 
the Japanese and American Operating Environments. Each of the 
Japanese and American data (here) provides a picture of the 
variance between the two Strategic Duration Perspectives which are 
dependent upon the opportunities in the Operating Environment and 
a match with the expected and anticipated fruition of such returns 
on invested resources. 
Another enlightening measurement of the uniqueness of the American 
Strategic Management Model is the selection of the most effective 
planning duration in the three corporate categories, as given in 
Section 2: Question C. The data suggests that while all three 
samples selected "medium range plans" the American sample 
suggested using "short range plans" slightly more then the Japanese 
and less then the Japanese-American respondents. 
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A direct measurement of the respondents' Strategic Duration 
Perspective was made in Section 2: Question D. This data reflects all 
three respondent categories sele-cting a "somewhat long term" 
description of their corporate Strategic Duration Perspective as 
their primary opinion. The American sample selected a strong 
definition of their Strategic Duration Perspective as "somewhat short 
term" this was in contrast to the Japanese but similar in trend to the 
Japanese-American sample reflecting and isolating the impact of the 
Operating Environment on the design of the strategic management 
model of a particular Operating Environment. 
The viability of the American Strategic Management Model can be 
tested in the viability of the process to sustain the evolution of the 
American economy over the past thirty years during which the 
increase in sheer pace of change in the Operating Environment and 
the increased complexity of political influences, Kagono et al ( 1985) , 
have played major roles in economic fluctuations. The constant has 
been the increased shortening of the Strategic Duration Perspective 
as a result of the improvements in efficiency, productivity, 
expectation of a consumer lead economy and most importantly as a 
risk management/reduction strategy given the increased risk 
associated with the time-laps effect. 
The ability of the American economy to ebb and flow through the 
cyclical evolution of history is proof that strategic management as it 
has evolved in the United States is viable. Empirical proof was clear 
in Section 2: Question A; where the data reflected strategic plans as 
becoming "more relevant" in the American sample in spite of a "fast" 
paced Operating Environment which according to Section 2: Question 
B. has not made strategic planning redundant. This indicates a 
strategic management model which sustains an evolutionary 
flexibility somewhat equated with the evolution of the unique 
American Operating Environment. 
It may be argued that the first hypothesis is confirmed by the 
empirical research, that an independent and viable strategic 
management model exists in the United States based upon a short 
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term performance based Strategic Duration Perspective. The 
question remains whether such American Strategic Management Model 
and Strategic Duration Perspective is an optimum; this will be 
argued in the third and forth hypotheses discussion. 
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4. 2. 2 Hypothesis Two 
The second hypothesis is that Japan, which is acclaimed for its 
economic miracle, has a long term Strategic Duration Perspective. 
Thus, Japan is a good anthesis to the American Strategic 
Management Model and useful to this study because of Japan's 
corporate infiltration into the American Operating Environment. This 
facilitates a comparison of Japanese-American and American 
Strategic Duration Perspectives. The objective is to evaluate the 
literary critique of America's short term Strategic Duration 
Perspective by comparing the Japanese-American ( SDP. ) adaptation 
to the American Operating Environment, with the American Strategic 
Duration Perspective. 
Japanese corporations are well known for having taken essentially 
American business management principals as expounded by Deming 
( 1989 pp. 10-17) and others in creating an economic miracle 
primarily based upon public economic institutions (for example the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry MIT!), commitment to long term 
strategic resource investment, total quality management systems and 
artificial (ie. non-market) channelling of resources. It may be 
argued that the reason for the success of long-termism in Japan was 
the strategic-fit between long term time horizons and the Japanese 
pre-existing socio-cultural-political values so aligned. 
It may be argued that if Deming and the American management 
philosophy had been based upon short-termism that Japan would not 
(indeed could not) have imbibed these processes as efficiently they 
did and secondly, that the pace of economic development under the 
Deming philosophy (generalization) could not have taken place at the 
rate it did. The radical improvement in Japanese economic 
development, to the extent that strategic management played a role, 
may be argued to be directly related to the alignment between the 
long term value system, which pre-existed "the Demming" infusion, 
and the strategic long-termism management philosophy which merged 
into a powerful accelerator of Japanese economic development. 
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Data on the Japanese Operating Environment was collected in Section 
1 of the survey; the pace of change was found to be "fast", very 
similar in Weighted Average Points to the American definition of 
"fast". 
The Japanese (see Section 1: Question B) stressed both "competition 
for market share" and "corporate performance goals" equally. It is 
difficult to determine which of these is the primary source. It may 
be argued that the competition for market share arose out of 
prioritizing the strategy of performance goals. This sample also 
suggested that "consumer demand" and "increased access to 
information" where both significant sources of change in the 
corporate Operating Environment. 
By assigning labels to each of the question's seven options as either 
internal or external in terms of the corporation's ability to control 
them; the Japanese appear to perceive slightly more internal "push" 
attributes to the sources of change in their Operating Environment. 
This may be argued to suggest that the Japanese appear to control 
the changes in their environment slightly more then the American 
sample. While the methodology here is indirect the results concur 
with the literary view that the Japanese Operating Environment is 
more structured and closed then the American. This may be 
regarded as a reason why American corporations are more vulnerable 
to changes in the Operating Environment and an argument for the 
American Operating Environment being labelled more hostile to the 
extent it is more volatile and uncontrollable via internal corporate 
power and policy. 
The Japanese sample (see Section 1: Question C) suggest that 
strategic management is a "somewhat" effective tool for managing the 
interaction between the internal and external Operating 
Environments with which the corporation must deal. The American 
sample reflected the same result as the Japanese but felt strategic 
management was overall slightly less effective then the Japanese. 
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The data (see Section 2: Question D) shows the Japanese shortening 
their Strategic Duration Perspective over the past five years in 
response to the evolution of their Operating Environment. This is 
significant as it contradicts the literary perception of Japanese 
strategic management and dramatically impacts this research as the 
data reflects a movement in the Japanese Strategic Management Model 
toward shorter-termism generally attributed to the American 
strategic management model. This movement is reflected by clear 
data and should be considered against the tradition of long-termism 
in Japan, ie. dramatic within this context. 
Further, the fact that Japan was found to be shortening its Strategic 
Duration Perspective is itself re-enforcement of the American 
Strategic Duration Perspective model. That is, if Japan, which is 
held up as an example of the positive results of long-termism, is 
itself moving away from such traditional model, then such movement 
may be argued to be an indication of not only what the Americans are 
facing and adapting to, but suggestive of a broader global trend 
toward a shorter term Strategic Duration Perspective - here argued 
to be adaptation to an evolving Operating Environment. 
"Indeed, these are difficult times for many 
of Japan's business leaders. They are beginning 
to realize, as is much of the country, that 
the bursting of the "bubble economy" is no mere 
correction of the country's ove~heated stock and 
real estate markets but rather a warning that 
a fundamental shift in the nation's economy 
is in order. " 
Shintaro Hori, Fixing Japan's White-Collar Economy: 
A Personal View, Harvard Business Review, November-
December 1993, p. 157. 
It is argued that should the Japanese-American sample reflect a 
similar movement from long to shorter-termism in their strategic 
management model that this Japanese and Japanese-American trend 
may be argued to further strengt..hen the hypothesis that the 
American short term performance based Strategic Management Model 
and Strategic Duration Perspective are valid to the extent that they 
are being replicated (in propensity) by two corporate categories 
whose "natural" and original Strategic Duration Perspective is long-
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termism. 
The Japanese Operating Environment is clearly evolving at an 
accelerated pace and the changes are reflected in the Operating 
Environment's effect on the Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective 
which has notably shortened over the past five years (see Section 2: 
Question D) . 
11 So far, companies have been pursuing 
a piece-meal approach to trimming their 
payrolls, a custom that is common in the 
West but is still considered extreme in 
Japan, with its culture of reciprocal 
loyalty between employer and worker. This 
short-term approach to slimming overhead 
costs is creating strains within Japanese 
workforce." 
Shintaro Hori, Fixing Japan's White-Collar 
Economy: A Personal View, Harvard Business 
Review, November - December 1993, p. 163. 
The Strategic Duration Perspective of the Japanese sample was 
measured in Section 2 of the research survey. The data suggested 
that strategic plans are "more relevant" to the day to day operations 
in Japanese corporations (see Section 2: Question A) . While the data 
reflected the Japanese Operating Environment as "fast" paced (see 
Section 1: Question A) the respondents (see Section 2: Question B) 
suggested that strategic planning is not being made unnecessary by 
the pace of change in the Operating Environment. Thus, it may be 
argued that in fact strategic management is the process by which 
corporations deal with their Operating Environments, the past, 
present and future point of market-contact between the internal and 
external forces represented in the process of commercial activity 
carried out by a corporate organization. 
This argument of increasingly short-termism necessitated by the 
increased pace and complexity of commercial activity and the 
Operating Environment is re-enforced (see Section 2: Question E) 
by Japanese respondents who agreed and slightly agreed that 
strategic management must become more real time to preserve the 
contribution of strategic management to corporate performance as 
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envisaged in the Herold (1972) study, for example. 
"In the past, the appraisal and 
incentive systems used by Western 
companies to manage performance 
were rare in Japan." 
Shintaro Hori, Fixing Japan's White 
-Collar Economy: A Personal View, 
Harvard Business Review, November -
December 1993, p. 164. 
The Japanese sample suggested "medium range" strategic plans as 
those contributing most to corporate performance (see Section 2: 
Question C) yet the sample continues to perceive itself as having a 
"somewhat long term" Strategic Duration Perspective (see Section 2: 
Question D). Contradiction'? It could be argued that while the 
demands of the Operating Environment, corporate productivity and 
production innovation may necessitate a more real time strategic 
management approach, the corporate mission and vision may remain 
"somewhat long term" . 
It should be noted that, in the context of Japanese strategic 
management, the "somewhat long term" Strategic Duration 
Perspective (see Section 2: Question D) may be theorized to be a 
retreat from what this question may have rendered some years ago 
in Japan. This suggestion is not tested in the survey and is confined 
to the researcher's opinion. 
The ability of strategic management to deal with the implications of 
the time-laps effect was questioned in Section 2: Question G; the 
Japanese (sample) are in slight agreement that strategic 
management is retarded to the extent it diminishes in impact and 
accuracy over time. By implication strategic management has a 
period over which it is most useful to the corporation; this coincides 
with the research theory that there is an optimum Strategic Duration 
Perspective which if established will assist corporate leadership in 
matching strategic plans and strategic resource allocation resulting 
in positive corporate performance and positioning ie. approximation 
of the Objective Reality. 
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The value of Strategic Duration Perspective is its ability to assist in 
aligning the subjective perspective of strategy and time with the 
objective evolution of the Operating Environment, given the 
unidentified (evolving) future Operating Environment, corporate 
performance (intended) and the desired (intended) concluding 
corporate position. 
The Japanese sample (see Section 2: Question J) agreed and slightly 
agreed that the principal of Competitive Advantage and Strategic 
Duration Perspective share the same economic resource base. The 
rational for this is that any matching of Strategic Duration 
Perspective with time, future Operating Environment, corporate 
performance and concluding corporate position is directly dependent 
upon the natural resources of a given Operating Environment and 
corporate entity. The uniqueness of an Operating·Environment is its 
composition of natural resources facilitating a Competitive 
Advantage; hence the theory of alignment between the principals of 
Competitive Advantage and Strategic Duration Perspective. 
The Japanese sample shows a trend toward the American short term 
Strategic Duration Perspective model. This may be argued to be the 
result of an evolution in the Operating Environment and a 
combination of factors including the competition for market share, 
consumer demand and the global commercial activity, accelerated by 
the vast proliferation .of technology (amongst other factors) • The 
Strategic Duration Perspective of the Japanese sample is shorter 
then hypothesized which may be argued to reinforce the hypothesis 
that the American short term Strategic Duration Perspective may be 
an optimum perspective. 
The second hypothesis is proven to the extent that Japan is 
historically and currently remains a good example of long term 
Strategic Duration Perspective. Further, that such is relative to the 
American Strategic Duration Perspective. The Japanese Strategic 
Duration Perspective appears to be shortening in relation to its 
historic definition. Such shortening in Japanese Strategic Duration 
Perspective may be regarded as dramatic given the Japanese 
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tradition and commitment to long term Strategic Duration Perspective 
and secondly, an endorsement of the ~erican short term Strategic 
Duration Perspective especially since such occurred outside of the 
"blamed" American Operating Environment. Yet, Japan's Operating 
Environment may be argued to be heavily influenced by, and 
connected to the American Strategic Duration Perspective model 
causing (in part) the shift in Japanese Strategic Duration 
Perspective. 
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4. 2. 3 Hypothesis Three 
"The typical Japanese firm in the 
United States employs an approach 
to management distinctively different 
from the typical American firm. 
Rather then replicate the form 
developed in their native Japan, 
the firms modified their management 
to suit United States needs. 
Nonetheless, they retain a good 
deal of Japanese style and remain 
very different from most American 
firms. II 
William Ouchi, Theory Z: How American 
Business can meet the Japanese Challenge, 
Addison-Weseley, 1981, p. 12. 
The third hypothesis is the most prominent in terms of this 
research. The research methodology is to assess the American short 
term Strategic Duration Perspective against the adaptation/s made 
by the Japanese-American Corporations as these units of competition 
compete in the American Operating Environment. The degree and 
direction which the Japanese-American Strategic Duration 
Perspective adaptation takes within the American Operating 
Environment (Ibuka 1982 p. 3) (either toward the American model, 
retention of the Japanese model or other scenario) will indicate and 
demonstrate the viability or not or degree thereof, of the American 
Strategic Duration Perspective in relation to the American Operating 
Environment "But, it is also true that we are Japanese who cannot 
become 'Americans', because we born and grew up in Japan." (see 
letter from Japanese-American respondent Appendix 4) . 
That is, to the extent that Japanese-American corporations have 
adopted the American Strategic Duration Perspective serves to 
support the hypothesis that the short-term Strategic Duration 
Perspective is arguably a positive strategic management model and 
one which may be considered an optimum approach for that 
pi:u:ticular (American) Operating Environment. 
However, to the extent that Japanese-American corporations have 
retained their long-term strategic perspective with positive business 
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results, puts into question the validity of the American Strategic 
Duration Perspective and the whole question of approximating 
Objective Reality Management for the American Strategic Duration 
Perspective. 
Should the Strategic Duration Perspective of the American sample 
not be supported by the data from the Japanese-American sample the 
question is the basis for this "retarded" American Strategic Duration 
Perspective in light of the possibility that Japanese-American 
corporations maybe utilizing a long term Strategic Duration 
Perspective? The hypothesis is that the American short term 
Strategic Duration Perspective is a natural reflection of a holistic 
appreciation and perception of the American Operating Environment, 
of which corporate America is an important economic participant and 
socio-political-cultural structure. 
An analysis of the Japanese-American sample's description of the 
American Operating Environment in Section 1 forms a basis for their 
Strategic Duration Perspective. The Japanese-American sample 
reflected a "fast" pace of change in the American Operating 
Environment, yet the sample's perception was ten weighted average 
percentage points below the American sample, both of whom were 
theoretically measuring the same Operating Environment. Yet, the 
data could not discount one, the extent to which the Japanese-
American sample is incubated from the American Operating 
Environment by Japanese economic support systems which located in 
America to serve their clientele, for example Japanese banks. 
Secondly, the data is weakened to the extent (unknown due to 
survey anonymity) that the American Operating Environment is a 
diverse, complex and geographically specific beast. In spite of these 
limitations the data is insightful in relating the same perception of a 
"fast" paced of change in the American Operating Environment by 
Japanese-American corporations, with a variation in the strength of 
the opinion. 
As regards the source of change in the Operating Environment the 
Japanese-American sample reflected a higher priority in the financial 
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area. As suggested in an earlier discussion this may be related and 
attributed to the fact that as relatively new investments the financial 
returns and capitalizations of such newer and faster developing 
business units could be a rational for this financial emphasis. It 
should be noted that the Japanese-American sample reflected the 
perception of the American Operating Environment more as one may 
have expected the American sample to define it, ie. with a financial 
market emphasis. This American look-alike perception may be 
explained in part by the fact that Japanese-American corporations 
employ local talent which accounts for a portion of their Strategic 
Duration Perspective and their adaptation to the American Operating 
Environment. 
The Japanese-American corporations found strategic management a 
"somewhat effective management tool", as did the American sample, 
yet the Japanese-American sample regarded strategic management as 
a less effective tool then the American sample. This may be explained 
by the argument that the Japanese-American sample's strategic 
management model is evolving at a more rapid rate in the process of 
adaptation to the American Operating Environment then say, the 
more mature American Strategic Management Model and Strategic 
Duration Perspective. Further, the Japanese-American hybrid 
Strategic Management Model is part Japanese and therein the logic 
for the reduced effectiveness as perceived by the Japanese-America 
sample in its regard for strategic management as a management tool 
within the American Operating Environment. 
The Japanese-American sample in Section 1: Question D suggested 
that they had shortened their Strategic Duration Perspective by two 
weighted average points more then the American sample. This may 
be argued to suggest that in its adaptation to the American 
Operating Environment the Japanese-American Strategic Duration 
Perspective required a shortening of its historic (Japanese) 
Strategic Duration Perspective. That is, the Japanese-American data 
here suggests an accelerated shortening of Strategic Duration 
Perspective relative to the American sample over the past five years, 
arguably reflecting their longer original (Japanese) Strategic 
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Duration Perspective. Further, the Japanese-American data 
suggests less "no effect on Strategic Duration Perspective" then the 
Japanese data; suggesting that the twenty Weighted Average 
Percentage "shortened Strategic Duration Perspective" is 
compounded to the extent that there was more effect on their 
Strategic Duration Perspective in the American Operating 
Environment. 
The Strategic Duration Perspective of the Japanese-American sample 
in Section 2 of the survey reflected the following: 
In Section 2: Question A the Japanese-American sample suggested 
that strategic plans were increasingly relevant to the day to day 
corporate operations, yet this Japanese-American data was thirteen 
Weighted Average Percentage less then the American sample. 
Suggestive of the fact, given Section 2: Question B data that 
Japanese-American respondents found the pace of change in the 
Operating Environment did not render strategic plans redundant and 
therefore arguably relevant, that Japanese-American corporations 
use strategic plans less for short term day to day operations, but 
possibly more in line with the traditional definition of strategic 
management issues. To the extent that the American sample's 
Weighted Average Percentage for Section 2: Question A was thirteen 
points higher (more relevant) may be construed as more reflective 
of the Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective then the American 
model. 
In Section 2: Question C the Japanese-American sample showed a 
tendency toward the American Strategic Duration Perspective with 
weighted averages in similar sequence to both the American and 
Japanese samples, yet closer to the American then the Japanese. 
This slight preference for the American model is found in the more 
balanced Weighted Average Percentage of thirteen for "medium range 
plans" and eleven for "short range plans" leading to a suggested 
movement away from the Japanese data in terms of short range plans 
in favour of the American sample's short range plans Weighted 
Average Percentage data. Further, the Japanese-American data in 
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medium range plans is lower then both the American or Japanese 
data. This may be regarded as supportive of an argument that 
shorter range planning is more effective for relatively new 
investments (corporate units of competition) in foreign Operating 
Environments and that the American Operating Environment 
reflected this adjustment in perception. 
The Japanese-American sample in Section 2: Question D defined their 
Strategic Duration Perspective as more "somewhat short term" then 
the Japanese sample and less "somewhat long term" then the 
Japanese data. This data combined indicates a movement from the 
Japanese to the American Strategic Duration Perspective by the 
Japanese-American sample. The position of Japanese-American 
Strategic Duration Perspective adaptation to the American Operating 
Environment may be argued to suggest a progressive movement 
which this survey caught in a cross sectional still-frame due to the 
nature of the data gathering methodology. 
The logic is that the origins of the Japanese-American sample's 
Strategic Duration Perspective was Japanese SDP.; thus deviation 
from such may be argued to be in direction away from their original 
(Japanese) model. This argument is supported by the logic that the 
direction of this movement is toward the American model, given the 
fact that it was reflected by Japanese-American respondents 
operating in the United States. It should be noted that such 
adaptation would be unlikely to produce a regressive direction in 
Strategic Duration Perspective, yet the significance of the data and 
trend stands and is useful for the purposes of this study. 
In addition the data from Section 2: Question D shows the Japanese-
American sample with the highest Weighted Average Percentage for 
"very long term" Strategic Duration Perspective. This result may be 
theorized to be either or a combination of the continued influence of 
the Japanese parent company via Japanese patriot (revolving door) 
managers and or secondly, a resistance to the radical differences 
between the American and Japanese Operating Environments and a 
desire to retain some semblance of Japanese business identity and 
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familiarity amidst the powerful American economic cultural force. 
This is supported by Ouchi (1981) and Bowman (1986). Again, 
reference is made to the correspondence received from the Japanese-
American respondent reaffirming such (see Appendix 4) . 
"Interestingly, though, over half (52 
percent) felt that the Japanese would 
in turn be influenced by the American 
culture, and that the longer the period 
of operation in this country, the greater 
the probability that the company would 
be increasingly Americanized." 
James Bowman et al, Japanese Management 
in America: Experts Evaluate Japanese 
Subsidiaries, SAM Advanced Management 
Journal, Vol. 51, Summer 1986, p. 24. 
In Section 2: Question E the Japanese-American sample again reflects 
the American sample more then the Japanese, which is supportive of 
the adaptation process as a result of operating in the Unites States 
(Bowman 1986) . The Japanese-American sample agrees to a greater 
(WAP.) extent than the Japanese that strategic management must 
become more real time as a result of the increasingly fast pace of the 
Operating Environment. This tolerance of a more decentralised 
strategic management process is indicative of the empowering culture 
present in American, more so then Japanese corporations, where in 
spite of consensus building the power structure is arguably 
concentrated in senior management and further enhanced by their 
longevity of service. 
The Japanese-American sample found the sources of Strategic 
Duration Perspective to be diluted, as did the American and 
Japanese samples in Section 2: Question F. The Japanese-American 
sample found Strategic Duration Perspective to be based less upon 
culture then the American sample. This may be suggestive of the 
fact that their culture of origin (Japanese) is very different from the 
culture in which they operate (American). The Japanese-American 
sample were almost as sure as the American sample that competition 
was an important source of Strategic Duration Perspective, slightly 
more so then the Japanese data. 
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While the American sample found the equity markets to be an 
important source of Strategic Duration Perspective the Japanese-
American' s did not, which reflects their relationships with Japanese-
American banks who came to America to serve these Japanese-
American accounts and brought with them the Japanese banking 
philosophy which may be described (in general) as polar to the 
American arms length, short term and debt-myopic banking 
approach. 
Sequentially the Japanese-American sample was more aligned with 
their Japanese patriots then the American sample in Section 2: 
Question F. It may be argued that Japanese-American corporations 
may be more aligned with the Japanese sample in defining the 
sources of Strategic Duration Perspective if in fact Strategic 
Duration Perspective is based upon latent socialized economic-socio-
cultural-political values. The fact that in some cases the Japanese-
American sample reflected an alignment with the American sample is 
indicative of the impact of the Operating Environment and two, the 
fact that Japanese-American corporations employ American managers 
(with difficulty in some cases) which would accelerate the adaptation 
process. 
The data in Section 2: Question F reflect the reality of the Japanese-
American circumstances; that they have Japanese origins yet face an 
American Operating Environment. In the data on culture, equity 
markets, debt market, technology and CEO's Japanese-American 
respondents reflected Japanese more then the American data, yet in 
the competition and consumer market categories Japanese-American 
respondents reflected American data more then Japanese data. 
The Japanese-American sample in Section 2: Question G reflected a 
closer alignment with the American sample, yet not too distant from 
the Japanese data, regarding the time-laps effect on the 
effectiveness of strategic management over time. The Japanese-
American data is suggestive of the theory that the Operating 
Environment is the key to the type, process and deployment of the 
strategic management process. It may be argued that the rational for 
215 
the American and Japanese-American alignment on this point is that 
their shared Operating Environment is more influential then the 
commonality of values and culture between Japanese and Japanese-
American corporations. This is significant as the result suggests 
that corporate entities transposed to different Operating 
Environments should adapt to the local Operating Environment to 
maximize performance and do so within a shorter lead time, 
facilitating faster and higher investment returns. 
The complexity of transposed corporations like the Japanese-
American sample is well illustrated in the data from Section 2: 
Question H. The question deals with the proficiency of the 
respondents to utilise their perception of the Operating Environment 
effectively in the production of corporate performance. The 
Japanese-American sample reflected the weakest ability in this area. 
Both the American and Japanese data reflect respondents who are 
far more proficient at reading the Operating Environment into 
corporate performance. The Japanese-American lagged seven 
Weighted Average Percentage and nine Weighted Average Percentage 
behind the Japanese and American samples respectively in the "very 
proficient" category. This is argued to be a noticeable area of 
weakness and a reflection of the difficulty facing Japanese 
corporations competing in an American Operating Environment in 
spite of using American management. 
In the category of "somewhat proficient" the Weighted Average 
Percentage amongst the three respondents categories was far more 
even. This is argued to be a reflection of the more important theory 
that it is very difficult for any organization to effectively utilize its 
Operating Environment to produce specific results, ie. corporate 
performance. Further, the data suggests that in spite of the 
difficulty, the respondent samples do a good job of perceiving the 
Operating Environment to the extent that such is reflected in their 
corporate performance. 
In the comparison of Competitive Advantage and Strategic Duration 
Perspective (see Section 2: Question J) the respondents were fairly 
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consistent in their "slight agreement" and "agreement" of such 
theory. That is, there appears from the data to be support for the 
theory that the factors which contribute to competitive advantage 
are also attributable to a particular Strategic Duration Perspective. 
The fact that the Japanese-American sample is along-side the 
American and Japanese data here suggests that this theory exists 
even in a situation of corporate geographic transition and the 
attachment of the theory to a different set of competitive advantage 
components, namely that of the American Operating Environment. 
The Japanese-American self analysis in terms of their distinctive 
Strategic Management Model (see Section 2: Question M) reflected a 
"slightly agree" and "agree" posture. Sequentially, their response 
was the strongest in favour of agreement of the three categories. In 
fact their Weighted Average Percentage for "agree" was the highest 
by five Weighted Average Percentage points. The fact that these 
Japanese-American respondents regarded their Strategic 
Management Model as distinctive from both the American and 
Japanese is important as a distinctive posture may be argued to 
suggest an innovative approach to strategic management in the 
Operating Environment of the United States. This is important to the 
study, as the differentiation by the Japanese-American sample from 
the Japanese Strategic Management Model is critical to the study as 
it is from this distinctive positioning of the Japanese-American 
Strategic Management Model that one may argue the optimum 
Strategic Duration Perspective for American corporations. 
At this stage in the discussion it is argued that the shared Operating 
Environment of the Japanese-American and American samples is 
objectively the same ie. the United States of America. The data 
collected from the Japanese-American and American samples project 
a similar perception of the Operating Environment. This similarity 
is important to the hypothesis because should these two categories 
perceive, what is objectively the same, to be different then the 
hypothesis could not be proven or disproved based upon this 
perception because the "playing field" needs to be, or at least needs 
to be perceived as being level so as to isolate the element of 
217 
Strategic Duration Perspective, to the extent possible, so as to 
measure the Strategic Duration Perspective movement by the 
Japanese-American SOP. sample. 
The next phase in evaluating the third hypothesis is an analysis of 
the Japanese-American Strategic Duration Perspective, the following 
is a discussion of the data collected in Section 3 of the research 
survey. 
In Section 3: Questicn A the survey examines the direction of the 
Japanese-American Strategic Duration Perspective. The assumption 
is that the Strategic Duration Perspective origins of a Japanese-
American corporation were Japanese long-termism which via the 
process of adaptation to the American Operating Environment may 
have been altered. The question is did the original Japanese-
Arnerican Strategic Duration Perspective alter and secondly, if it 
did, in which direction and degree did it gravitate; toward the 
Japanese, or American Strategic Duration Perspective Model? 
The data here (see Section 2: Question A) portrays a movement 
toward American short-termism with primary support for "shorter-
term strategic management approach then Japanese". Secondly, 
support for "slightly shorter-term strategic management approach 
then Japanese" and "no change in Japanese strategic management 
approach" is equal. There is a clear movement toward the American 
model which is then balanced in the secondary position with support 
for, and against change toward the American model. 
This data may be argued to reflect a clear adaptation of the Japanese 
Strategic Duration Perspective model within the American Operating 
Environment in favour of the local Strategic Duration Perspective 
model. This needs to placed in the perspective of a slightly lesser 
Weighted Average Percentage of no change in Japanese Strategic 
Duration Perspective while operating in the American Operating 
Environment. While the evidence is not unanimous (in terms of 
opinion category) it is suggested that the combined Weighted 
Average Percentage of the first and second listed options outweigh 
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the Weighted Average Percentage opinion of no change and therefore 
argued to be in favour of an adaptation of the original Japanese 
Strategic Duration Perspective by the Japanese-American sample as 
a result of operating within the American Operating Environment ie. 
toward the American Strategic Duration Perspective Model. 
It should be noted that while the data in Section 3: Question A 
suggests a movement toward the American Strategic Duration 
Perspective model; there is evidence in the data to suggest a 
preservation of the Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective model 
on the part of a portion of the sample. This partial preservation of 
Japanese influence was suggested by Ouchi (1981). Further, 
substantially smaller portion of the sample suggested they had 
lengthened their Strategic Duration Perspective as a result of 
planning for an American Operating Environment. This point is 
further brought out in Section 3: Question B, where the tolerance 
or support by the Japanese parent and or holding corporations, for 
Strategic Duration Perspective changes made by Japanese-American 
corporations is evaluated. 
The data suggests the same trend of conservative support by the 
Japanese organization for changes made by Japanese-American units 
to the Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective. This restrained 
support is evidenced in the literature in similar cases where change 
required by Japanese-American corporations is highly contested by 
their Japanese superiors, this is especially evident from American 
managers in Japanese-American employment who complain of "shadow 
management" and other cosmetic policies (Novotny 1984) (Allen 1988) 
(Rice 1988). A recent example is the complication with the American 
leadership of MCA, a Japanese-American corporation owned by 
Matsushita of Japan (Turner 1994). 
"Blunt and hot tempered, he (Mr. Sheinberg) 
never adapted to working smoothly with 
Matsushita .... " 
R. Turner, Will Sheinberg Ever Get a Solo 
at the top of MCA'?, The Wall Street Journal, 
October 25 1994, p . BS. 
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" . • . say he (Mr. Sheinberg) had 
little choice, because he couldn't 
get the attention of Matsushita 
executives, including Matsushita's 
president." 
R. Turner, Will Sheinberg Ever Get a Solo 
at the top of MCA?, The Wall Street Journal, 
October 25 1994, p. BS. 
Further, the data is consistent with the theory that the management 
(be they American or Japanese nationals) of some Japanese-American 
entities are, to say the least, meticulously controlled and hence the 
conservative approach which results in a Strategic Duration 
Perspective position, which may be argued to be unduly influenced 
by corporate leadership from Japan. In spit of this theory, the 
data's Weighted Average Percentage reflects a "somewhat 
supportive" stance as perceived by the Japanese-American sample 
of their Japanese leadership for changes (they) made to the 
Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective model. 
To further investigate this adaptation of original Japanese long term 
Strategic Duration Perspective Section 3: Question D inquires as to 
the extent of such movement as evidenced by the data in Question A 
above and reinforced by the evidence in Section 3: Question B. The 
primary data suggest that "slight change" has been made to the 
Japanese Strategic Management Model as a result of operating in the 
American Operating Environment. The secondary selection reflects 
that "most has changed11 and thirdly a lesser support for "very little 
change" . The data is clear that not only has adaptation of the 
Japanese Strategic Management Model taken place in the American 
Operating Environment, but it would appear that such adaptation 
has been substantial. This is important as it ties into the data from 
Section 3: Question A above which suggested a distinct shortening 
of the original Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective as a result 
of the American Operating Environment. 
The data from these two Questions combine to strengthen the 
hypothesis that substantial adaptation to the Japanese Strategic 
Management Model has taken place as a result of operating in the 
American Operating Environment and that such adaptation has been 
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the shortening of the Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective. This 
argument is clear support of the third hypothesis which theorized 
that if the Japanese-American sample reflected a movement toward 
the American Strategic Duration Perspective, that such would be 
supportive of the first hypothesis regarding the emergence of a 
distinctive and positive Strategic Management Model based upon a 
short term Strategic Duration Perspective. Further, that such 
adaptation as evidenced in the Japanese-American sample reflects 
the hypothesis that the short term Strategic Duration Perspective of 
the American Strategic Management Model is not only legitimate but 
may be argued to be an optimum Strategic Duration Perspective 
given the unique attributes of the American Operating Environment. 
These arguments are supported by Section 3: Questions E and F, 
which suggest that the Japanese-American sample support the 
theory that corporations doing business in a foreign Operating 
Environment should utilize the local Strategic Duration Perspective 
as a management tool. The use of such local Strategic Duration 
Perspective is a means of improving the adaptation process and 
therein performance. Further, it may be argued that such adoption 
of the local Strategic Duration Perspective sooner rather then later 
would likely improve the lead time of (resource) investment returns 
generally. 
Section 3: Question F is confirmation of the theory that the optimum 
Strategic Duration Perspective for the American Operating 
Environment is (in terms of the current conditions and attributes of 
this American Operating Environment) the short-termism of the 
status quo as exhibited by corporate America (generalization) . The 
data here suggests that the Japanese-American sample has been 
unable to retain a long term Strategic Duration Perspective in the 
American Operating Environment. Yet, a sizable portion of the 
sample suggested that they were able to retain a long term Strategic 
Duration Perspective. This may be argued to originate from many 
sources including longevity of operation, presence of Japanese 
managers, revolving-door approach to Japanese managers who are 
less exposed to the American Operating Environment and 
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consequently less likely to concede their Japanese Strategic Duration 
Perspective roots and less open to American Management styles. As 
Bowman ( 1986) argued Japanese-American corporations are expected 
to be distinctive from both Japanese and American entities, which 
was confirmed by the Japanese-American respondent's letter (see 
Appendix 4) . 
An overview of the third hypothesis is that its substance is proven 
to the extent the Japanese-American units of competition have 
adopted a more American Strategic Duration Perspective model then 
their Japanese SOP. origins while operating in the American 
Operating Environment. This proves that the American Strategic 
Duration Perspective model is appropriate given the American 
Operating Environment, to the extent possible at this point in time, 
and may be argued to be an optimum. Further, Japan's shortening 
of Strategic Duration Perspective is further proof of a broader 
trend; such trend is increasingly similar in Strategic Duration 
Perspective to the American model thereby supporting the theory 
that the American SOP. Model is arguably an advancement of 
strategic management theory given the contemporary configuration 
of the (American) Operating Environment. 
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4. 2. 4 Hypothesis Four 
The forth hypothesis is that the optimum Strategic Duration 
Perspective for the American Operating Environment lies is some 
combination of short and longer term Strategic Duration Perspective, 
the balance of which may be (partially) extracted from an analysis 
of the movement by Japanese-American companies in respect of their 
Strategic Duration Perspective adaptation to the American Operating 
Environment. 
The American Strategic Duration Perspective defines the alignment 
of, management's perception of the Objective Reality with the 
investment of strategic resources. The focus of Strategic Duration 
Perspective is as an enabling tool for management to improve their 
perception of the evolving Operating Environment so as to facilitate 
a matching of environmental evolution, strategic resource 
commitment, maximum performance of such resource investment and 
optimum "post" investmentcorporatepositioning givenMintenzberg's 
( 1985) theory of Retrospective strategy. 
This study used the Japanese-American sample as a means of 
defining the Strategic Duration Perspective trend which would 
indicate an optimum SDP. for the American Operating Environment. 
The conclusion from this study is that the American short term 
Strategic Duration Perspective (that is the perception held and 
deployed by the vast majority of American corporations) is generally 
short term relative to the Japanese approach (which is generally 
accepted as long term). Further, that this American SOP. is in fact 
an optimum given the structure, direction and temperament of the 
contemporary American Operating Environment. 
Strategic Duration Perspective reflects the alignment of the 
Objective Reality concept with the perceived evolution of the 
Operating Environment. As such Strategic Duration Perspective is 
an evolutionary management tool which is conceptual, based upon 
soft and hard data yet continuously reflecting the theoretical 
maximization of strategic investment decisions into a concealed 
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unfolding of the factual time progression within the Operating 
Environment ie. the future reality. The hypothesis is that in order 
to more closely approximate the Objective Reality (thereby 
maximising investment performance) one requires an objective basis 
for a conceptual subjective perception of the future and the inherent 
dangers of the time-laps effect on strategic resources allocation/s. 
This study has shown the Japanese-American sample moving from a 
traditional Japanese long term Strategic Duration Perspective toward 
an American short term Strategic Duration Perspective in a 
conservative and restrained fashion. The trend is clear, yet 
regarded as work-in-progress which is plausible given the nature 
of Japanese strategic management, the process of Operating 
Environment adaptation itself, the desired parallel evolution of 
external forces and internal strategy and the evolutionary nature of 
the discipline. In spite of the tedious pace it may be concluded that 
the Operating Environment plays a substantial and influential role 
in the type and structure of a particular Strategic Management Model 
as argued by Mintzberg (1972). This is not to suggest that the 
Japanese-American Strategic Management Model will necessarily 
duplicate the local model, in this case the American Model. Rather, 
it is sufficient to argue the considerable role which an appreciation 
of the local Operating Environment will have on foreign corporate 
entities and their Strategic Duration Perspective as they compete in 
the local Operating Environment. Such information on the adaptation 
is then useful in evaluating and improving the local Strategic 
Duration Perspective, as done in this study. 
The forth hypothesis may be argued to be proven in that the 
Japanese-American Strategic Management Model reflects adaptation 
to the local Operating Environment in terms of a shorter Strategic 
Duration Perspective over it's model of origin, the Japanese SDP .. 
The important issue here is that the degree of SDP. adaptation by 
the Japanese-American sample may be argued to have resulted in a 
shorter then Japanese but longer then American Strategic Duration 
Perspective. This has been achieved with generally positive 
corporate results. This does measure against the American Strategic 
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Duration Perspective approach. Thus, it may be argued that while 
the American Strategic Duration Perspective is an optimum the 
Japanese-American corporate sample suggests that sound financial 
results can be achieved with a shorter then Japanese, yet, longer 
then the American Strategic Duration Perspective within the 
American Operating Environment. While it is difficult to predict the 
long term performance of this Japanese-American Strategic Duration 
Perspective, Bowman (1986) argued that the longer these Japanese 
corporations are exposed to the American Operating Environment the 
more they will become Americanized. Kono ( 1984) argued that 
Japanese managers would have a short term SDP. if placed in the 
American Operating Environment, this has been confirmed in this 
study. It is plausible to suggest that if in fact similar business 
results maybe available with a slightly longer term SDP. then it 
would be prudent to look at this influence (not necessary an 
alternative) as a viable resource and possible partial alternative for 
American corporations. In fact data from Section 1: Question D 
hinted at just such inclination by the American sample. 
This argument is weakened to the extent that the evolution of the 
Japanese-American Strategic Duration Perspective may be argued to 
be an imitation of the American Strategic Duration Perspective Model 
moving along a continuum (admittedly lagging behind the American) 
which may appear to be a distinctive Strategic Duration Perspective 
model but which in fact may be a Strategic Duration Perspective 
model evolving and adapting to the local Operating Environment at 
a unique pace given the tangible and intangible links with and to the 
Operating Environment of origin. Further, the Japanese-American 
Strategic Duration Perspective may be theoretically beyond the 
American organization given the unique attributes of the Japanese-
American organization, as argued by Das ". . . the organizational 
temporal horizon is constituted collectively by all the individual 
executives." Time: The Hidden Dimension in Strategic Planning, Das 
et al, Long Range Planning, Vol. 24, No. 3, June, 1991. Secondly, 
given the data reflecting an association between Competitive 
Advantage and Strategic Duration Perspective (see Section 2: 
Question J) . 
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Consequently this recommendation constitutes a review by corporate 
America of the Japanese-American Strategic Duration Perspective 
within the context of improving an existing American Strategic 
Duration Perspective which is imperfect, yet arguably the best 
positioned to serve the needs of the strategic management 
practitioners. 
Strategic Duration Perspective as an alignment tool inherently 
requires flexibility to reflect the continuum of environmental 
evolution. Each decision requires its own logic within the broader 
strategic schedule/ vision and combination of short and long term 
strategic decisions are inevitable. The argument is that in (general) 
matters of strategic resource management the Strategic Duration 
Perspective for American corporations operating at home is short-
termism as they have expounded it to this point, arguably in relation 
to their perception of the Operating Environment and the socio-
cultural value system upon which it is superimposed. 
The literature's negative critique of the American short term 
Strategic Duration Perspective has been put into question by the 
results of this study which suggest that Japanese-American 
corporate entities, whose instinctive Strategic Duration Perspective 
is long-termism, have adapted their Strategic Duration Perspective 
toward a more American short-termism model while operating in the 
American Operating Environment. In so doing these Japanese-
Arnerican organizations have, to the degree that adaptation.has been 
achieved thus far (which is arguably substantial given their 
Strategic Duration Perspective origins and the conservative traits 
attributed to Japanese management), provided credence to the 
Strategic Duration Perspective of the American strategists and the 
short term performance based Strategic Management Model which is 
based upon the contemporary American Operating Environment. This 
theory is in line with Mintzberg' s Life Cycle and Adaptive Theories 
of strategic management. 
The American Strategic Duration Perspective may be regarded as an 
innovative approach to strategic management and arguably 
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represents the future of the discipline given the fact that global 
economics coupled with massive technological usage, proliferation of 
data and communication via The World Wide Web, a new GATT 
agreement, increasingly free trade globally and the demise of Soviet 
global power have given rise to the Earth's potentially most 
promising economic period in history. This new economic era has 
brought with it a consumer driven force in demand side economics 
increasingly matched by a market driven supply side which has 
accelerated the entire economic process and re-engineered the 
entities and structures which enable such development. 
The management of strategy and the strategic resources of 
corporations' are accelerating to the point where a decentralisation 
of strategic power has emerged, primarily visible in America, which 
will force strategic management to be disseminated down through the 
corporation and secondly, partly as a consequence of the former, 
have strategic decisions being made closer to the point of market 
contact/ interface. This process will redistribute aspects of 
strategic power which has thus far been concentrated in senior 
management. The focus of this dissemination will be to improve 
strategic investments as a result of deploying (resources) closer to 
the point of market contact which will facilitate an accelerated 
deployment of strategic resources which will hasten return on such 
investment for investors. Delayed deployment, as argued by Quinn's 
(1978) Delayed Theory of asset allocation, thereby reducing risk by 
basing resource allocation on the most current data and analysis. 
Corporate America is very aware of the dual strategic competition for 
operating revenue and just as importantly the strategic competition 
for investment capital, thus risk reduction and Operating 
Environment control are vital to approximating the Objective Reality 
by deploying strategic resource as close to the "future" as possible. 
An overview of hypothesis four suggests that the research did 
identify a Strategic Duration Perspective other then the American 
within the American Operating Environment. It was exhibited by the 
Japanese-American sample and was shorter then the Japanese yet 
longer then the American. Further, it is suggested that such theory 
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is unique to the Japanese-America organization given their unique 
collection of resources ie. their organizational Competitive 
Advantage. 
The hypothesis was supported by the fact that Japan is shortening 
it$ Strategic Duration Perspective, Japanese-American respondents 
shortened their Strategic Duration Perspective in their adaptation 
to the American Operating Environment and American respondents 
reflected confidence in their Strategic Duration Perspective. Thus, 
it may be argued that the research identified an accelerating trend 
where corporations are shortening their time horizons in response 
to the increased pressure within the Operating Environment, 
primarily founded upon the compounded complexity of market share 
growth strategies. Further, that this (shortened SOP. ) trend was 
originated by the American Strategic Duration Perspective and 
plausibly validated by the SOP. movement of Japanese-American 
respondents who reflected a Strategic Duration Perspective 
movement from Japanese to a more American type model and 
secondly, the shortening of SOP. by Japanese respondents. 
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4. 3 Contribution To The Body Of Knowledge 
i. Development of the Strategic Duration Perspective concept: 
A means of defining the subjective management filter as it 
relates to strategic management and time-horizons. Redefined 
the relationship between time and strategic management in an 
applied format. 
ii. Definition of Strategic Management: 
Comprehensive, multi-dimensional, multi-functional collection 
of resources whose design and system is aligned with the 
future corporate positioning and the impending Operating 
Environment. Where current corporate performance is a 
product of past and present strategy which is sufficiently 
supple so as to incorporate (industry /market specific and 
economically general) evolution. 
"Strategy planning does not deal with future 
decisions. It deals with the futurity of 
present decisions. Decisions exist only in 
the present. The question that faces the 
strategic decision-maker is not what his 
organization should do tomorrow. It is, 
"What do we do today to be ready for an 
uncertain tomorrow'?"" 
Peter Drucker, Management, London, William 
Heinemann LTD, 1974, p. 125. 
iii. American Strategic Duration Perspective: 
Found American Strategic Duration Perspective to have 
lengthened; yet it remains relatively (relative to Japanese and 
Japanese-American samples) short term. 
iv. Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective: 
Found that Japanese strategy has shortened its Strategic 
Duration Perspective. 
v. Japanese-American Strategic Management Model: 
Found an independent and unique form of strategic 
management evolving in the Japanese-American data. This is 
considered an Emerging strategic management model. 
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vi. Japanese-American Strategic Duration Perspective: 
Found that the Japanese (sample) corporations operating in 
America had modified their Japanese SDP. which reflected the 
American SOP. more then the Japanese SDP .. 
vii. American Strategic Duration Perspective: 
Found that the American short term SOP. was substantiated 
by the Japanese-American SOP. adaptation, which reflected 
the American SDP. ie. short-termism. Thus, proving that 
corporations with historically long term SOP. (Japanese-
American) shortened their SDP. when operating within the 
American Operating Environment thus making the case for the 
American SOP. short-termism as objectively rational if not 
appropriate for the American Operating Environment. 
viii. Relevancy of Strategic Plans: 
Found strategic plans remain important to operations in spite 
of the decreasing time perspective associated with strategic 
plans; thus the development of real-time strategic management 
has not retarded the relevancy of such plans. 
ix. Competitive Advantage and Strategic Duration Perspective: 
Fond that there is a correlation between the principal of 
Competitive Advantage and SDP. ; that these two principals 
may share common or over lapping resources which contribute 
or make-up such competitive advantage and SOP .• 
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CHAPTER 5: 
5. 0 South Africa And Strategic Duration Perspective 
The South African Operating Environment has undergone, and 
recently completed a political revolution with mammoth economic, 
social and political implications. 
As a result of this democratization the country is in the process of 
re-defining its economic-socio-political-cultural systems and 
identity. Capitalism is the overwhelming basis of economic activity, 
yet the redistribution of political power based upon universal 
franchise, will necessitate a re-engineering of the structures and 
accesses to the country's economic resources and opportunities to 
ensure continued stability of the Operating Environment. 
This discussion looks at the application of Strategic Duration 
Perspective as a means of improving the performance of local and 
foreign investors in the South African Operating Environment. 
Further, to identify ways in which Strategic Duration Perspective 
may be used by South African corporations investing in foreign 
markets. The collective substance of which serve to improve the 
strategic investment decisions made at this critical time in South 
Africa's economic history. 
In this thesis Japanese-American corporate respondents were 
surveyed to measure the extent of their Strategic Duration 
Perspective adaptation to the American Operating Environment. The 
Japanese-American Strategic Duration Perspective was then 
compared to the American Strategic Duration Perspective so as to 
evaluate the latter which had been criticized in the literature for 
being too short term. The theory is that if an "imported" Strategic 
Duration Perspective adapts to the local Operating Environment the 
local corporations learn about their own Strategic Duration 
Perspective in a quasi objective format. 
231 
The economic activity of South Africa has for many years been 
battered by the social and political processes which in 1994 resulted 
in the election of a democratic African National Congress 
Government. The economy will be adjusting to the new dispensation 
and developing a unique competitive advantage based upon a social 
revision of the natural resources. While this takes place in an 
unpredictable social realignment process, local and foreign investors 
will make strategic investment decisions based upon expected 
quantitative results. The composition of this competitive advantage 
may be argued to be founded in the historical competitive advantage, 
upon which and into which the new social structures will build a 
revised competitive advantage. 
The emerging Operating Environment is not only new as a result of 
political modifications but new in the sense that there will be an 
entirely different economic agenda which will present a new set of 
threats and opportunities for corporate South Africa. Further, the 
global economy that South Africa was locked-out of in the 1980's is 
very different from the one it now re-enters. The past attraction of 
South Africa may have been diluted by the accelerated development 
of Operating Environments competing for international investment. 
The global economy of the next century is here now and competition 
is more fierce and difficult then ever as a result of the new 
concentration of economic and political power globally. 
Today, South Africa is only one of many investment destinations 
open to global investors. The opening up of the Communist Block, 
Asia and South America offer serious competition to South Africa in 
terms of investment locals. South Africa may well be the gate-way to 
Africa, offering a significant competitive advantage in respect of 
such access, but these African markets offer global investors 
(relatively speaking) limited returns and historically carry 
controversial economic and political baggage. This reduced 
attraction is compounded by the American and United Nation's 
experience in Somalia over the past years. 
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In order to overcome the competition for investment resources South 
Africa will have to present a clear picture of its investment 
opportunities to local and foreign capital, ie. project its asymmetrical 
competitive platform or competitive advantage. This marketing plan 
needs to expound the investment niche/s available and build 
confidence in the current leadership to sustain economic stability in 
the face of an arguably contrasting socio-political agenda and 
expectations. 
The role of a study of South Africa's Strategic Management Model 
would be to provide important information to local and foreign 
investors regarding the efficient management of their resources in 
relation to the accelerated evolution of the South African Operating 
Environment. Where there is an acceleration of economic activity, 
there is a proportionally heightened need for strategic management 
to ensure that these valuable and decisive resources are allocated in 
an attractive (ROI. ) yet politically responsible package. Further, 
these asset allocations must bear in mind the social expectations 
which are an important factor in solidifying the country's political 
stability. The increase in resource allocation which is under way and 
which is increasing in size and number is an appropriate challenge 
for Strategic Duration Perspective which may be deployed as an 
alignment tool between strategic management asset allocation and the 
Operating Environment. Strategic Duration Perspective is critical to 
any strategic investment decision especially when the Operating 
Environment is experiencing the release of pent up investment 
decisions, resources and social aspirations. 
South Africa is attracting increasing amounts and numbers of foreign 
investors who bring with them their perception of their Operating 
Environments and respective Strategic Duration Perspectives. In 
their effort to maximize their returns these investors will need to 
adapt their perception of competition to that of the South African 
Oparating Environment. While this adjustment is difficult under 
"normal" conditions the degree of complexity is compounded by the 
rapid evolution of the contemporary Operating Environment. Thus, 
the very aspects which attract these investors to South Africa (the 
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unleased consumerism, labour and regional market potential) carry 
the most (potential) jeopardy. The risk for South Africa is that 
these waves of investments do not meet investor expectations and 
the economy looses the current economic, political and social 
momentum. By understanding the definition of Strategic Duration 
Perspective for the South African Operating Environment the 
expectations of investors can be clearly married to the reality factor 
thus increasing the alignment between expected and resulting 
investment performance. 
11 All this comes atop an economic recovery 
in South Africa that Mr. Vianello calls 
"probably the most underestimated boom in 
the world" . 11 
Ken Wells, U.S. Investment in South Africa, 
The Wall Street Journal, October 6, 1994. 
It is suggested that this investment and development process need 
to be managed by strategic management utilizing an appropriate 
Strategic Duration Perspective so as to reduce the investment risks 
as described above. This assistance needs to be forth coming from 
internal economic structures which can assist investors in aligning 
their investments and expectations with the Objective Reality of the 
South African Operating Environment. 
South Africa needs to import foreign capital and technology to 
develop its local and foreign markets. While South Africa has 
experienced remarkable political gains and demonstrated an 
unprecedented ability for peaceful democratic transition, investment 
in her competitive advantages have only recently (President 
Mandela's 1994American tour) noticeably increased. Thus, Strategic 
Duration Perspective has a role to play in aligning local and foreign 
corporate perception with the Objective Reality of South Africa's 
potential. 
A defined Strategic Duration Perspective for South Africa would 
provide an understanding of the investment alignment required by 
the Operating Environment generally and the target industry 
specifically. Such Strategic Duration Perspective analysis may also 
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be used to target foreign investment marks who fit the local 
Strategic Duration Perspective, enhancing the likelihood of them 
committing strategic resources and thereby enhance South Africa's 
reputation as an investment destination. 
Given the changes in South Africa the Strategic Duration 
Perspective of South African corporations' would have to be re-
established in order to evaluate their relationship with/to the South 
African Operating Environment as it is emerging. 
Once this work was complete one could utilize the model developed in 
the American study to evaluate the South African Strategic Duration 
Perspective. For example one could compare the Strategic Duration 
Perspective of South African corporations with that of Japanese-
South African entities and based upon the direction and degree of 
Strategic Duration Perspective adaptation (toward or away from the 
South African Strategic Duration Perspective model) one could 
suggest modification to the South African Strategic Duration 
Perspective or not. 
Further, South Africa is emerging from radical change which will 
impact the economic activity and the evolution of the Operating 
Environment. Consequently, given the vast amount of change 
expected as a result of the political transition it is suggested that 
any measurement of the Strategic Duration Perspective of corporate 
South Africa would produce data which would need to be updated 
more regularly (relative to the American study) in the initial period; 
as the accelerated pace of change in the Operating Environment 
would lead to a disproportional acceleration in the evolution of the 
Strategic Duration Perspective internally and globally. Once the 
dust has settled on the political front and the economic cycles are 
resuming an "identifiable" economic pattern of activity then such 
studies could reflect longer periods. 
Strategic Duration Perspective may be used by South African 
corporations seeking foreign investments, for example the recent 
SAPIE acquisition in the United States. Here Strategic Duration 
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Perspective would enable SAPIE management to align its Strategic 
Duration Perspective pro-actively with that of the American 
Operating Environment and in so doing improve its investment 
efficiency. 
In South Africa it would be useful to study the adaptation by 
Japanese-South African companies, and or the adaptation by the 
South African Operating Environment to such foreign Strategic 
Duration Perspectives. This may indicate weather in smaller 
Operating Environments, like South Africa's, foreign Strategic 
Duration Perspectives can influence local Strategic Duration 
Perspective'? If this were possible South Africa's SOP. may develop 
out of the local system and the influences of foreign corporations 
whose size and impact are sufficient to influence the local Strategic 
Duration Perspective. 
The process whereby a new South Africa emerged from the ashes of 
Apartheid involved a modification by all the population groups of 
their values and perception of a democratic South Africa. Each 
population group needs to come to terms with the past, present and 
future realities of the economic SWOT. of the new era. The 
leadership needs to unite this emerging culture and give it a unity 
of value and purpose so that people begin to identify themselves as 
South African's first and by ethnic group second. It is through this 
process of nation building and cultural development that South 
Africa will find its common value system upon which Strategic 
Duration Perspective may be deployed for the development of local 
and international investment. Further, whether South Africa's 
Strategic Duration Perspective is short-termism, long-termism or 
some hybrid from will depend upon the studies here proposed. Such 
research needs to discover whether South African configured 
Operating Environment can sustain an "national" SOP. in light of the 
radical internal changes, accelerated local and foreign capital 
investment and the development of the popular majority. The 
application of SOP. principals is inherently customized, hence the 
need for South African SOP. research in light of current and 
projected socio-demographic-economic configurations. Although this 
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configuration is an evolving process, there must be a commitment to 
promote a Strategic Duration Perspective which is rooted in popular 
cultural values and expectations, for to fail in the application of this 
principal would weaken economic development and approximation to 
the Objective Reality. 
In conclusion Strategic Duration Perspective could assist with the 
economic revitalization of the New South Africa. 
The following SDP. study is suggested for South Afric;1: 
First, an analysis modeled upon an expanded version of this 
American study using possibly Japanese-South African corporations. 
Secondly, an evaluation of the foreign investment community to 
identify those that fit or are aligned with the competitive advantages 
and local SDP. . The reality for South Africa is that she can not 
afford a less then competitive return on local and foreign 
investment. The competition for international investment is 
increasing and the population of South Africa need to have their 
expectations approached. It is within this complex combination of 
consumer and investor satisfaction that the future stability of South 
Africa will be defined. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
6. 0 Research Summary And Conclusion 
"The world inevitably changes; existing 
practices and principals of action 
inevitably become unreasonable. " 
Roger Martin, Changing the Mind of the 
Corporation, Harvard Business Review, 
November - December 1993, p. 94. 
The research concept developed from the critical review of the 
American strategic time horizon in the literature, Andrews ( 1987) • 
It was argued that corporate America was too short term and 
consequently risking damage to the economic resources and 
competitive advantage of the Operating Environment in the short and 
more importantly medium to long term. 
The general contemporary opinion on the subject reflected an esteem 
for the Japanese long term strategic time horizon which had 
paralleled Japan's dramatic penetration into the global economy. This 
parallel proved too tempting for authors to ignore and the arguments 
for a long term strategic time horizon for the United States of 
America followed. This literary recommendation was latently naive as 
Mintzberg pointed out in 1987. 
"But while prescription for strategic 
change in the literature may come easy, 
management of the change itself, in 
practice, especially when it involves 
perspective, comes hard." 
Henry Mintzberg, Crafting Strategy, 
Harvard Business Review, July- August, 
1987, p. 31. 
The issue of corporate America's affinity with the short term was 
unquestionably more complex and deeply rooted in the composition 
of their Strategic Duration Perspective. This conceptual subjective 
management function, which Mitroff (1981) described as partly 
metaphysical, is the most consequential in corporate management. 
Errors in strategic management judgement are inevitably substantial 
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and very often fatal. Hence the need to determine the validity or not 
or degree thereof of the American Strategic Duration Perspective. 
The American Strategic Duration Perspective has recently been 
reflected in the political structures with a call for Federal term limits 
for legislators, which reinforces the argument that American short-
termism is, if anything, a long standing and continuing trend. 
". . . it was found that U.S. firms are more 
flexible in their strategic deployment of 
resources and that they emphasize short-term 
resource utilization, while Japanese firms 
emphasize long-term resource accumulation •••. " 
T. Kagono et al, Strategic vs. Evolutionary 
Management, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1985. 
Having lived, studied and worked in the United States of America 
the researcher was at odds with the written criticism of the American 
strategic short-termism. The culture of the American people is 
highly reflective of the strategic short-termism, thus it was argued 
that any attempt to transplant, no matter how surgically and 
theoretically well suited, a long term strategic approach was doomed 
to fail in America. The basis for this predication is the very 
theoretical basis for the run away success of importing the Demming 
philosophy (generalization) into Japan. That is, the Demming (and 
many others) management theory of quality and long term 
consequential resource allocation was a wonderful strategic fit with 
the pre-existing cultural value system in Japan. The Japanese were 
able to imbibe these management philosophies for the very reason 
why corporate America could not. That is, the values of the 
American population are short-termism, inclusive, flexibility and 
freedom, while Japanese value are conservative, exclusive, 
structured, collaborative and long term. 
The question remained as to the validity of this American short term 
performance based Strategic Management Model, and the research 
would target this inquiry. 
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"Culture effects how these problems are perceived 
and how they are resolved. Societal learning also 
establishes horizons of perception." 
Richard Pascale et al, The Art of Japanese 
Management: Application for American Executives, 
Simon & schuster, 1981, p. 22. 
To study this subjective phenomenon the research developed a term 
and applied definition for the conceptual notion of time horizon as it 
relates to strategy and strategic management namely, Strategic 
Duration Perspective ( SDP. ) • This term is a combination of the 
managerial perception of strategic management and the subjective 
duration perspective of such within the function of corporate 
strategic management. The definition includes the strategist's 
perception of the Operating Environment in its broadest sense, 
including the internal and external arenas and the all important 
alignment of the subjective perception of the Operating Environment 
with the corporate resources and their deployment and consequential 
rendering (or not or degrees thereof) of the corporate mission and 
objectives in relation to the Objective Reality. The Objective Reality 
was also defined in this thesis; this concept has its origins in 
Mintzberg's (1985) paper in which he compared intended strategy 
with resulting strategic consequences. 
"Strategies and theories are not realities 
themselves, only representations (that is, 
abstractions) of reality in the minds of 
people." 
Henry Mintzberg, Crafting Strategy, 
Harvard Business Review, July- August, 
1987 I P• 29. 
With the main conceptual aspects defined the research sought a 
method of evaluating the conceptual American Strategic Duration 
Perspective in an objective study. That is, the methodology could 
not only ask the respondents for an explanation or their rational for 
utilizing the American Strategic Duration Perspective, the research 
needed to explain the American Strategic Management Model as a 
comparative process. The study matched the conceptual elements of 
strategic management with the conceptual subjective Strategic 
Duration Perspective discussed by Westley and Mintzberg in 1989. 
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The research model was built upon the theory that if the Japanese 
Strategic Duration Perspective is long term and functioning 
theoretically positively in the Japanese Operating Environment; what 
had occurred to this approach when deployed in the American 
Operating Environment. The hypothesis was that the adaptation to 
the American Operating Environment by the Japanese Strategic 
Duration Perspective would "project" the American Operating 
Environment onto and into the Japanese long term Strategic 
Management Model. The results in adaptation, or not or degree 
thereof, would allow the study to argue the validity of the American 
Strategic Duration Perspective as the comparison would highlight the 
adaptation trends. 
The issue of American SOP. validity is important as the validity/ 
value of strategic management and planning has been well 
established in many studies, especially Thune and House (1970). 
Thus, the refinement of the process and perception of the actors is 
significant to the discipline's development; development which has 
the potential to increase corporate asset performance, based upon 
proximity to the Objective Reality. 
Thus, the hypotheses were to determine weather a distinctive 
American Strategic Management Model existed whose basis was short 
term corporate performance, an apparent contradiction to the 
traditional definition of strategic management. Secondly, to confirm 
the Japanese long term Strategic Management Model. Thirdly, to 
measure via a cross sectional survey, the adaptation by Japanese-
Arnerican corporations to the American Operating Environment. And 
lastly to develop a theory where the contradiction of long-termism 
and short-termism could co-exist to the benefit of the corporation's 
strategic resources allocation and the performance of the corporate 
assets in the nearer term. 
" ..• and I am only now beginning to 
appreciate how mechanically organizations 
resist newer truth - and how strong the 
emotions are that underlie these mechanisms." 
Roger Martin, Changing the Mind of the 
Corporation, Harvard Business Review, 
November - December 1993, p. 81. 
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The survey' s goal was to gather data on specific subjective and 
conceptual perceptions regarding the strategist's view of their 
Operating Environment which is complicated by the emotional risks 
intrinsic to such perspectives. The survey was divided into four 
sections namely; Operating Environment, Strategic Duration 
Perspective Information, JapanesP.-American Strategic Duration 
Perspective and fourthly, Demographic Information. 
The response rate was adequate given the senior positions of the 
target respondents within three corporate categories, American, 
Japanese and Japanese-American. The survey was professionally 
translated and mailed to three hundred thirty one respondents. By 
August 1994 an average response rate of thirty eight percent of 
those surveys reasonably estimated to have reached their targeted 
respondent was achieved. 
The analysis and findings were enlightening, the data was 
qualitatively evaluated and argued. The selected quantitative 
analysis involved graphs reflecting the trends of strategic 
management and Strategic Duration Perspective in the three 
corporate categories to support hypotheses evaluation. 
Hypothesis one dealing with a distinctive positive American Strategic 
Management Model was confirmed. 
Hypothesis two, dealing with a Japanese long-termism was 
confirmed. Yet, notably the Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective 
was itself found to be shortening in duration perspective. This 
finding facilitated the theory that shorter term Strategic Duration 
Perspectives are a broad trend brought on in part by the need for 
delayed strategic deployment as advocated by Quinn (1978) and 
secondly, the impact of accelerating and increased time based 
competition. 
Hypothesis three reflected an adaptation by the Japanese-American 
sample toward the American Strategic Duration Perspective, 
confirming the objective validity of the American Strategic 
Management Model and Strategic Duration Perspective. 
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Hypothesis four dealing with synthesising long and short term 
Strategic Duration Perspectives was ambiguous. No clear process 
was identified yet the research did identify an important fact that 
the Japanese-American sample suggested as feasible a Strategic 
Duration Perspective in the American Operating Environment which 
is longer then the American yet shorter then the Japanese. The 
researcher felt it would be presumptions to draw extensive 
conclusions based upon the structure of the data. This research 
made every attempt to honour and respect the proportions of the 
study while arguing the hypotheses as reflected in the data. 
"This contrast in resource deployment is the 
most significant difference between Japan and 
the u .s. ••••II 
T. Kagono et al, Strategic vs. Evolutionary 
Management, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1985, 
p. 30. 
"This finding corresponds to the difference 
in environment and objectives cited earlier: 
it is quite reasonable for the U.S. firms, 
which have higher priority to profitability 
and face a lower opportunity environment, to 
emphasize mobility and short-term capitalization 
of resources." 
T. Kagono et al, Strategic vs. Evolutionary 
Management, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1985, p. 
30. 
The thesis discussed the application and use of Strategic Duration 
Perspective as an alignment tool for strategists to deploy in aligning 
their strategic resource allocation decisions with the impending 
future Operating Environment and desired consequential corporate 
positioning and results. 
The American Strategic Duration Perspective is arguably optimum 
for the contemporary American Operating Environment. The 
competitive advantages woven into the cloth that is the American 
Operating Environment reflect the existing duration perspective. 
Thus, the American Strategic Duration Perspective is argued to be 
a living, cyclical process ongoing and dependent upon the Operating 
Environment for definition. As argued by my learned teachers, 
Mintzberg in his Adaptive theory and Lawrence (1967) who argue 
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that strategy must reflect the Operating Environment, Strategic 
Duration Perspective as deployed in America is an optimum 
application. 
11 
••• managerial reality is not an absolute; 
rather it is socially and culturally determined. 11 
Richard Pascale et al, The Art of Japanese 
Management: Application for American Executives, 
Simon & schuster, 1981, p. 22. 
The application of Strategic Duration Perspective was argued in a 
chapter on South Africa. It was suggested that of paramount 
importance was the principal of promoting a Strategic Duration 
Perspective defined by the Operating Environment. The dramatic 
recent developments required the deployment of Strategic Duration 
Perspective in defining the alignment of investor perceptions and 
expectations with this Operating Environment. It is suggested that 
with modification and due regard for the transient nature of a South 
African study, Strategic Duration Perspective would assist in the 
efficiencies of corporate South Africa in terms of their local and 
international strategic resource allocation decisions. Further, 
Strategic Duration Perspective could be used to align foreign 
investors with an optimum South African Strategic Duration 
Perspective thereby increasing their return on investment and lead 
time for such - thus enhancing South Africa's reputation as an 
investment destination. 
"Japanese business success began when Western 
ideas were grafted onto traditional holistic 
orientation of the Japanese. 11 
Kosaku Yoshida, Deming Management Philosophy: 
Does it Work in the US as Well as Japan, 
Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. 24, 
No. 3, 1989, p. 10. 
In conclusion, the thesis was successful in determining the validity 
of the American Strategic Duration Perspective and identifying a 
trend by the three corporate categories that Strategic Duration 
Perspectives are shortening, leading to an increasingly Real-Time 
Strategic Management Model and the efficiencies which will follow. 
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Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire English 
Pre-mailing letter. 
Bryan J Tollman, Researcher 
2912 Quail Ave No 
Golden Valley MN 55422 
United States of America 
Phone and fax : (USA) (612) 529-5523 
Date 
Strategic Planner 
Corporation 
Address 
City State Zip 
Country 
Dear Strategic Planner 
I am doing research on the Corporate Strategic Management of 
corporations operating in America and Japan as part of my Doctoral 
thesis. 
As a Strategic Planner for a major corporation, your participation in 
this project is very important. I know how valuable your time is; 
thus I have made my questionnaire as short and user-friendly as 
possible. 
In a few days you will receive a brief questionnaire. Please would 
you be so kind as to complete and return the survey at your earliest 
convenience. 
A summary of the results and discussion will be mailed to you within 
six months. Any and all data is anonymous and confidential; my only 
interest is scientific research. 
This research is dependent upon the goodwill of people such as 
yourself and I appreciate your cooperation. Thank you. 
Sincerely yours 
Bryan Jonathan Tollman 
(BA MBA) 
Researcher 
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Questionnaire mailing cover letter. 
Bryan J Tollman, Researcher 
2912 Quail Ave No 
Golden Valley MN 55422 
United States of America 
Phone and fax : (USA) (612) 529-5523 
Date 
Strategic Planner 
Corporation 
Address 
City State Zip 
Country 
Dear Strategic Planner 
My pre-survey letter dated ?? ??? 1993 refers. 
I fully realize how important your time is; would you be so kind as 
to complete the brief survey which is attached. Thank you for your 
participation. 
This questionnaire is part of a scientific study of Corporate 
Strategic Management. The response you provide is anonymous and 
confidential. The sole objective of the study is scientific 
investigation. 
Please mail your completed responses in the enclosed self-addressed 
envelope. A summary of the results and discussion will be mailed to 
you within six months. 
If you have any questions please call or fax me on the phone number 
provided. 
Thank you for your time today 
Bryan Jonathan Tollman 
(BA MBA) 
Researcher 
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Questionnaire introduction. 
The following is a brief introduction to the central concept of the 
research - Strategic Duration Perspective. 
Strategic Duration Perspective (Strategic Duration Perspective) is 
defined by the researcher as the Conceptual Application and 
Appreciation of Strategic Management in relation to a particular 
Operating Environment. Strategic Duration Perspective relates to a 
TIME PERSPECTIVE attributed generally to a particular Strategic 
Management Model, which in turn is attributed to corporations and 
their staff operating in a particular economy, within the global 
economy. 
The research question arose out of the debate in the business and 
strategic literature surrounding the different American and 
Japanese Strategic Management Models. The American Short-Term 
Strategic Duration Perspective as apposed to the Japanese Long-
Term Strategic Duration Perspective. 
The research question arose why American Corporations, their 
leaders and planners used the Short-Termism Strategic Duration 
Perspective. 
The researcher hypothesised that American corporation's Strategic 
Duration Perspective is based upon a rational, logical interaction 
with the American Operating Environment. That, in fact American 
corporations have developed an innovative, highly reflective and 
evolutionary Application Strategic Duration Perspective based on 
their particular Operating Environment. 
Further, that a new Short-Term Strategic Management Theory had 
emerged in America based upon the increasing pressures on time as 
a factor of business in all phases, aspects and expectations of 
commercial activity in the United States of America. 
The most effective way of reviewing this debate was to compare three 
forms of Corporate Strategic Management namely; Japanese, 
American and the Strategic Management of Japanese Corporations 
operating in America. The experiment is to observe and measure the 
changes made by Japanese Corporations Strategic Management Model 
while operating in America. The changes or lack thereof made by 
these Japanese-American Corporations will provide insightful data 
on the American Short-Term Strategic Management Model. 
The survey questions follow - thank you. 
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Survey questions. 
SECTION 1: OPERATING ENVIRONMENT INFORMATION. 
A. How would you describe the Pace of change in the 
Corporation's Operating Environment? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. erratic. 
2. chaotic. 
3. fast. 
4. slow. 
B. What is the Source of change in the Corporation's Operating 
Environment'? 
(Please circle one or more responses) 
1. corporate performance goals. 
2. financial market's demand for results. 
3. equity market's demand for growth. 
4. new product technology. 
S. competition for market share. 
6. consumer demand. 
7. increased access to information. 
C. How effective a tool is Strategic Management for managing the 
interaction between the Corporation and the Operating 
Environment? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. very effective. 
2. somewhat effective. 
3. not very effective. 
4. not at all effective. 
D. How has the evolution in Operating Environment over the past 
S years affected your Strategic Duration Perspective (SDP)? 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
shortened no effect lengthened 
SDP on SDP SDP 
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SECTION 2: STRATEGIC DURATION PERSPECTIVE INFORMATION. 
A. Are your Strategic Plans becoming more or less relevant to the 
day-to-day corporate operations'? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. more relevant. 
2. less relevant. 
B. Is the pace of change in the Operating Environment making 
Strategic Planning redundant'? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. yes. 
2. no 
C. Which of the following would you suggest is THE most 
effective in terms of your Corporation's performance'? 
(Please circle your response) 
1. long range strategic plans . 
2. medium range strategic plans. 
3. short range strategic plans. 
D. How would you describe the Strategic Duration Perspective of 
your Corporation'? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. very short-term. 
2. somewhat short-term. 
3. somewhat long-term. 
4. very long-term. 
E. If the Operating Environment is evolving at an increasingly 
fast pace; Strategic Management must become more Real-Time 
if it is to remain a fundamental management tool. 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
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F. The concept of Strategic Duration Perspective has multiple 
sources; how would you assign these sources amongst the 
choices listed below. 
(Please answer as a percentage where 0% = not a source of 
Strategic Duration Perspective and 100% = the only source of 
Strategic Duration Perspective) 
Basis of Strategic Percentage apportioned 
Duration Perspective as basis of SOP 
culturally based 
competition based 
equity market based 
debt market based 
consumer market based 
technology based 
CEO based 
TOTAL 100% 
G. Strategic decisions are taken in the present while the effect 
of these decisions unfold in the future; thus reducing the 
effectiveness of Strategic Management'? 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
H. How proficient is the Corporation at translating its Operating 
Environmental Perception into Corporate Performance? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. very proficient. 
2. somewhat proficient. 
3. not very proficient. 
4. not at all proficient. 
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I. There is an American Corporate Strategic Management Model 
with its own distinctive characteristics. 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
J. The principal of Competitive Advantage as it refers to various 
economies is an established economic principal. Would you 
agree or disagree that these same economic factors which 
make-up a particular competitive advantage are also 
responsible for the development of a particular Strategic 
Duration Perspective'? 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
K. There is a Japanese Corporate Strategic Management Model 
with its own distinctive characteristics. 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
L. What is your definition of the following Strategic Duration 
Perspectives (SDP)'? 
(Please answer as a number of years) 
short term SDP long term SDP 
...... years ...... years 
M. There is a Japanese-American Corporate Strategic Management 
Model with its own distinctive characteristics. 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
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SECTION 3: JAPANESE CORPORATIONS OPERATING IN THE USA. 
A. As a Japanese Strategic Planner working in a Japanese-
Arnerican corporation, in which direction have you changed 
from the traditional Long-Term Japanese Strategic 
Management as a result of planning for an American Operating 
Environment? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. shorter-term strategic management approach than 
Japanese. 
2. slightly shorter-tf:rm strategic management approach than 
Japanese. 
4. no change in Japanese strategic management approach. 
5. longer-term strategic management approach than Japanese. 
Please note there is no question 3 above. 
B. How supportive is your Japanese Management in Japan for you 
to make changes to the traditional Long-Term Japanese 
Strategic Management approach for the American Operating 
Environment? 
(Please circle one response) 
1. very supportive. 
2. somewhat supportive. 
3. not very supportive. 
4. not at all supportive. 
Please note there is no question C. 
D. As a Japanese Corporation operating in America how much 
have you altered your Japanese approach to Strategic 
Management? 
(Please circle your response) 
1. total change. 
2. most has changed. 
3. slightly changed. 
4. very little change. 
5. no changes. 
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E. Would you agree or disagree that while operating in a foreign 
economy strategic planners SHOULD use the Local Strategic 
Duration Perspective to achieve corporate strategic goals and 
objectives? 
(Please mark the appropriate box) 
strongly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
F. As a Japanese Corporation operating in America have you been 
able to retain a long-term approach to Strategic Management? 
(Please circle your response) 
1. yes. 
2. no. 
SECTION 4: DEMOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION. 
A. 1. age --- years. 
2. sex - male / female 
3. corporate position-----------
4. years in this position --- years. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
PLEASE MAIL YOUR SURVEY IN THE 
SELF ADDRESSED ENVELOPE 
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Reminder letter one. 
Bryan J Tollman, Researcher 
2912 Quail Ave No 
Golden Valley MN 55422 
United States of America 
Phone and fax : (USA) (612) 529-5523 
Date 
Strategic Planner 
Corporation 
Address 
City State Zip 
Country 
Dear Strategic Planner 
I am writing to you regarding my study of the Strategic Manage~ent 
Models of American and Japanese corporations. 
The response has been good, unfortunately I have not yet received 
your completed questionnaire. As you know scientific research is 
dependent upon an adequate response rate - please would you be so 
kind as to complete the enclosed copy. 
This questionnaire is part of a scientific study of Corporate 
Strategic Management. The response you provide is anonymous and 
confidential. The sole objective of the study is scientific 
investigation. 
Your contribution is greatly appreciated. Thank you. 
Sincerely yours 
Bryan Jonathan Tollman 
(BA MBA) 
Researcher 
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Reminder letter two. 
Bryan J Tollman, Researcher 
2912 Quail Ave No 
Golden Valley MN 55422 
United States of America 
Date 
Strategic Planner 
Corporation 
Address 
City State Zip 
Country 
Dear Strategic planner 
If you have already completed the survey and returned it to us, my 
sincere thanks. If not, please assist me by completing the brief 
survey so that I may conclude this lengthy research project. A 
summary of the results will be mailed to you within five months. The 
response you provide is anonymous and confidential. 
I have included a copy of the questionnaire for your convenience. 
Please mail your completed responses in the enclosed self-addressed 
envelope. 
Your contribution is greatly appreciated. Thank you. 
Sincerely yours 
Bryan Jonathan Tollman 
(BA MBA) 
Researcher 
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Reminder letter three. 
Bryan J Tollman, Researcher 
2912 Quail Ave No 
Golden Valley MN 55422 
United States of America 
Phone and fax : (USA) (612) 529-5523 
Date 
Strategic Planner 
Corporation 
Address 
City State Zip 
Country 
Dear Strategic Planner 
A few weeks ago I wrote to you seeking your assistance in a study 
of Strategic Management. As of today I have not received your 
completed survey. 
I understand the pressures of your position and schedule; but your 
participation is important and thus I request your assistance in 
completing the brief questionnaire and mailing it back at your 
earliest convince. 
I am enclosing a copy questionnaire for your convince. Thank you. 
Sincerely yours 
Bryan Jonathan Tollman 
(BA MBA) 
Researcher 
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Survey received thank you letter. 
Bryan J Tollman, Researcher 
2912 Quail Ave No 
Golden Valley MN 55422 
United States of America 
Phone and fax : (USA) (612) 529-5523 
Date 
Strategic Planner 
Corporation 
Address 
City State Zip 
Country 
Dear Strategic Planner 
Just a short note to thank you for completing and mailing your 
survey back to me. 
I appreciate your effort and will be mailing you a summary of the 
results and discussion. 
Sincerely yours 
Bryan Jonathan Tollman 
(BA MBA) 
Researcher 
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Survey results discussion letter. 
Bryan J Tollman, Researcher 
2912 Quail Ave No 
Golden Valley MN 55422 
United States of America 
Phone and fax : (USA) (612) 529-5523 
Date 
Strategic Planner 
Corporation 
Address 
City State Zip 
Country 
Dear Strategic Planner 
Thank you for participating in my Corporate Strategic Management 
research. 
As promised I am enclosing a summary of the results; I trust these 
will make for interesting reading. 
Sincerely yours 
Bryan Jonathan Tollman 
(BA MBA) 
Researcher 
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Appendix 2: Survey Questionnaire Japanese 
Pre-mailing letter. 
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Questionnaire mailing cover letter. 
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Questionnaire introduction. 
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Survey questions. 
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Survey results discussion letter. 
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Survey received thank you letter. 
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Appendix 3: Letter From USA Ambassador To Japan 
Mr. Bryan Jonathan Tollman 
2912 Quail Avenue North 
Golden Valley Minnesota 55422 
Fax: 612-529-5523 
Dear Mr. Tollman: 
AMBASSADOR OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
TOKYO 
February 7, 1994 
Thank you for your recent fax, informing me that you 
are writing a doctoral dissertation on Japanese and American 
management models. 
I agree with you that this is a valuable field of study. 
We have learned much from the Japanese recently in 
manufacturing techniques, and I am proud to see that the 
Japanese are again looking to us for management ideas to 
help them overcome their present economic difficulties. 
I hope you are successful in your research. 
With best wishes, 
Walter F. Mondale 
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Appendix 4: Support Of Thesis Subject Matter 
March 23, 1994 
Mr.BryanJ Tollm.an 
Researcher 
2912 Quail Avenue No 
Golden Valley, MN 55422 
Dear Mr. Tollm.an: 
Enclosed you will find the completed questionnaire you submitted to 
The 
Mr. Chairman of the Board of Directors, referred your 
questionnaire to the Corporate Strategy Department. As I am sure you 
can appreciate, since The Corporation is a global 
company, our corporate strategy officers travel throughout the world 
and are often not in their offices for long periods of time. 
This is an interesting and timely subject for your doctoral dissertation 
and we wish you success in your research. 
Sincerely, 
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Appendix 5: Respondent On Japanese-American Management 
Apr. 1, 1994 
Bryan J Tollman, Reseacher 
2912 Quail Ave No 
Golden Valley, MN 55422 
Dear Mr. Tollman 
Please find the attached response to your questionaires which you have sent us several times 
that I was said so. 
I have answered carefully on behalf of its 
president and C.E.O. 
One thing I want you to note is, unlike other Japanese corporations, has been affected by 
American Management Philosophy since its inauguration, i.e. 1964, or at least we might believe 
that our corporate culture would be somewhat different from those of other Japanese 
corporations. But, it is also true that we are Japanese who cannot become "Americans", because 
we born and grew up in Japan. 
I apologize for this delay in responding this to you. I hope this could be useful for your valuable 
research. 
With best regards, 
Vice President and Treasurer 
"The typical Japanese firm in the United States employs an 
approach to management distinctively different from the 
typical American firm. Rather then replicate the form 
developed in their native Japan, the firms modified their 
management to suit United States needs. Nonetheless, they 
retain a good deal of Japanese style and remain very different 
from most American firms." 
William Ouchi, Theory Z: How American Business can Meet the 
Japanese Challenge, Addison-Wesley, 1981, p .12. 
The respondent's letter and this quote refer to the overlap between 
Competitive Advantage and Strategic Duration Perspective. 
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Appendix 6: Letter Affirming Translation Quality 
Hr. Bryan Jonathan Tollman 
2912 Ouai I Aveooe North 
G<>lden Valley, Minnesota, 55422 
Fax:612·529·5523 
Dear Mr. Tollman: 
Co.,Ltd. 
Japan 
April 20,1994 
\Je have received yoor letter regarding SOP \#ritten in 
very SoPhisticated Japanese. \.'e would I ike to contribute to 
your doctoral dissertation. 
However, before we reply to your inquiries, \le would 
I ike 11<>re infor11ation about you and your research. Ve vi II be 
pleased if you kindly let us know the out I ine of your academic 
career. the doctoral course you belong to now, and the 
adressee·eo111panies I ist you sent your survey to. Our 
facsimile number is 
\Je are looking forvard to your successful doctoral 
research. 
Best regards, 
(Special ~'Sistant to President 
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Appendix 7: Letter From Professor A J Strickland 
From: A.J. (Lonnie) Strickland To: Mr. Bryan Tollman Date: 5l2w.M Time: 10:12:53 
A.J. STRICKLAND 
1 Old NorthRiver Point 
Tuscaloosa, AL 35406 
Page 1of1 
Otlice 205-3-18-892-1 
Home 205-752-2573 
Fax 205-348-6695 
Intemet ASTRICKL@ALSTON.CBA.UA.EDU 
May 28. 1994 
To: Respondents of the Mr. Bryan Tollman's Sun·ey 
As Mr. Tollman"s dissertation survey ad\isor, I wish to you to encourage 
you to take the few minutes to complete the enclosed survey. 
As a Protessor of Strategic Managment at The University of Alabama, your 
participating in this dissertation research project is very important to increasing the 
body of knowledge in the arena of Strategy Fonnulation and Tmplement.atfon. 
I am sure that if you \\ish, Mr. Tollman would bemore than happy to discuss 
with you his findings when he completes his work. 
If you have any questions of me, please do not hesitate to con~~t me at the 
letterhead address. 
Sincerely. 
A.J. Strickland 
Professor of Strategic 
Management 
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Appendix 8: Research Results Summary For Respondents 
Bryan J Tollman, Researcher 
2912 Quail Ave No 
Golden Valley MN 55422 
United States of America 
Phone and fax : (USA) (612) 529-5523 
31 October 1994 
Strategic Planner 
Corporation 
Address 
City State Zip 
Country 
Dear Strategic Planner 
Thank you for participating in my Corporate Strategic Management 
research. 
As promised I am enclosing a summary of the results; I trust this 
summary will make for interesting reading. Thank you for your 
support. 
Sincerely yours 
Bryan Jonathan Tollman 
(BA MBA) 
Researcher 
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Dear RESPONDENT, 
The research was successful as an exploration of the topic which 
sought to evaluate an optimum Strategic Duration Perspective for the 
American Operating Environment by comparing the American 
Strategic Management Model with that of the Japanese-American 
corporations. 
The data reflected the following: 
1. That indeed an independent and viable strategic management 
model exists in the United States of America based upon a 
short term performance based Strategic Duration Perspective. 
2. That, to the extent that Japan is historically a good example 
of long term Strategic Duration Perspective, relative to the 
American Strategic Duration Perspective. Further, that the 
Japanese Strategic Duration Perspective appears to be 
shortening. Such sho~ening in Japanese Strategic Duration 
Perspective may be regarded as dramatic given the Japanese 
tradition and commitment to long term Strategic Duration 
Perspective and secondly, a re-enforcement of the American 
short term Strategic Duration Perspective especially since 
such occurred outside of the "blamed" American Operating 
Environment. Yet, Japan's Operating Environment may be 
argued to be heavily influenced by the American Strategic 
Duration Perspective model causing in part the Japanese 
Strategic Duration Perspective shift. 
3. That, the Japanese-American units of competition have indeed 
adopted a more American Strategic Duration Perspective model 
which proves that the American Strategic Duration 
Perspective model is appropriate to the American Operating 
Environment, to the extent possible, and may therefor be 
argued to be an optimum. Further, Japan's shortening of her 
Strategic Duration Perspective is further proof of a broader 
possibly global trend. 
4. That the research did identify a balance between long and 
short range strategic planning/ management. The hypothesis 
was proven by the fact that one, Japan is shortening its 
Strategic Duration Perspective, Japanese-American 
respondents shortened their Strategic Duration Perspective 
in their adaptation to the American Operating Environment, 
American respondents reflected confidence in their Strategic 
Duration Perspective. Thus, it may be argued that the 
research identified an accelerating trend where corporations 
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are shortening their time horizons in repone to the increased 
pressure within the Operating Environment primarily founded 
upon market share growth strategies. 
Again thank you for your time, effort and interest in this fascinating 
topic. 
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Appendix 9: List Of Surveyed Respondents 
Corporate American Respondents 
Aetna Life & Casualty Co 
Ronald Compton, C. E. O. 
151 Farmington Avenue 
Hartford CT 06156-0001 
Aetna Life Insurance & Annuity CO 
Gary Benanav, President 
151 Farmington .t\.venue 
Hartford CT 06156-0001 
Albertson S Inc 
Gary Michael, C.E.O. 
250 Parkcenter Boulevard, P.O. Box 20 
Boise ID 83726-0020 
Alco Standard Corporation 
Ray Mundt, C.E.O. 
P .0. Box 834 
Valley Forge PA 19482-0834 
Allstate Life Insurance Co of New York 
Louis Lower, President 
P.O. Box 2898 
Huntington Station NY 11746-0709 
American Electric Power Co Inc 
Richard Disbrow, C. E. O. 
1 Riverside Plaza 
Columbus OH 43215-2373 
American Express Co 
Harvey Golub, President, C.E.O. 
American Express Tower, W /Financial Cntr. 
New York NY 10285-0001 
American General Corporation 
Roy Haley, President, C. O. O. 
2929 Allen Parkway 
Houston TX 77019-2155 
American International Group Inc 
Thomas Tizzio, President 
70 Pine Street 
New York NY 10270-0002 
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American Stores Co 
Victor Lund, President, C. E. O. 
709 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City UT 84102-1208 
American Telegraph & Telegraph Co 
Robert Allen, C.E.O. 
32 Avenue of the Americas 
New York NY 10013-2412 
Ameritech Corporation 
William Weiss, C. E. O. 
30 South Wacker Drive 
Chicago IL 60606-7402 
AMR Corporation 
Robert Crandall, C . E • O . 
4333 Amon Carter Boulevard 
Fort Worth TX 76155-2605 
Ahchor Bancorp Inc 
James Large, C.E.O. 
420 Broadway 
Hewlett NY 11557 
ARA Group Inc 
Joseph Neubauer, C. E. O. 
ARA Tower 
1101 Market Street 
Philadelphia PA 19107 
Banc One Corp 
John McCoy, C.E.O. 
100 East Broad Street 
Columbus OH 43271-0001 
Bankamerica Corp 
Richard Rosenberg, C. E. O. 
Bank of America Center 
San Francisco CA 94104 
Bankers Trust New York Corp 
Charles Sanford, Chairman of the Board 
280 Park Avenue 
New York NY 10017-1216 
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Bell Atlantic Corporation 
Ramond Smith, C.E.O. 
1717 Arch Street 
Philadelphia PA 19103-2787 
Bell.south Corp 
John Clendenin, C. E. O. 
1155 Peachtree Street Northeast 
Atlanta GA 30367-6000 
Bergen Brunswig Corp 
Robert Martini, C • E • O • 
4000 Metropolital Drive 
Orange CA 92668-3502 
Burlington Northern Inc 
Gerald Grinstein, C. E. O. 
3800 Continental Plaza 
777 Main Street 
Fort Worth TX 76102-5384 
Capital Cities ABC Inc 
Daniel Burke, C.E.O., C.O.O. 
77 West 66TH Street 
New York NY 10023-6298 
Centerior Energy Corp 
Robert Farling, President, C.E.O. 
6200 Oak Tree Boulevard 
Independence OH 44131-2561 
Chase Manhattan Corp 
Thomas Labrecque, C. E. O. 
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza 
New York NY 10081-0001 
Chemical Banking Corp 
John McGillicuddy, C. E. O. 
270 Park A venue 
New York NY 10017-2014 
CIGNA Corp 
Wilson Taylor, C.E.O., President 
One Liberty Place 
Philadelphia PA 19192-1550 
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Citicorp 
John Reed, C.E.O. 
399 Park Avenue 
New York NY 10043-0001 
Coast Savings Financial Inc 
Ray Martin, C.E.O. 
1000 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles CA 90017-2457 
Commonwealth Edison Co 
Lames O'Connor, C.E.O. 
One First National Plaza 37th Floor 
P .0. Box 767 
Chicago IL 60690-0767 
Consolidated Freightways Inc 
Donald Moffitt, President, C. E. O. 
3240 Hillview Avenue 
Palo Alto CA 94304-1201 
Continental Airlines Holdings Inc 
Robert Ferguson, President, C.E.O. 
Suite 2010 
2929 Allen Parkway 
Houston TX 77019-2120 
CSX Corp 
John Snow, President, C. E. O. 
901 East Cary Street 
Richmond VA 23219-4031 
Dayton Hudson Corp 
Kenneth Macke, C. E. O. 
777 Nicollet Mall 
Minneapolis MN 55402-2055 
Delta Air Lines Inc 
Ronald Allen, C.E.O. 
Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport 
Atlanta GA 30320 
Dime Financial Corp Connecticut 
John Shortell, President, C. E. O. 
95 Barnes Road 
Wallingford CT 06492-1801 
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Dominion Resources Inc Virginia 
Thos Capps, President, C.E.O. 
P .0. Box 26532 
901 East Byrd Street 
Richmond VA 23261-6532 
Dun & Bradstreet Corp 
Charles Moritz, C.E.O. 
299 Park Avenue 
New York NY 10171-0002 
Enron Corp 
Kenneth Lay, C.E.O. 
1400 Smith Street 
Houston TX 77002-7369 
Entergy Corp 
Edwin Lupberger, C. E. 0. 
225 Baronne Street 
New Orleans LA 70112-1704 
Federal Express Corp 
Frederick Smith, President, C . E. O. 
2005 Corporate Avenue 
Memphis TN 38132-1796 
Firstfed Michigan Corp 
Gene Harling, President, C.E.O. 
1001 Woodward Avenue 
Detroit MI 48226-1904 
Fleming Cos Inc 
Dean Werries, President, C.E.O. 
6301 Waterford Boulevard 
Box 26647 
Oklahoma City OK 73126 
Fluor Corp 
Leslie Mccraw, C. E. O. 
· 3333 Michelson Drive 
Irvine CA 92730-0002 
FPL Group Inc 
James Broadhead, President, C. E. 0. 
700 Universe Boulevard 
Juno Beach FL 33408-2657 
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Glenfed Inc 
Stephen Trafton, President, C.E.O. 
700 North Brand Boulevard 
Glendale CA 91203-1238 
Golden West Financial Corp 
Marion Sandler, C. E. O. 
1901 Harrison Street 
Oakland CA 94612-3588 
Great Western Financial Corp 
James Montgomery, C. E. O. 
9200 Oakdale Avenue 
Chatsworth CA 91311-6519 
GTE Corp 
Charles Lee, C.E.O., President 
One Stamford Forum 
Stamford CT 06904 
H F Ahmanson & Co 
Richard Deihl, C • E • O • 
4900 Rivergrade Road 
Irwindale CA 91706-1438 
Halliburton Co 
Thomas Cruikshank, C. E. O. 
3600 Lincoln Plaza 
Dallas TX 75201 
Hartford Life Insurance Co 
Donald Frahm, C.E.O. 
P .0. Box 2999 
Hartford CT 06104-2999 
Home Depot Inc 
Bernard Marcus, C. E. O. 
2727 Paces Ferry Road 
Atlanta GA 30339-4053 
Hospital Corp of America 
Jack Bovender Jr., C.E.O. 
One Park Plaza 
Nashville TN 37203 
336 
Household International Inc 
Donald Clark, C.E.O. 
2700 Sanders Road 
Prospect Heights IL 60070-2799 
Houston Industries Inc 
Don Jordan, C.E.O. 
5 Post Oak Park 
4400 Post Oak Parkway 
Houston TX 77027 
Humana Inc 
David Jones, C.E.O. 
500 West Main Street 
Louisville KY 40202-2941 
IDS Life Insurance Co 
James Mitchell, President, C.E.O. 
IDS Tower 10 
Minneapolis MN 55440-0534 
ITT Corp 
Rand Araskog, C.E.O. 
1330 A venue of the Americas 
New York NY 10019-5490 
J P Morgan & Co Inc 
Douglas Warner, President 
60 Wall Street 
New York NY 10260-0060 
KMART Corp 
Joseph Antonini, C.E.O. 
3100 West Big Beaver Road 
Troy MI 48084-3004 
Kroger Co 
Joseph Pichler, C. E. O. 
1014 Vine Street 
Cincinnati OH 45202-1100 
Lincoln International Corp 
Decoursey Combs, C. E. O. 
Suite NO 6 
120 Village Square 
Louisville KY 40243 
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Loew S Corp 
Laurence Tisch, C. E. O. 
667 Madison A venue 
New York NY 10021-8087 
Marriott Corp 
Richard Marriott, Executive V. P. 
10400 Fernwood Road 
Bethesda MD 20058 
May Department Stores Co 
David Farrell, C. E. O. 
611 Olive Street 
St Louis MO 63101-1799 
MCI Communications Corp 
Bert Roberts Jr., C.E.O. 
1801 Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest 
Washington DC 20006 
McKesson Corp 
Harrison Russell, Vice President 
One Post Street 
San Fransisco CA 94104-5296 
Melville Corp 
Stanley Goldstein, C. E. O. 
One Theall Road 
Rye NY 10580-1404 
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 
Daniel Tully, C.E.O. 
North Tower World Financial Center 
250Vesey Street 
New York NY 10281-1220 
Metropolitan Financial Corp Minnesota 
Norman Jones, C.E.O. 
6800 France Avenue South 
Minneapolis MN 55435-2017 
Morgan Stanley Group Inc 
Robert Greenhill, President 
1251 Avenue of the Americas 
New York NY 10020-1181 
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Walt Disney Co 
Michael Eisner, C . E • 0 . 
500 South Buena Vista Street 
Burbank CA 91521-0001 
J C Penny Co Inc 
William Howell, C . E • O. 
6501 Legacy Drive 
Plano TX 75024-3698 
Nationsbank Corp 
James Hance, Jr. , Chief Financial Officer 
Nationsbank Corporate Center 
Charlotte NC 28255-0001 
Nationwide Life Insurance Co 
Richard McFerson, C. E. O. 
One Nationwide Plaza 
Columbus OH 43216 
Norfolk Southern Corp 
David Goode, C.E.O. 
Three Commercial Place 
Norfolk VA 23510-2191 
NYNEX Corp 
William Ferguson, C • E. 0 . 
335 Madison A venue 
New York NY 10017-4605 
Pacific Enterprises 
Willis Wood, Jr., C.E.O. 
633 West Fifth Street 
Los Angeles CA 90071-2006 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co 
Richard Clarke, C. E. O. 
77 Beale Street 
P. 0. Box 770000 
San Francisco CA 94177-0001 
Pacific Telesis Group 
Sam Ginn, C.E.O. 
130 Kearny Street 
San Francisco CA 94108-4818 
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Paine Webber Group Inc 
Donald Marron, C • E. O. 
1285 Avenue of the Americas 
New York NY 10019 
Philadelphia Electric Co 
Joseph Paquette, Jr. , C. E. O. 
2301 Market Street 
P .0. Box 8699 
Philadelphia PA 19101 
Price Co 
Robert Price, C.E.O. 
4649 Morena Boulevard 
San Diego CA 92117-3650 
Public Service Enterprise Group Inc 
James Ferland, C.E.O. 
80 Park Plaza 
P.O. Box 1171 
Newark NJ 07101-1171 
Roadway Services Inc 
Joseph Clapp, President 
1077 Goege Boulevard 
P.O. Box 88 
Akron OH 44309-0088 
Ryder System Inc 
Anthony Anthony, C.E.O. 
3600 Northwest 82nd Avenue 
Miami FL 33166-6623 
Safeway Inc 
Steven Burd, C.E.O. 
Fourth and Jackson Streets 
Oakland CA 94660-0001 
Salomon Inc 
Robert Denham, C. E. O. 
Seven World Trade Center 
New York NY 10048-1102 
SCECORP 
John Bryson, C.E.O. 
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue 
P.O. Box 800 
Rosemead CA 91770-0800 
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Sears Roebuck & Co 
Edward Brennan, C. E. 0. 
Sears Tower 
Chicago IL 60684-0001 
Southern Co 
Edward Addison, C.E.O., Chairman of the Board 
64 Perimeter Center East 
Atlanta GA 30346-6401 
Southland Corp 
Clark Matthews, II., C.E.O. 
2711 North Haskell Avenue 
Dallas TX 75204-2906 
Southwestern Bell Corp 
Edward Whitacre, Jr. , C. E. O. 
175 East Houston 
San Antonio TX 78299-2933 
Sprint Corp 
William Esrey, C • E • O. 
P. 0. Box 11315 
Kansas City MO 64112-0315 
Student Loan Corp 
Stephen Biklen, C.E.0. 
99 Garnsey Road 
Pittsford NY 14534 
Supervalu Inc. 
Michael Wright, President 
11840 Valley View Road 
Eden Prairie MN 55344-3643 
SYSCO Corp 
John Woodhouse, C. E. 0. 
1390 Enclave Parkway 
Houston TX 77077-2099 
Tele Communications Inc 
John Malone, President 
Terrace Tower II 
5619 OTC Parkway 
Engelwood CO 80111 
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Texas Utilities Co 
J. S. Farrington, C.E.O. 
2001 Bryan Tower 
Dallas TX 75201 
Time Warner Inc 
Gerald Levin, C.E.O. 
75 Rockefeller Plaza 
New York NY 10019-6908 
Toys R Us Inc 
Charles Lazarus, C. E. O. 
461 From Road 
Paramus NJ 07652-3524 
Trans World Airlains Inc 
Robert Cozzi, Senior Vice President 
100 South Bedford Road 
Mount Kisco NY 10549-3432 
Transamerica Corp 
Frank Herringer, C. E. O. 
334 Montgomery Street 
San Francisco CA 94111-2770 
Travelers Corp 
Edward Budd, C.E.O. 
One Tower Square 
Hartford CT 06183-0001 
Travelers Insurance Co 
Richard Booth, President 
One Tower Square 
Hartford CT 06183-0001 
UAL Corp 
Stephen Wolf, C.E.O. 
1200 East Algonquin Road 
P. 0. Box 66919 
Elk Grove Township IL 60007 
Union Pacific Corp 
Drew Lewis, C.E.O. 
Martin Tower 
Eighth & Eaton Avenues 
Bethlehem PA 18018 
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United Parcel Service of America Inc 
Kent Nelson, C.E.O. 
400 Perimeter Center-Terraces North 
Atlanta GA 30346 
USAIR Inc 
Seth Schofield, C . E . O • 
2345 Crystal Drive 
Arlington VA 22227-0001 
Wal Mart Stores Inc 
David Glass, C.E.O. 
Bentonville AR 72716-0001 
Walgreen Co 
Daniel Jorndt, President 
200 Wilmot Road 
Deerfield IL 60015-4616 
Washington Mutual Savings Bank 
Kerry Killinger, C . E . 0 • 
1201 Third Avenue 
Seattle WA 98101-3000 
Waste Management Inc 
Dean Buntrock, C.E.O. 
3003 Butterfield Road 
Oak Brook IL 60521-1100 
Winn Dixie Stores Inc 
Dano Davis, Principal Executive Officer 
5050 ·Edgewood Court 
Jacksonville FL 32254-3601 
Woolworth Corp 
Harold Sells, C.E.O. 
233 Broadway 
New York NY 10279-0003 
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Corporate Japanese Respondents 
All Nipon Airways CO., Ltd. 
Akio Kondo, President and C.E.O. 
2-5 Kasumigaseki 3-Chome, 
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100 Japan 
Ashahi Bank 
Shigehiko Yoshino, President 
1-1-2, Ohtemachi, 
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100 Japan 
The Ashikaga Bank Ltd. 
Hisao Mukae, President 
Head Office 1-25, Sakura 4-Chome, 
Utsunomiya-shi, Tochigi-ken 320 Japan 
The Bank of Fukuoka, Ltd. 
Ryoji Tsukuda, President 
13-1, Tenjin 2-Chome, Chuo-ku, 
Fukuoka-shi 810 Japan 
The Bank of Tokyo 
Takagaki, President 
3-2, Nihonbashi Hongokucho 1-Chome, 
Chuo-ku, 103 Japan 
The Bank of Yokohama, Ltd. 
Takeshi Tanaka, President 
47, Honcho 5-Chome, 
Naka-ku, Yokahama 231 Japan 
The Chiba Bank, Ltd. 
Takashi Tamaki, President 
Head Office 1-2, Chiba-minato, Chiba-shi, 
Chiba-ken 260 Japan 
Eiki Konno, President 
4-7, Kawaramachi 2-Chome, Chuo-ku, 
Osaka 541 Japan 
Chubu Electric Power Co. , Inc. 
Kamesaburo Matsunaga, President 
1, Toshin-cho, Higashi-ku, 
Nagoya 461-91 Japan 
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The Chugoku Electric Power Co. , Inc. 
Koki Tada, President 
4-33, Komachi, Naka-ku, 
Hiroshima-ken, 730-91 Japan 
The Chuo Trust and Banking Co. , L822 
Kei Sakanoue, President 
7-1, Kyobashi 1-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Tokyo 104 Japan 
The Dailei, Inc. 
Isao Nakauchi, Chairman and President 
1-1, Minatojima Nakamachi 4-chome, 
Chuo-ku, Kobe-shi, Hyogo-ken 650 Japan 
The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd. 
Kuniji Miyazaki, President 
1-5, Uchisaiwi-cho 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
Daikyo 
Shuji Yokoyama, President 
4-24-13, Sendagaya, shibuya-ku, 
Tokyo 151 Japan 
The Daiwa Bank, Ltd. 
Akira Fujita, President 
Head Office 2-1, Bingomachi 2-chome, Chuo-ku 
Osaka 541 Japan 
Daiwa House Industry Co., Ltd. 
Shunichi Ishibashi, President 
Head Office 5-16, Awaza 1-chome, Nishi-ku 
Osaka 550 Japan 
Daiwa Securities Co., Ltd. 
Motoo Esaka, President 
6-4, Otemachi 2-chome, Chiyoda-ku 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
The Fuji Bank, Ltd. 
Toru Hashimoto, Presidet 
5-5, Otemachi 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
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Fujita Corporation 
Kazunori Fujita, President 
6-15, Sendagaya 4-chome, Shibuya 
Tokyo 151 Japan 
Hanwa Co., Ltd. 
Shigeru Kita, President 
13-10, Tsukiji 1-chome, Chuo-ku, 
To1<yo 104 Japan 
Hazama Corporation 
Shigeru Handa, President 
5-8, Kita-Aoyama 2-chome, Minato-ku 
Tokyo 107 Japan 
The Bank of Hiroshima, Ltd. 
Osamu Hashiguchi, President 
Head Office 3-8, Kamiyacho 1-chome, Naka-ku, Hiroshima-shi 
Hiroshima-ken 730 Japan 
Hitachi Sales Corporation 
Yasuya Miyoshi, President 
15-12, Nishishimbashi 2-chome, Minato-ku 
Tokyo 105 Japan 
The Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Ltd. 
Hiroshi Yamauchi, President 
Head Office 7, Nishi 3-chome, Odori, Chuo-ku 
Sapporo 060 Japan 
The Hokuriku Bank, Ltd. 
Teruo Kubota, President 
Head Office 2-26, Tsutsumichodori 1-chome, Toyama-shi, 
Toyama-ken 930 Japan 
Hokuriku Electric Power Company 
Masao Tani, President 
15-1, Ushijima-cho, Toyama-shi, 
Toyama-ken 930 Japan 
The Industrial Bank of Japan 
Yoh Kurosawa, President 
3-3, Marunouchi 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
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Ito-Yokado Co., Ltd. 
Masatoshi Itoh, President 
1-4, Shiba-Koen 4-chome, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo 105 Japan 
Itochu 
Minoru Murofushi, President 
4-1-3, Kyutaro-machi, Chuo-ku, 
Osaka 541-77 Japan 
Japan Airlines Co. , Ltd. 
Matsuo Toshimitsu, President 
7-3, Marunouchi 2-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
Japan Securities Finance Co., Ltd. 
Tatsuo Tajima, President 
2-10, Nihonbashi Kayabacho 1-chome, 
Chuo-ku, Tokyo 103 Japan 
The Joyo Bank Ltd. 
Itaru Ishikawa, President 
5-5, Minamimachi, 2-chome, Mito-shi, 
Ibaraki-ken 310 Japan 
Jusco 
Hidenori Futagi, President 
1-1, Kanda-Nishikcho, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 101 Japan 
Kijima Corporation 
Akira Miyazaki, President 
2-7, Motoakasaka 1-chome, Minato-ku 
Tokyo 107 Japan 
Kenematsu Corporation 
Keiji Oda, President 
2-1, Shibaura 1-chome, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo 105-05 Japan 
The Kansai Electric Power Co. , Inc. 
Kiyoji Morii, President 
3-22, Nakanoshima 3-chome, Kita-ku, 
Osaka 530 Japan 
347 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. 
Hiroshige Matsunari, President 
2-9, Nishi-Shimbashi 1-chome, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo 105 Japan 
KawaMatsunarisho Corporation 
Kinji Ibaraki, President 
4-1, Hamamatsu-cho 2-chome, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo 105 Japan 
Keio Teito Electric Railway Co., Ltd. 
Kenichi Kuwayama, President 
9-1, Sekido 1-chome, Tama-shi 
Tokyo 206 Japan 
Kinki Nippon Railway Co., Ltd. 
Shigeichiro Kanamori, President 
1-55, Uehommachi 6-chome, Tennoji-ku, 
Osaka 543 Japan 
Kumagai Gumi Co. , Ltd. 
Taichiro Kumagai, President 
2-1, Tsukudocho, Shinjuku-ku, 
Tokyo 162 Japan 
Kyushu Electri Power Co. , Inc. 
Tetsuya Watanabe, President 
1-82, Watanabe-dori 2-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Fukuoka 810 Japan 
The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd. 
Tetsuya Horie, President 
2-4, Otemachi 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
Marubeni Corporation 
Tomio Tatsuno, President 
Head Office: 5-7, Hommachi 2-chome, 
Chuo-ku, Osaka 541 Japan 
Mitsubishi Corporation 
Shinroku Morohashi, President 
6-3, Marunochi 2-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100-86 Japan 
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The Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd. 
Tsuneo Wakai, President 
7-1, Marunochi 2-chome, Chiyoda-ky, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
The Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Corporation 
Hiroshi Hayashi, President 
4-5, Marunochi 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. 
Naohiko Kumagai, President 
2-1, Ohtemachi 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
Mitsui Fudosan Co., Ltd. 
Jun-ichiro Tanaka, President & C. E. O. 
1-1, Nihonbashi Muromachi 2-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Tokyo 103 Japan 
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. 
Susumu Temporin, President 
1-1, Toranomon 2-chome, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo 105-91 Japan 
Mitsui Trust & Banking Co., Ltd. 
Ken Fujii, President 
1-1, Nihonbashi Muromachi 2-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Tokyo 103 Japan 
Mitsukoshi, Ltd. 
Yoshiaki Sakakura, President 
4-1, Nihonbashi Muromachi 1-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Tokyo 103 Japan 
Nichii 
Toshimine Kobayashi, President 
2-2-9, Awaji-machi, Chuo-ku 
Osaka 541 Japan 
Nichimen Corporation 
Yoshimi Tanaka, President 
13-1, Kyobashi 1-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Tokyo 104 Japan 
349 
The Niko Securities Co., Ltd. 
Kichiro Takao, President 
Shin-Tokyo Building, 3-1, Marunouchi 3-chome, Chiyoda-ku 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
The Nippon Credit Bank 
Seishi Matsuoka, President 
13-10, Kudankita 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku 
Tokyo 102 Japan 
Nippon Express Co., Ltd. 
Shoichiro Hamanaka, President 
12-9, Sotokanda 3-chome, Chiyoda-ku 
Tokyo 101 Japan 
Nippon Shinpan Co., Ltd. 
Yoji Yamada, President 
33-5, Hongo 3-chome, Bunkyo-ku, 
Tokyo 113-91 Japan 
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. 
Masashi Kojima, President 
1-6, Uchisawai-cho, 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
Nippon Yusen K. K. 
Jiro Nemoto, President 
3-2, Marunouchi 2-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
Nishimatsu Construction Co., Ltd. 
Taira Shibata, President 
20-10, Toranomon 1-chome, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo 105 Japan 
Nissei Sangyo Co., Ltd. 
Teruo Ishikawa, President 
24-14, Nishi-Shimbashi 1-chome, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo 105 Japan 
Nissho Iwai Corporation 
Akira Nihio, President 
Tokyo Head Office: 4-5, Akasaka 2-chome, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo 107 Japan 
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The Nomura Securities Co., Ltd. 
Hideo Sakamaki, President 
9-1, Nihonbashi 1-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Tokyo 103 Japan 
Obayashi Corporation 
Takao Tsumuro, President 
4-33, Kitahama-Higashi, Chuo-ku, 
Osaka 540 Japan 
Odakyo Electric Railway Co., Ltd. 
Takashi Takigami, President 
8-3, Nishi-Shinjuku 1-chome, Shinjuku-ku, 
Tokyo 160 Japan 
Orient 
Yoshio Abe, President 
3-1-1, Higashi-Lkebukuro, Toshima-ku, 
Tokyo 170 Japan 
The Sakura Bank, Ltd. 
Kenichi Suematsu, President 
3-1, Kudan-Minami 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100-91 Japan 
The Sanwa Bank, Ltd. 
Hiroshi Wantabe, President 
Head Office: 5-6, Fushimimachi 3-chome Chuo-ku, 
Osaka 541 Japan 
Sato Kogyo Co., Ltd. 
Yoshitake Sato, President 
1-11, Sakuragi-cho, Toyama-shi, 
Toyama 930 Japan 
Seibu Railway Co. , Ltd. 
Iwago Nisugi, President 
11-1, Kusunokidai 1-chome, Tokorozawa-shi, 
Saitama-ken 359 Japan 
The Seiyu, Ltd. 
Seiji Tsutsumi, Chief Executive Officer 
1-1, Higashi Ikebukuro 3-chome, Toshima-ku, 
Tokyo 170 Japan 
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Sekisui House, Ltd. 
Masaru Tanabe, President 
2-27, Nakanoshima 6-chome, Kita-ku, 
Osaka 530 Japan 
Shimizu Corporation 
Harusuke Imamura, President 
2-3, Shibaura 1-chome, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo 105-07 Japan 
Shizuoka Bank, Ltd. 
Jikichiro Sakai, President 
110, Gofukucho 1-chome, Shizuoka-shi, 
Shizuoka-ken 420 Japan 
Sumitomo Corporation 
Tomiichi Akiyama, President 
Sumitomo Building, 5-33, Kitahama 4-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Osaka 541 Japan 
The Sumitomo Bank, Ltd. 
Sotoo Tatsumi, President 
Head Offfice: 6-5, Kitahama 4-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Osaka 541 Japan 
The Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd. 
Hiroshi Hayasaki, President 
Head Office: 5-33, Kitahama 4-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Osaka 541 Japan 
Taisei Corporation 
Yasuo Satomi, President 
25-1, Nishishinjuku 1-chome, Shinjuku-ku, 
Tokyo 163 Japan 
Takashimaya Co., Ltd. 
Hiroshi Hidaka, President 
1-5, Namba 5-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Osaka 542 Japan 
Takenaka Corporation 
Toichi Takenaka, President 
1-13, Hommachi 4-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Osaka 541 Japan 
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Toda Corporation 
Moriji Toda, President 
7-1, Kyobashi 1-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Tokyo 104 Japan 
Tohoku Electric Power Co. , Inc. 
Teruyuk.i Akema, President 
7-1, Ichibancho 3-chome, Aoba-ku, Sendai-shi, 
Miyagi-ken 980 Japan 
The Tokai Bank 
Kiichiro Itoh, President 
Head Office: 21-24, Nishik.i 3-chome, Naka-ku, 
Nagoya 460 Japan 
The Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co.Ltd. 
Shunji Kono, President 
2-1, Marunouchi 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
The Tokyo Electric Power Co. , Inc. 
Gaishi Hiraiwa, Chairman, C. E. 0. 
1-3, Uchisaiwa-cho 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
Tokyo Gas Co., Ltd. 
Kunio Anzai, President 
5-20, Kaigan 1-chome, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo 105 Japan 
Tokyu Corporation 
Jiro Yokota, President 
26-20, Sakuragaokacho, Shibuya-ku, 
Tokyo 150 Japan 
Tokyu Construction 
Tetsu Gotoh, President 
16-14, Shibuya 1-chome, Shibuya-ku, 
Tokyo 150 Japan 
Tomen Corporation 
Tsuneo Kitamura, President 
Osaka Head Office: 6-7, Kawaramachi 
1-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Osaka 541 Japan 
353 
Toshoku Ltd. 
Mitsuo Iizuka, President 
4-3, Nihonbashi Muromachi 2-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Tokyo 103 Japan 
The Toyo Trust And Banking Co., Ltd. 
Mitsuo Imose, President 
4-3, Marunouchi 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 100 Japan 
Toyota Tsusho Corporation 
Keiji Nogami, President 
Nagoya Head Office: 7-23, Meieki 
4-chome, Nakamura-ku, 
Nagoya 450 Japan 
Yamaichi Securities 
Atsuo Miki, President 
2-4-1, Yaesu, Chuo-ku, 
Tokyo 104 Japan 
Yamato Transport Co., Ltd. 
Kohji Miyauchi, President 
12-16, Ginza 2-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Tokyo 104 Japan 
The Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Co.Ltd 
Yasuo Goto, President 
26-1, Nishi-Shinjuku 1-chome, Shinjuku-ku, 
Tokyo 160 Japan 
The Yasuda Trust And Banking Co., Ltd. 
Fujio Takayama, President 
2-1, Yaesu 1-chome, Chuo-ku, 
Tokyo 103 Japan 
Yuasa Trading Co., Ltd. 
Kenichi Furumi, President 
8-7, Sambancho, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 102 Japan 
,_ 
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Corporate Japanese-American Respondents 
Dai-!chi Kangyo Bank of California 
Masahiro Shimizu, President 
770 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles CA 90017 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank of California 
W R Ayres, Vice President 
301 A Street 
San Diego, CA 92101 
The Daiwa Bank, Ltd. 
Y. Inokuchi, General Manager 
Suite 4040, 555 South Flower Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2416 
Daiwa House Corporation 
K. Terada, President 
Suite 170, 2082 Business Center Drive 
Irvine, CA 92715 
Daiwa Securities America, Inc 
Mr. Munegami, General Manager 
Suite 3636, 333 South Grand Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA 90071-1540 
Fujitsu America, Inc 
Yasushi Nakamura, President 
3055 Orchard Drive 
San Jose, CA 95134 
Hanwa American Corporation 
Kazuhisa Shiotani, General Manager 
Suite 2010, 500 South Grand Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Hazama Corporation 
Isao Honda, Director, General Manager 
370 South Crenshaw Boulevard, Suite 202 
Torrance, CA 90503 
The Hokkaido Takushoku Bank., Ltd. 
Shigenobu Kotani, General Manager 
Suite 3522, 333 South Grand A venue 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
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Japan Airlines Co., Ltd 
Yasushi Kawano, Vice President 
Suite 402, 300 North Continental Boulevard, 
El Segundo, CA 90245 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd 
K. Futagawa 
221 Main Street, 16th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
The Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd., 
Hirorni Yokoyama, General Manager 
Suite 3700, 444 South Flower Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Mitsubishi Acceptance Corporation 
Yasuyuki Ogasawara, President 
Suite 100, 36 Executive Park 
Irvine, CA 92714 
The Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd. 
The President 
800 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
The Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Corp. 
Michitaka Ishikawa, Director 
Suite 1650, 911 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc 
Makoto Ejima, Senior Vice President & GM, 
Pacific SW HQ Suite 2000, 
611 West Sixth 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc 
Furnihiko Tsukano, General Manager 
Suite 3000, One California Street 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
Mitsui Fudosan (U.S.A.), Inc 
Okitarni Komada, President 
Suite 1550, 800 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, Ca 90017 
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Mitsui Fudosan (U.S.A.), Inc 
Yoichiro Hamaoka, Vice President 
505 Montgomery Street 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
The Mitsui Trust & Banking Co., Ltd., 
Katuoki Sone, General Manager 
Suite 3800, 611 West Sixth Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Mitsukoshi, Ltd. 
S Kumon, General Manager 
Suite 2725, 2049 Century Park East 
Los Angeles, CA 90067 
Nichii Corporation of America, Ltd. 
Itaru Tanaka, Director & General Manager 
Skypark Two, Suite 140, 23440 Hawthorne 
Torrance, CA 90505 
Nichimen America, Inc. 
Noboru Saka, Deputy General Manager 
Suite 1150, 235 Montgomery 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
Nichimen America, Inc. 
Shinichi Komeda, General Manager 
Suite A, 2328 Walsh Avenue 
Santa Clara, CA 95051 
The Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd., 
Mr. Nobuyoshi Nagaya, General Manager 
Suite 1400, 800 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Nippon Express U.S.A. Inc. 
Mr. N. Oishi, Manager 
400 Valley Drive CA 94005 
Nittetsu Shoji America, Inc. 
Osamu Maeda, President 
Suite 186, 725 South Figueroa Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Sanwa Bank California 
S. Bartoletti, President 
24299 Southland Drive, Hayward Commercial Banking Office 
Hayward, CA 94545 
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Sanwa Bank California 
Mark Yoda, President, C.E.O. 
612 South Flower Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Sato Kogyo America Corporation 
Makoto Miura, President 
Suite 200-1, 18922 Cowan Street 
Irvine, CA 92714 
Seibu Transportation Co., Ltd. 
Hiroshi Nagai, President 
752 South Glasgow A venue 
Inglewood, CA 90301 
The Shizuoka Bank, Ltd. 
Hiroshi Kubono, General Manager 
Suite 3700, 707 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
The Sumitomo Bank of California 
G. Yamashiro, V. P. and Manager 
16041 Goldenwest Street 
Huntington Beach, CA 92647 
The Sumitomo Bank, Ltd. 
Masami Surnii, General Manager 
Suite 3700, 611 West Sixth Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd. 
Senji Horiuchi, General Manager 
Suite 5300, 333 South Grand Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Toda Development, Inc. 
Kenichi Kimura, President 
Suite 630, 120 South San Pedro Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90012 
The Tokai Bank of California 
J. Richard Belliston, Executive V. P. 
534 West Sixth Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90014 
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Tokyo Aircargo American, Inc. 
Takashi Nagai, Vice President 
9320 Bellanca A venue 
Los Angeles, CA 90045 
Tokyu Construction 
D. Saito, C.E.O. 
199 South Los Robles A venue, Suite 250 
Pasadena, CA 91101 
Tomen America, Inc. 
Susumu Masaki, V. P. and General Manager 
445 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2550 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Toshoku Los Angeles, Inc. 
Etsuo Tamura, President 
Suite 300, 515 South Figueroa Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Toshoku Los Angeles, Inc. 
M. Omizo, Executive Vice President 
465 California Street 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
The Toyo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd. 
Tadashi Oshima, Branch Manager 
444 South Flower Street, Suite 1550 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Toyota Tsusho America, Inc. 
Sampei Nagare, General Manager 
Suite 350, 1875 South Grant Street 
San Mateo, CA 94402 
Yamaichi International (America), Inc. 
Yukio Nagai, Executive Vice President 
333 South Hope Street, Concourse Level 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Yamaichi International (America), Inc. 
Craig Leman, Branch Manager 
235 Montgomery Street 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
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Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. America 
Tomohisa Uno, Executive Vice President 
Suite 1600 600 Wilshire Boulvard 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
The Yasuda Trust and Banking Co., Ltd. 
Kenji Kawakami, General Manager 
Suite 3990, 725 Figueroa Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd. 
Kazuhisa Shin, General Manager S. E. 
110116th Street, North West 
Washington, DC 20036 
The Bank of Tokyo, Ltd. 
Mutsuo Hatano, Chief Representative 
Suite 703, 1825 K Street Northwest 
Washington, DC 20006 
Chubu Electric Power Co. , Inc 
Tatsuo Yagi, Manager 
Suite 1220, 900 17th Street Northwest 
Washington, DC 20006 
Japan Leasing USA, Inc. 
Shinobu Nagahori, President 
Two Sound View Drive 
Greenwich, CT 06830 
Marubeni America Corporation 
Takeo Tanaka, Senior V.P. & G.M. 
Suite 1215, 1615 L Street, Northwest 
Washington, DC 20036 
NTT America, Inc. 
Masahiko Tominaga, Deputy Director 
Suite 500, 1615 "L" Street North West 
Washington, DC 20036 
Tokyo Electric Power Company 
Konosuke Sugiura, General Manager 
Suite 720, 1901 L Street, North West 
Washington, DC 20036 
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US Japan Business Council, Inc. 
Roger Swanson, President 
1020 19th Street Northwest 
Washington, DC 20036 
Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. 
Takeshi Sakurai, President 
Suite 600, 816 Conn. Avenue North West 
Washington, DC 20006 
The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd. 
President 
165 South King Street 
Honolulu, HI 96813 
Hazama Corporation 
Mr. Toyoshima, General Manager 
Ala Moana Pacific Center, Suite 1240 
1585 Kapiolani Boulevard 
Honolulu, HI 96814 
The Long Term Credit Bank of Japan 
Yasuyoshi Tsuji, Chief Representative 
Suite 2801, Marquis One Tower 
245 Peachtree Center A venue Northeast 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
Nippon Shinpan USA, Inc. 
Tsutomu Wada, Director 
Suite 1509, 2222 Kalakaua Avenue 
Honolulu, HI 96815 
The Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd. K. Mizuno 
Suite 800, 190 South LaSalle Street 
Chicago, IL 60603 
The Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Corp. 
Shunji Ichikawa, General Manager 
Suite 3100, 440 La Salle Street 
Chicago, IL 60605 
Mitsui O. S. K. Lines (America) , Inc. 
Ron Stevenson, Vice President 
Suite 1330, 122 South Michigan Avenue 
Chicago, IL 60603 
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The Mitsui Trust & Banking Co., Ltd. 
Kazuo Hara, General Manager 
190 South Lasalle 
Chicago, IL 60603 
The Nikko Securities Co. International, 
Masumi Yamaguchi, Branch President 
Suite 2760, One South Wacker Drive 
Chicago, IL 60606 
Nissei Sangyo America, Ltd. 
Koichi Maekawa, President 
Suite 200, 2850 East Golf Road 
Rolling Meadows, IL 60008 
Tokio Marine Management, Inc. 
Mr. Shin-ichi Asami, Office Manager 
Suite 2950, 444 North Michigan venue 
Chicago, IL 60611 
The Daiwa Bank, Ltd. 
Lee Milligan, V. P. and General Manager 
Suite 1402, 10 East Baltimore Street 
Baltimore, MD 21202 
The Kinki Sharyo Co., Ltd. 
Norio Hara, General Manager 
20 Walnut Street 
Wellesley Hills, MA 02181 
Nissho Iwai American Corporation 
Toshiaki Sasaki, General Manager 
Suite 902, One Cambridge Center 
Cambridge, MA 02142 
Yamato Transport U.S.A., Inc. 
Yuki Hawkins, Operation Manager 
Suite 125, 1500 East 79th Street 
Bloomington, MN 55425 
Kajima International, Inc. 
Ayao Katayama, Executive V .P. & C .O.O. 
2100 North Central Road 
Fort Lee, NJ 07024 
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Kanematsu U.S.A., Inc. 
Y. Hotta, Vice President, General Manager 
2001 Elizabeth Street 
North Brunswick, NJ 08902 
Kanematsu U.S.A., Inc. 
M. Yosomiya, President 
400 Cottontail Lane 
Somerset, NJ 08873 
Kawasho International (USA) , Inc. 
Harutoshi Iida, President 
Seventh Floor, Two Exectuive Drive 
Fort Lee, NJ 07024 
Asahi America, Inc. 
S. Yoshida, Vice President 
220 East 42nd Street 
New York, NY 10017 
The Bank of Fukuoka, Ltd. 
Yukio Osada, Manager 
47th Floor, One Liberty Plaza, 
165 Broadway New York, NY 10006 
Bank of Yokohama, Ltd. 
T. Okubo 
Suite 8067, One World Trade Center 
New York, NY 10048 
Chiba Bank, Ltd. 
Toshiki Ishii, General Manager 
18th Floor, 45 Broadway 
New York, NY 10006 
Chiyoda Life Asset Management of America, 
Tetsuji Takatami, President 
25th Floor, 10 East 50th Street 
New York, NY 10022 
Chori America, Inc. 
Gonosuke Yonezawa, President 
Suite 5440, One Penn Plaza 
New York, NY 10118 
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The Chuo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd. 
Chitaru Kohzu, General Manager 
Suite 8322, Two World Trade Center 
New York, NY 10048 
The Dai-ichi Life Co. 
Mr. Takahashi, Chief Representative 
28th Floor, 65 East 55th Street 
New York, NY 10022 
Daiei Trading Co. , Ltd. 
Motoki Tsunomori, Senior President 
56-71 55th A venue 
Maspeth, NY 11378 
Daihyaku Life America, Inc. 
Norio Kudo, Executive Vice President 
Suite 2302, 65 East 55th Street 
New York, NY 10022 
Daiwa Securities American, Inc. 
Mr. Yonetani President 
25th Floor, One World Financial CenterT-A 
New York, NY 10281 
Dentsu, Inc. 
Kosuke Ohashi, President 
1114 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036 
East Japan Railway Company 
Kenichi Shimura, Director 
Room 1961, 45 Rockefeller Plaza 
New York, NY 10111 
The Fuji Bank and Trust Co. 
Toru Kukihara, President and C. E. O. 
Two World Trade Center 
New York, NY 10048 
The Fuji Bank, Ltd. 
Hideo Nakamura, General Manager 
Suite 6011, One World Trade Center 
New York, NY 10048 
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The Hiroshima Bank, Ltd. 
Sho Takahashi, General Manager 
One Wall Street, 31st Floor 
New York, NY 10005 
Hitachi America, Ltd. 
Keishi Toda, President 
50 Prospect Avenue 
Tarrytown, NY 10591-4698 
The Hokkaido Bank, Ltd. 
Mr. Abiko, General Manager 
27 Madison Avenue/ 11th Floor 
New York, NY 10022 
The Industrial Bank of Japan, Ltd. 
Isamu Koike, General Manager 
245 Park Avenue 
New York, NY 10167 
Joyo Bank, Ltd. 
Makoto Kaku ta, General Manager 
10th Floor, 335 Madison Avenue 
New York, NY 10017 
The Kansai Electric Power Co. 
Furniya Tsuda 
375 Park Avenue, Suite 2607 
New York, NY 10152 
Kumagai Gurni Co., Ltd. 
M Furuta, President 
Third Floor, Four Columbus Circle 
New York, NY 10019 
The Meiji Seimei Insurance Agency of N. Y. 
Mototsura Nishijima, President 
31st Floor, 245 Park Avenue 
New York, NY 10167 
Nomura Securities Investment Trust Mgnt. 
Kohji Sugita, Chief Representative 
21st Floor, 180 Maiden Lane 
New York, NY 10038 
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Obayashi Corporation 
Seiichi Yabe, General Manager 
12th Floor, 666 Fifth Avenue 
New York, NY 10103 
Orient Leasing USA Corporation 
Takashi Koizumi, President 
48th Floor, 780 Third Avenue 
New York, NY 10017 
Orix USA Corporation 
Takashi Koizumi, President and Director 
Suite 4800, 780 Third A venue 
New York, NY 10017 
Shimizu America Corporation 
S. Ishii, President 
11th Floor, 650 Madison Avenue 
New York, NY 10022 
The Shoko Chukin Bank 
Kazuo Yamakawa, General Manager 
Two Wall Street 
New York, NY 10005 
Taisei America Corporation 
Y. Kumazawa, President and C. E. O. 
24th Floor, 114 West 47th 
New York, NY 10036 
Taiyo Asset Management of America 
Masanori Saito, President 
277 Park Avenue, 27th Floor 
New York, NY 10177 
Takashimaya, Inc. 
J. Shinohara, President 
509 Fifth Avenue 
New York, NY 10017 
Takenaka International (USA), Ltd. 
Kenji Murakami, Executive Vice President 
Fourth Floor, 70 East 55th Street 
New York, NY 10022 
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Toho America International, Inc. 
Hiroichi Ogata, President 
37th Floor, 540 Madison Avenue 
New York, NY 10022 
Tohoku Electric Power Co. , Inc. 
Takehiko Sugawara, General Manager 
Suite 2304, 65 East 55th Street 
New York, NY 10022 
Tokyo Gas Co. , Ltd. 
Junji Yoshitak1~, Chief Representative 
280 Park Avenue 
New York, NY 10017 
Yasuda Life Company 
Kunio Yasuda, Chief Representative 
28th Floor, 575 Fifth Avenue 
New York, NY 10017 
Yuasa Trading Co. (America), Inc. 
Masahiro Kawabe, President 
31st Floor, 150 East 52nd Street 
New York, NY 10022 
The Zenshinren Bank 
Yoshio Mizoe, General Manager 
Suite 8023, One World Trade Center 
New York, NY 10048 
Daiwa House Corporation 
Katsuya Terada, President 
Suite 140, 1001 West Euless Boulevard 
Euless, TX 76040 
Sekisui House America, Inc. 
Shinichiro Taki, President 
Suite 810, 10800 North East Eighth Street 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
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Appendix 10: Detailed Record Of Survey Data 
Section One. 
Section 1. Question A. American Sample . 
.. 
.. 1. 2 • 3. .. 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
• l 
s l 
• l 
1 l 
• l 
• l 
10 l 
11 l 
ll l 
13 l 
14 l 
lS l 
16 l 
l7 l 
10 l 
19 l 
:IO l 
21 l 
22 l 
23 l 
24 l 
25 l 
26 l 
21 l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 l 
33 l 
34 l 
35 l 
36 l 
31 l 
38 l 
39 l 
•• l 
41 l 
TOt.&ls I A..era.gm 3 3 32 3 
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Section 1. Question A. Japanese Sample. 
J l. 2. 3. .. 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
• l 
s l 
• l 
7 l 
• l 
9 1 
10 l 
11 l 
12 l 
13 1 
u 1 
15 1 
16 l 
17 1 
18 l 
19 1 
20 l 
21 l 
22 1 
23 l 
24 1 
25 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 l 
32 1 
33 1 
34 1 
35 
36 1 
37 
38 
39 1 
40 
Totals I A.ftllE'&IJ'IS 5 • 25 0 
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Section 1. Question A. Japanese-American Sample. 
" 
JA 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1 
2 1 
3 1 
4 1 
5 1 
6 1 
7 1 
8 1 
9 1 
10 1 
11 1 
12 1 
13 1 
14 1 
15 1 
16 1 
17 1 
18 1 
19 1 
20 1 
21 1 
2l 1 
23 1 
24 1 
25 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
Toto.la I Averages 4 5 20 3 
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Section 1. Question B. American Sample . 
.. l. .. 3. . . s. .. 7. 
1 1 
2 l l l 
3 l l l l 
• l l 1 l 
5 1 l l 
6 1 1 l l 
7 l 
• 1 1 l l 1 
' 
l 1 l 1 1 
10 1 
11 l l l 
12 1 l l 1 l l l 
13 1 1 1 
u 1 l l 1 l l 
15 l 1 
16 1 l 
17 1 1 1 1 
18 l l 
19 l 1 l 1 l l l 
20 1 
21 l 
22 l l l 
23 l l l 
24 l l l l 
25 l l 
26 l l 1 l 
27 1 
28 1 1 1 
29 l 1 1 
30 1 1 l 
31 1 l 
32 1 l l 
33 l l l l l l l 
34 1 
35 l 1 
:16 1 1 l 
37 l 1 l l 
38 l l 1 
39 l l l 
40 l l l 
u l l l l 
'1"0t&l.• /.&. ... "4fes 19 15 10 16 31 23 16 
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Section 1. Question B. Japanese Sample. 
J l. 2. 3. .. 5 • 6. 7. 
l l 
2 l l l 
3 l 
• l 1 l 1 
5 l l 1 1 
6 l 1 l l 
7 1 l 1 1 
8 1 l l 
9 1 1 
10 1 l 1 
11 l l l 
12 l l 
13 l l l l 1 
H l 
15 l l 1 1 
16 1 l 
n l l 
18 l l 
u l l l l 
20 l l 
21 l l l l 
22 l 
23 l 1 l 
24 l 1 l l 
l5 l l 
26 l 1 
27 l l l 
28 l 1 l l 
29 1 
JO l 1 l l 1 
31 l 
32 l l 
33 l l l l l 
34 1 l 1 l 
l5 
36 l 1 
37 
38 
39 l l l 
40 
TOt.e.19 I A.'l'et'qea 22 7 • H 22 15 16 
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Section 1. Question B. Japanese-American Sample. 
B 
JA 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1 
2 1 1 
3 1 
4 1 1 1 1 
5 1 1 l l 
6 l l l l 1 
7 l 1 1 
8 l l l 
9 l 
10 l 1 1 
11 1 
12 l l 
13 l l 
14 l 
15 1 l l l 
16 1 l 
17 1 1 l 
18 l 1 
19 l l 1 l 
20 l l l 1 
21 l l 1 
22 1 
23 1 1 
24 l 1 1 
25 1 l l 
26 1 1 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l l 
30 1 l 
31 l l l 1 
32 1 
33 1 1 1 1 
\'01:418 I Averages 17 9 4 10 23 10 7 
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Section 1. Question C. American Sample. 
c 
.. l. 2. J. 4. 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 1 
5 1 
6 1 
7 l 
• 1 
• 1 
10 1 
11 1 
12 1 
13 1 
14 1 
15 1 
16 1 
17 1 
18 l 
19 l 
20 1 
21 1 
22 1 
23 1 
24 l 
25 1 
26 1 
21 1 
28 1 
29 l 
30 1 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
34 1 
35 1 
36 1 
37 l 
38 l 
39 1 
40 l 
41 l 
TOtUs I a..,_.aqes • 27 4 l 
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Section 1. Question C. Japanese Sample. 
c 
J 1. 2. 3. .. 
1 1 
2 l 
3 l 
• l 
5 l 
6 1 
7 l 
8 l 
• l 
10 l 
11 l 
12 1 
13 l 
u 1 
15 l 
16 l 
17 l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
21 1 
22 l 
23 1 
2• l 
2S 1 
26 l 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 l 
31 1 
32 1 
33 l 
.. l 
35 
36 1 
37 
38 
39 1 
•o 
~&l• I i.veraqes 10 21 5 0 
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Section 1. Question C. Japanese-American Sample. 
c 
JA 1. 2. 3. 4. 
l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 l 
5 l 
6 l 
7 l 
8 l 
9 l 
10 l 
11 l 
12 l 
13 l 
14 l 
15 l 
16 l 
17 l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 1 
21 l 
22 l 
23 1 
24 1 
25 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 l 
29 1 
JO 1 
ll l 
32 l 
33 1 
Total a I Averages 6 21 5 0 
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Section 1. Question D. American Sample. 
.. shortened DO dtect l<nqtl>cmed 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
• l 
5 l 
• l 
1 l 
• l 
9 l 
10 l 
ll l 
12 l 
13 l 
u l 
15 l 
16 l 
11 1 
18 l 
19 1 
20 1 
21 l 
22 1 
23 l 
,. l 
25 l 
26 l 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 
32 l 
33 l 
34 l 
35 l 
36 l 
31 l 
38 l 
39 l 
40 l 
u l 
Tot.el• I A.ver.,,_ 20 • 12 
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Section 1. Question D. Japanese Sample. 
J shortened DO ett:ect. lmqtheoed 
l l 
l l 
3 l 
• l 
5 1 
6 1 
7 1 
8 1 
9 1 
10 l 
11 l 
12 1 
13 l 
l< l 
15 1 
16 1 
17 l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
21 l 
22 l 
23 l 
2< l 
25 l 
26 l 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 1 
33 l 
34 l 
35 
36 1 
37 
38 
39 l 
40 
Total• I &.veraqes 22 11 3 
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Section 1. Question D. Japanese-American Sample. 
D 
JA shortened no effect lenqthened 
l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 l 
5 l 
6 l 
7 l 
8 l 
g l 
10 l 
11 l 
12 l 
13 l 
14 l 
15 l 
16 l 
17 l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 1 
21 l 
22 1 
23 l 
24 l 
25 1 
26 l 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 1 
32 l 
33 l 
Totals I Averages 22 g l 
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Section Two. 
Section 2. Question A. American Sample. 
.. l. i. 
1 1 
2 1 
3 1 
• 1 
s 1 
6 1 
1 1 
• 1 
9 1 
10 
11 l 
12 
13 1 
u 1 
lS 1 
16 1 
n 1 
18 1 
19 1 
20 1 
21 1 
22 l 
23 1 
2< 1 
2S 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
3< 1 
3S 1 1 
36 1 
37 1 
38 1 
39 1 
•• 1 
n 1 
Tat..t• I&..,_...,.._ 38 2 
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Section 2. Question A. Japanese Sample . 
... 
J l. 2. 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 l 
' 
l 
• l 
7 l 
8 l 
9 l 
10 l 
ll l 
12 l 
13 l 
14 
15 l 
16 l 
ll l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
21 l 
22 l 
23 l 
24 l 
25 l 
26 l 
n l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 l 
33 l 
34 l 
35 
36 l 
37 
38 
39 l 
40 
Totals I .t.ver eves 31 4 
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Section 2. Question A. Japanese-American Sample. 
"· 
J-A 1. 2. 
I 
2 1 
3 1 
4 l 
5 1 
6 1 
7 1 
8 1 
g 1 
10 l 
11 1 
12 1 
13 1 
a 1 
15 1 
16 l 
17 1 
18 1 
1g 1 
20 l 
21 l 
22 l 
23 l 
24 1 
25 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
2g 1 
30 l 
31 1 
32 1 
33 l 
Totals I Averages 25 7 
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Section 2. Question B. American Sample . 
.. 
.. L 2. 
1 1 
2 1 
J 1 
• 1 
s 1 
6 1 
1 1 
• 1 
• 1 
10 1 
11 1 
12 1 
lJ 1 
14 1 
15 1 
16 
n 1 
18 1 
19 1 
20 1 
21 1 
22 1 
2J 1 
,. 1 
25 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
JO 1 
31 1 
J2 1 
JJ 1 
34 1 
JS 1 
J6 1 
37 1 
J8 1 
39 1 
•• 1 
41 1 
TIK&b I A..•ere.991 0 •• 
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Section 2. Question B. Japanese Sample . 
.. 
J l. 2. 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
• l 
s 1 
6 l 
7 1 
• l 
9 l 
10 l 
11 l 
12 l 
13 l 
14 
lS l 
16 l 
17 l 
10 l 
19 
20 l 
21 l 
22 l 
23 l 
24 l 
25 l 
26 l 
27 l 
28 l l 
~ l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 l 
33 l 
34 l 
3S 
36 l 
37 
38 
39 l 
40 
Tot.al.9 I L9«ateS 12 23 
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Section 2. Question B. Japanese-American Sample. 
B. 
J-A 1. 2. 
1 
2 1 
3 1 
4 1 
5 1 
6 1 
7 1 
8 1 
9 1 
10 1 
11 1 
12 1 
13 1 
14 1 
15 1 
16 1 
17 1 
18 1 
19 1 
20 1 
21 1 
22 1 
23 1 
24 1 
25 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
Tota.la I Averages 11 21 
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Section 2. Question C. American Sample. 
c. 
.. l. 2 • 3. 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 l 
5 l 
6 l 
7 l 
• l 
• l 
10 l 
11 l 
12 l 
13 l 
H l 
15 l 
16 l 
17 l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
21 l 
22 l 
23 l 
24 l 
25 l 
l<5 l 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
3l l 
32 l 
33 l 
34 l 
35 l 
36 l 
37 l 
38 l 
39 l 
40 l 
u l 
Total• I A."'9I'-Veit 4 26 ll 
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Section 2. Question C. Japanese Sample. 
c. 
J L l. 3. 
l l 
l l 
3 l 
' 
l 
5 l 
6 l 
7 l 
• l 
9 l 
10 l 
11 
ll l 
13 l 
14 l 
15 l 
16 l l 
17 l 
16 l 
19 l 
10 l 
21 l 
21 l 
13 l 
14 l 
l5 l 
16 l 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 l 
33 l 
34 l 
35 
36 l 
37 
38 
39 l 
40 
-rot.&1.a I A.V'll!IE'acJel 2 l5 9 
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Section 2. Question C. Japanese-American Sample. 
c. 
J-A !. 2. 3. 
l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 l 
5 l 
6 l 
7 l 
8 l 
9 l 
10 l 
11 l 
12 l 
13 l 
14 l 
15 l 
16 1 
17 l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
21 l 
n l 
23 l 
H l 
25 l 
26 l 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 l 
33 l 
Toto.ls I Averages 6 14 12 
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Section 2. Question D. American Sample. 
D. 
"" 
l. 2. 3. .. 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
• l 
s l 
• l 
7 l 
8 l 
• l 
10 l l 
11 l 
12 l 
13 l 
14 l 
lS l 
16 l 
17 l 
18 l 
19 l 
,., l 
21 l 
22 l 
23 l 
24 l 
2S l 
26 l 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 l 
33 l 
34 l 
35 l 
36 l 
37 l 
38 l 
39 l 
40 l 
41 l 
~als / &."'9r&qes 2 17 22 l 
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Section 2. Question D. Japanese Sample . 
.. 
J l. 2. 3. .. 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
• l 
5 l 
• l 
7 l 
• l 
9 l 
10 
11 1 
12 1 
13 l 
14 l 
15 l 
16 l 
17 l 
18 1 
19 1 
20 l 
21 l 
22 l 
23 l 
2' l 
25 l 
26 l 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 1 
33 l 
34 l 
35 
36 1 
37 
38 
39 1 
40 
Tot&ls I A.TeratJm 0 • 25 2 
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Section 2. Question D. Japanese-American Sample. 
D. 
J-A 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1 
2 1 
3 1 
4 1 
5 1 
6 1 
7 1 
8 1 
9 1 
10 
11 1 
12 1 
13 1 
14 1 
15 1 
16 1 
17 1 
18 1 
19 1 
20 1 
21 1 
22 1 
23 1 
24 1 
25 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
TOtal• I Averages 0 11 14 6 
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Section 2. Question E. American Sample . 
.. 
.. •~ran cusaq slifJb, sli¢ aqree st ran 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
• 1 
5 l 
6 1 
T 1 
8 1 
9 l 
10 1 
11 l 
12 1 
13 1 
u 1 
lS l 
16 1 
lT l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
ll l 
22 l 
23 1 
2' l 
25 1 
26 1 
21 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
3' 1 
35 1 
36 1 
31 1 
38 1 
39 1 
•o 1 
41 1 
'n:lt.a.l• I &.wee.ages 0 3 2 8 2• • 
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Section 2. Question E. Japanese Sample . 
.. 
J st ran d.isao sli¢ slic;sb •oree st.rai 
1 l 
2 l 
3 l 
• 1 
5 l 
• 1 
7 l 
8 l 
g 1 
10 l 
11 l 
12 l 
13 l 
u 1 
15 1 
l• l 
17 1 
18 1 
19 1 
20 1 
21 1 
22 1 
23 1 
24 1 
2S 1 
2• 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 l 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
34 1 
35 
•• 1 
37 
38 
39 1 
•o 
Tat.al• I &.._ages 0 1 3 16 12 • 
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Section 2. Question E. Japanese-American Sample. 
e. 
J-A stror disaq sliq~ sliqh agree stron 
1 
2 1 
3 1 
4 1 
5 1 
6 1 
7 1 
8 1 
9 1 
10 1 
11 1 
12 1 
13 1 
14 1 
15 1 
16 1 
17 1 
18 1 
19 1 
20 1 
21 1 
22 1 
23 1 
24 1 
25 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
'l'Otals I Averages 0 2 3 6 19 2 
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Section 2. Question F. American Sample . 
.. 
.. cul.t.ura c:xmpet itio equHy debt m.!I amsumer m <edmolO<J) <ZO 
l s TS s s 10 s 
2 so so 
3 20 2S 0 0 2S 20 10 
• s 90 0 0 0 0 s 
s 10 20 lS s 20 20 10 \ 
6 
1 s s 10 s so 10 s 
8 10 10 10 10 
• 10 25 lS 10 20 20 
10 
11 lS lS 10 co lS s 
12 s 20 10 20 30 lS 
13 s 10 s s 25 S5 2S 
lC •• 30 10 lO 
15 3 30 so 10 1 
16 20 20 10 20 30 
11 s 20 8 8 20 20 20 
18 lO 5 s 10 20 so 
19 10 10 20 lO 20 20 
20 10 20 10 10 20 10 20 
21 so s 20 20 s 
22 lS 30 lS co 
23 10 30 5 30 10 15 
24 20 20 20 20 20 
25 20 so 20 10 
26 2S co lO lS 
21 20 10 10 20 co 
28 lO lS 11 10 lS 10 13 
29 11 20 11 25 33 
30 s 2S 25 s 10 10 20 
31 co s 10 10 35 
32 10 50 co 
33 100 
34 s 60 5 10 20 
35 
36 s so 2S lS s 
37 s 30 30 s 10 10 10 
38 20 s so 25 
39 s 30 s s lS 3S s 
•• 10 2S 2S lS 25 
Cl 10 10 •• lO 20 
'l'Ot&l• I L._.aqes 434 925 S36 133 615 SlS 618 
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Section 2. Question F. Japanese Sample. 
r. 
J cultura ampetitiG equity debt .11'1 consumer " tedmol"'ll' "'° 
l 20 30 20 30 
2 s 25 10 30 25 s 
3 30 20 30 20 
• 25 75 
s 25 25 25 25 
6 15 20 15 30 10 10 
7 10 so 25 5 10 
• 10 20 20 20 30 
• 20 so 10 20 
10 15 30 30 25 
11 
12 s 20 10 15 25 10 15 
13 33 33 33 
14 
15 30 10 20 s 10 25 
16 50 15 15 20 
17 20 20 •• 20 
19 so 30 20 
19 16 16 16 16 16 16 
20 25 25 so 
21 10 20 •• 10 20 
22 5 25 5 25 15 5 
23 
24 10 20 15 15 15 10 15 
25 20 20 20 20 20 
26 33 33 33 
27 5 10 10 5 •• 20 10 
28 
29 
30 20 50 20 10 
31 10 75 5 10 
32 75 25 
33 20 50 20 10 
34 10 so 20 20 
35 
36 20 •• •• 
37 
38 
.. 10 70 20 
•• 
Tot.a.ls I .&.Yer"aqes 239 719 180 304 867 454 311 
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Section 2. Question F. Japanese-American Sample. 
P. 
J-A cultuC" ccmpetiti equity debt m consumer: technoloq CEO 
l 
2 10 30 40 10 10 
3 15 30 30 15 10 
4 10 50 30 10 
5 30 30 20 10 10 
6 15 50 25 5 5 
7 15 75 10 
8 10 10 5 60 20 5 
9 50 50 
10 5 50 10 20 5 10 
11 10 30 50 10 
12 
13 40 5 5 10 30 10 
l4 5 30 5 10 50 
15 5 60 25 15 
16 40 10 5 5 5 10 25 
17 
l8 5 25 30 30 10 
19 20 so 25 5 
20 10 40 40 10 
21 50 25 25 
22 50 50 
23 
24 10 20 20 40 10 
25 100 
26 30 15 50 5 
27 50 40 10 
28 
29 40 40 20 
30 10 20 30 30 10 
31 20 30 30 20 
32 50 50 
33 
Totals I Averaqes 235 880 205 205 565 410 215 
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Section 2. Question G. American Sample. 
"· 
.. stron cUs49 sliQb s.11¢. aqree st.ran 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 l 
5 l 
6 l 
1 
• l 
9 1 
10 1 
11 l 
12 l 
13 l 
14 1 
15 1 
16 1 
11 1 
18 l 
-19 1 
20 1 
21 1 
22 l 
2> 1 
24 l 
:n 1 
26 1 
21 1 
21 1 
29 l 
30 1 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
34 l 
35 1 
36 1 
37 1 
38 l 
39 1 
40 1 
41 l 
Tot.al• I &.Yerates 6 20 2 5 7 0 
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Section 2. Question G. Japanese Sample. 
"· 
J st ran dJ.saq sll.Qh sliQb. 
_.,. 
stran 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
• l 
5 l 
• l 
1 l 
• l 
• 1 
10 l 
11 
12 l 
13 l 
u l 1 
15 l 
16 1 
17 
18 1 
19 l 
20 1 
21 
22 l l 
23 l 
24 l 
25 l 
26 1 
21 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 l 
32 l 
33 1 
,. 1 
35 
36 1 
37 
38 
39 1 
•o 
Tatel• I &.Terqes 0 1 • 11 1 0 
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Section 2. Question G • Japanese-American Sample. 
G. 
J-A stron disaq sliqh sliqh agree stron 
l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 l 
5 1 
6 l 
7 1 
8 1 
9 l 
10 1 
11 1 
12 1 
13 l 
14 l 
15 l 
16 l 
17 l 
18 
19 l 
20 l 
21 l 
22 l 
23 l 
24 l 
25 l 
26 l 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 l 
33 l 
Totals I Aven1ges 0 10 8 10 3 0 
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Section 2. Question H. American Sample. 
H. 
.. l. 2 . J. .. 
l l 
2 l 
J l 
• l 
s l 
6 l 
7 l 
• l 
• l 
10 l 
11 1 
12 1 
13 1 
u 1 
lS 1 
16 1 
17 1 
18 1 
19 1 
20 1 
21 1 
22 1 
23 1 
2• 1 
2S 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 l 
32 1 
33 1 
JC 1 
~ 1 
36 1 
37 l 
38 1 
39 1 
•• 1 
u 1 
nKal• / ....... 12 23 6 0 
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Section 2. Question H. Japanese Sample . 
.. 
J 1. 2. 3. 4. 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 l 
s l 
6 l 
7 l 
• l 
9 l 
10 l 
11 
12 l 
13 l 
14 l 
lS l 
16 l 
17 l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
21 l 
22 l l 
23 l 
24 l 
2S l 
26 l 
27 1 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 l 
33 l 
34 l 
3S 
36 l 
37 
38 
39 1 
40 
Tot.41.s I &.ver 10 24 2 0 
402 
Section 2. Question H. Japanese-American Sample. 
H. 
J-A l. 2. 3. 4. 
l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 l 
5 l 
6 l 
7 l 
8 l 
9 l 
10 l 
11 1 
12 1 
13 l 
14 1 
15 1 
16 1 
17 1 
18 1 
19 l 
20 1 
21 1 
22 1 
23 1 
:;z4 l 
:;z5 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 1 
32 l 
33 1 
Totals I Ave 2 21 9 0 
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Section 2. Question I. American Sample. 
I. 
.. sUcmqly c1.1._ .... sliQb..t.l]' sli9bt.17 
--
st.ranql7 
l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 l 
s l 
• l 
7 l 
8 l 
• l 
10 l 
11 l 
12 l 
13 l 
14 l 
15 l 
16 l 
17 l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
21 l 
22 l 
23 l 
24 l 
lS l 
26 l 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 
32 l 
33 l 
34 l 
JS l 
36 l 
37 l 
38 l 
39 l 
40 l 
u l 
nKal• I &.'ftlr 2 • • 12 10 l 
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Section 2. Question I. Japanese Sample. 
I. 
J nrmql7 d.111.aaree slightly slightly 
-ee StrCIDQ'lJ' 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
• l 
5 l 
• l 
7 l 
8 l 
9 l 
10 l 
11 l 
12 l 
13 l 
14 l 
15 l 
16 l 
l7 l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
21 l 
22 l l 
23 l 
24 l 
25 l 
26 l 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 l 
33 l 
34 l 
35 
36 l 
37 
38 
39 l 
40 
Tat.al• I &.ver 0 3 0 ll 22 l 
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Section 2. Question I. Japanese-American Sample. 
I. 
J-A strongly disagree sliqhtly sliqhtly agree suonqly 
1 
2 1 
3 1 
4 1 
5 1 
6 1 
7 1 
e 1 
9 1 
10 1 
11 1 
12 1 
13 1 
u 1 
15 1 
16 1 
17 1 
18 
19 1 
20 1 
21 1 
21 1 
23 1 
24 1 
25 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
-
Totals I Ave 1 0 2 15 13 0 
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Section 2. Question J. American Sample. 
J . 
.. straoqly d.J.saqree sliQbtly sligb.t.ly 
--
atranqly 
l l 
2 l 
l l 
• l 
s l 
6 l 
1 l 
8 1 
• 1 
10 
11 l 
12 l 
13 l 
u l 
15 l 
16 1 
11 l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
21 l 
22 1 
23 l 
,. l 
l5 l 
26 l 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 l 
33 l 
.. l 
l5 l 
36 l 
37 l 
38 1 
39 1 
<O 1 
u l 
-rotal• I&.._. 0 2 2 12 23 l 
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Section 2. Question J. Japanese Sample. 
J. 
J strQD411' 41.Hqrec sliigb.tly diljlb.t.lJ' 
--
•~ranql:r 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 l 
5 l 
6 
7 l 
8 l 
• l 
10 l 
11 
12 
13 l 
14 l 
15 l 
16 l 
17 l 
l8 1 
19 l 
20 l 
21 l 
22 1 l 
23 1 
24 1 
25 l 
26 l 
27 
28 l 
29 l 
30 l 
31 l 
32 l 
33 l 
34 l 
35 
36 l 
37 
38 
39 l 
40 
TotU. /&...- 0 0 l 15 17 0 
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Section 2. Question J. Japanese-American Sample. 
J. 
J-A stronqly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
4 l 
5 l 
6 l 
7 l 
8 l 
9 l 
10 l 
11 l 
12 l 1 
13 l 
u 1 
15 1 
16 1 
17 l 
18 
19 1 
20 1 
21 1 
22 1 
:13 1 
24 1 
25 1 
16 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
Totals I Ave 1 1 2 11 17 1 
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Section 2. Question K. American Sample. 
·-
.. •trez191J' 
.u.-- sUigb.tly •li¢tly 
--
strooql:r 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
• l 
s l 
6 l 
7 l 
• l 
• l 
10 l 
ll l 
12 l 
13 l 
14 l 
15 l 
16 l 
17 l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
2l l 
22 l 
23 l 
24 l 
25 l 
M l 
27 
l8 l 
29 1 
30 1 
31 
32 1 
33 1 
34 l 
35 l 
"" 
l 
37 
38 1 
39 1 
40 1 
u 1 
ToUl.9 I.._.._ 1 l • • ll l 
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Section 2. Question K. Japanese Sample . 
.. 
J stccmqly disaqree sli¢.tly sliQbt.ly 
--
·~ranqly 
l l 
l l 
3 l 
• l 
5 l 
• l 
1 l 
8 l 
9 l 
10 l 
11 l 
ll l 
13 l 
u l 
15 l 
16 l 
17 l 
18 l 
19 l 
lO l 
ll l 
ll l 
l3 l 
l4 l 
l5 l 
l6 l 
ll l 
l8 l 
l9 l 
30 l 
31 l 
3l l 
33 l 
.. l 
35 
36 l 
37 
38 
39 l 
40 
Tot.&ls I._._. 0 0 0 10 19 1 
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Section 2. Question K. Japanese-American Sample. 
K. 
J-A strong.ly disagree s.light.ly s.light.ly agree strong.ly 
1 1 
2 1 
3 1 
4 1 
5 1 
6 1 
7 1 
e 1 
9 1 
10 1 
11 1 
12 1 
13 1 
14 1 
15 1 
16 1 
17 1 
18 1 
19 1 
:zo 1 
21 1 
2:z 1 
23 1 
24 
25 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
Totals I A'fl'e 0 1 2 15 12 2 
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Section 2. Question L. American Sample. 
L. 
... llbar"t term 1C09 tent 
l l 3 
2 <3 >3 
3 3 10 
• <2 >2 
5 3 7 
6 2 5-10 
7 2 10 
• l 5 
• 3 10 
10 
11 1-5 6+ 
12 3 10 
13 1-5 ~-10 
14 2-3 ~-10 
15 3-5 10-20 
16 3 7 
17 5 50 
18 3 10 
19 3-5 10 
20 2 5 
21 l 5 
22 3-5 6+ 
23 2 7 
24 l 5 
25 1-2 5-10 
26 l 3 
27 l 5 
28 3 12 
29 3 10 
30 2-3 10+ 
31 
32 l 5 
33 
34 l 6 
35 
36 3 10 
37 3 10 
38 2 10 
39 !t-10 >10 
40 1-2 7-10 
41 3 10 
TOt&l• I a...- 2 7 
413 
Section 2. Question L. Japanese Sample. 
L. 
J sboct tent lc:mv tera 
l 3 10 
l 5 10 
3 l 5 
• 10 20 
5 3 • 
6 l 5 
7 
8 5 15 
9 3 10 
10 3 5 
11 
ll 
13 l • 
14 2 5 
15 3 6 
16 1-5 5-15 
17 2 • 
18 3 10 
19 l 2 
20 2-5 •-7 
21 l 3 
22 1-5 8 
23 5 10 
24 l 3 
25 • • 
26 5 10 
27 l 3 
28 
29 
30 l 5 
31 2 • 
32 5 10 
33 l 5 
34 3 7 
35 
36 3 10 
37 
38 
39 5 10-20 
40 
Tot&l.9 I J...-er 2 • 
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Section 2. Question L. Japanese-American Sample. 
J-A short term long term 
1 1 3 
2 7 15 
3 3 10 
4 10 20 
5 1-3 3-5 
6 2 6 
7 3 9 
8 2 5 
9 2 5 
10 1 8 
11 1 5 
12 
13 2 7 
1( 1 5 
15 1 5 
16 1-5 10 
17 4 8 
18 
19 1 5 
20 2-3 5-7 
21 2 5 
22 3 5 
23 2-3 5-6 
24 1-2 S-10 
25 s 10 
26 1 10 
27 1 3 
28 5 15 
29 3 20 
30 3 10 
31 1-2 5-7 
32 I 5 
33 2 5 
Totals I Ave 2 7 
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Section 2. Question M. American Sample . 
.. 
.. st.rmMJlY d.isaqroe •li9flt.ly •liCJb.tly aqree nr<D911' 
1 1 
2 1 
3 1 
• 1 
5 1 
6 1 
1 1 
8 1 
• 1 
10 
11 1 
12 1 
13 
14 1 
15 1 
16 1 
11 1 
18 1 
19 1 
20 1 
21 
>l 1 
23 1 
24 
2S 1 
26 1 
l1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 
32 1 
33 1 
34 
35 1 
36 
31 
38 1 
3' 1 
40 
41 1 
TOt.41• / ...... 1 11 5 12 2 0 
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Section 2. Question M. Japanese Sample . 
.. 
• •trcmvly d.isaqree •liofl.t.lJ' •liCJb.tly 
--
stnnql:r 
l l 
2 l 
3 l 
• l 
5 l 
• l 
7 l 
• l 
9 l 
10 
11 l 
12 l 
l3 l 
u l 
15 l 
16 l l 
17 l 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
21 l 
22 l 
23 l 
2• l 
25 l 
26 l 
ll l 
28 l 
29 1 
30 l 
31 l 
32 
33 l 
3' l 
l5 
36 l 
37 
38 
39 l 
(0 
TOU.l.• I,...._ l • 8 u • 0 
417 
Section 2. Question M. Japanese-American Sample. 
M. 
J-A stronqly disagree slightly slightly agree strongly 
1 1 
2 1 
3 1 
4 1 
5 1 
6 1 
7 l 
e 1 
9 1 
10 1 
l1 1 
12 1 
13 1 
14 1 
15 1 
16 1 
17 1 
18 l 
19 l 
20 l 
21 1 
22 1 
23 1 
24 
25 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 1 
29 1 
30 1 
31 1 
32 1 
33 1 
Total• I Ave 0 6 1 14 10 1 
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Section Three. 
Section 3. Question A. Japanese-American Sample. -
A. 
J-A 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
l l 
2 
3 l 
4 
5 
6 l 
7 l 
8 l 
9 l 
10 l 
11 l 
12 l 
13 1 
14 1 
15 1 
16 1 
17 1 
18 1 
19 l 
20 1 1 
21 l 
22 1 
23 l 
24 
25 1 
26 1 
27 1 
28 l 
29 1 
30 l 
31 1 
32 1 
33 
!'Otah I Avera. 10 9 0 9 1 
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Section 3. Question B. Japanese-American Sample. 
J-A 1. 2. 13. 4. 
1 l I 
2 I I 
I: 1 I I I I 
I 
I I 5 I 
6 I 1 I I 7 I 1 
I I 
I I I I 8 I 1 I I 9 I I 1 I I 
10 I I 1 I I I I 
11 I I 1 12 1 
. I 
114 
1 
15 1 
116 
1 I 
17 1 I I I 
1 ie I I l I 
119 I l I 
20 l l 
21 1 
22 1 
23 1 
24 I 
25 I l 
26 l I 
27 l 
28 l 
29 l I 
30 l I 
31 l I 
32 l 
I 33 
Totals I Avero. 2 14 11 2 
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Section 3. Question D. Japanese-American Sample. 
D. 
J-A l. 2. 13. 4. Is. 
I I 
2 I I 3 I l 
I I 
I I 
5 I I 6 I 
7 1 I I I I I 
1s I I l I 
1:0 
I I 1 I 
I 1 I I I I J 11 I 1 I 
I 12 I 1 I 
113 1 I 
I I 114 I 
15 1 I 
16 
17 
18 I I 
119 l I I 
20 l I I 21 
22 
I I l 
123 I 
I 24 
125 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
l 31 l 32 I l 33 
TO'tal• I Avera l 10 12 6 0 
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Section 3. Question E. Japanese-American Sample. 
f!. 
J-A I strongly I dinqree I slightly I slightly agree I strongly 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
119 I I 
20 1 
li1 
122 
23 I 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
TOtals I AYera 0 3 0 
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l 
l 
l 
1 
l 
1 
1 
1 
13 
I ' I I I I .. 
I I 
I 1 I 
I l I 
l I 
1 I 
I 
1 I 
I I I 
l 
l 
l 
11 
l 
1 
2 
I 
I 
Section 3. Question F. Japanese-American Sample. 
r. 
J-A 
1 I 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
20 
21 I 1 I I 22 I 1 I 23 1 124 I I I 
r5 I 1 26 1 I 
27 I l I 
28 I l 
29 l I 30 1 
31 1 I 
32 l I 33 1 
TOtal• I Mera 14 I 16 
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Section Four. 
Section 4. Question A. American Sample . 
... 
I: 
21 
l2 
23 
JO 
31 
32 
.. 
.. 
41 
nKal• I &.YWaqes 
l. 
58 
64 
53 
42 
57 
46 
Sl 
44 
46 
•• 
50 
.. 
40 
54 
31 
40 
39 
.. 
,, 
36 
47 
2. 
I\ 
I " 
I " 
I 35 
424 
3. 
I ..., I 
I f'111c<ionM '""'""""I j ~i:l41 diracta< I 
I d>a.lrman 
I I I ceo I matrnan I 
I sr. aanaqin9 dir~ 
I sup. strategic plJ ..., I 
I =ti= I I . . I I ., ............. ~ 
I emec:uUve 
I executive director 
I vp/directot ,1 
I vp planninq vice c:tuurnan 
I ,!". ealS'..11.tmt 
nuteqic pl 
seru.our vp - stra.t 
director stratevi 
vp ed. nanaoer 
I vp - strateqic vp - str&teqJ' I •en.lour vice prosi 
, ........ -~,. 
1 
vp stn.ta;ic 
I director - corps I assist vp .... ...._ 
I dir=~ ~a<at1 
I .. - strat..,ic pl4 
,
1 
directer - strat, 
partner I 
CU.rector - strateq 
I ex. asst. 
I 33 
4. 
4.0 
4.0 
~.o 
li.O 
16.0 
1.0 
4.0 
6.0 
5.0 
3.V 
4.0 
8.0 
4.0 
1.0 
s.o 
4.{I 
4.0 
3.5 
3.0 
4.0 
1.0 
4.0 
10.0 
5.0 
3.0 
3.0 
0.3 
6.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.V 
3.0 
1.0 
4.2 
Section 4. Question A. Japanese Sample. 
l ,, 
I' ,. 
Is 
16 ,, 
I. 
I:. 
I" j 12 
1
13 
H 
I,< 
,,: 
111 
, ,. 
1
19 
20 
1~: , .. 
I" , ,. 
1: 
I 21 
I 20 
I:: 
I" 
1
31 
33 
1
34 
3S 
, .. 
1: 
139 40 
l. 2. 
72 
42 
63 
;3 
•• 
32 
65 
II 
66 
52 
36 
42 
50 
425 
3. 
I I 
I I 
1 assuunt to ct>air I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I secre<U}' to presi I 
I I 
I I 
I .. d._ I 
I 
lomer.i ll'MI•= 
I 
I 
1-=·=·-·1 
I I 
.. 
2.0 
3.0 
1.0 
LS I 
2.0 
3.0 
4.0 
1.0 
7.0 
1.5 
1.0 
to.e 
.. I 
... I 
Section 4. Question A. Japanese-American Sample. 
:-.. 
IJA Ii. l2. 
J? 
12 
13 
50 
4 tiJ 
5 55 
6 38 
17 
1: 
47 
46 
10 40 
ll 47 
13 54 I 
114 
47 l 
15 45 I 
116 
I 59 I 
111 37 I 
18 I I 
I I 
19 32 I 
20 55 I 
21 I I 
22 I 50 I 
23 I I 
24 I 50 I I 
25 43 I 
26 45 I 
27 35 I I 
28 I I 
29 I 30 I 
30 I 33 I I I 
31 I 45 I 
32 33 
I 33 49 
~otals I Averages 45 I 
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.. 
m 
11 
lil 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
.. 
Ill 
m 
"' 
m 
m 
= 
26 
vice president 
qenero.l manager 
l
strateqic planner 
executive vice-pr 
planner 
I I I branch manaqer I 
I 
I 
general manaaer I 
general .,.114g~r pl 
senior manager I 
V"ice president 
branch planning 
general manager I 
vice president 
vice president 
qeneral. manager 
general manager 
exe<=11t1Ye vice pr 
planner 
strategy de\"elq;m 
...... p. 
finance manaqar 
joint general mar 
manager 
chi"f financial c 
24 
4. 
LC 
5.0 
11.0 
15.0 
2.0 
3.0 
4.0 
2.0 
3.0 
20.0 I 
5.0 I 
21.0 I I 
2.0 I 
I 
I 5.0 
I 
I 
2.0 I I 
I 
18.Q I 
I 4.0 
3.0 I 
2.Q 
I 
3.0 I 2.0 I 
l.O 
I 
1.0 
18.0 
6 I 
